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II ••• the nature of the people is variable,
and whilst it is easy to persuade them,
it is difficult to fix them in that
persuasion. And thus it is necessary
to take such measures that, when they
believe no longer, it may be possible
to make them believe by force."
Nicolo Machiavelli (1513)
-,..
liAs soon as there is no longer any social
class to be held in subjection, as soon
as class rule, and the individual struggle
for existence based upon the present anarchy
in production, vii th the collisions and
excesses arising from this struggle, are
removed, nothing more remains to be held
in subjection nothing necessitating a
special coercive force, a state.1I
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1917)
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FORMS OF POLICING AND THE
POLITICS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
This study examines the role and development of
contemporary policing within the context of the social,
political and economic conditions of late capitalism.
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I (FORMS
OF POLICING THE WORKING CLASS) seeks to provide histor-
ical illustration and analysis of the development of the
class role of the police under capitalism, its inherent
para-militarism and some of the key events and processes
which have determined its formal development. The
analysis examines the development of preventive policing
under early capitalism, and its transformation into reac-
tive forms of policing under late capitalism.
Part 2 (POLICING KNOWSLEY) centres on a study of
the contemporary events and processes underlying the
development and impact of reactive forms of policing
on Merseyside working class communities. It examines
the factors which have played key roles in shaping police
organisation and law enforcement policies at Force,
Divisional and Sub-Divisional levels.
These factors, such as the development of corporate
org~isation, the centralisation and expansion of forces,
the development of mobile patrols, deteriorating social
conditions, greater use of coercion, specialisation
in operations and administration, the introduction of
new communication and computer systems, and the reaction-
ary ideologies underlying the law enforcement policies
of senior police command, are given particular considera-
tion in relation to their development and impact on the
Knows1ey Borough area of r1erseyside.
Part 3 (THE POLl TICS OF LA1t1 ENFORCm·lENT IN THE
1980's) examines the extent of the political autonomy
of the police from central and local government. The
analysis develops firstly a study on police power and
privilege, centred on the inquest in Knowsley into the
death of James Kelly at Huyton Police Station. This is
then followed by analysis of the confrontations and
conciliations between Merseyside Police Committee and
the Chief Constable, arising out of 'K' Division
incidents of 1979 and the anti-police riots of 1981.
Central to the politics of law enforcement in the
1980's has been the development of new reactive forms
of policing the daily lives of working class communities,
and the formation of a nationally centralised and
politically autonomous para-military third ford.
Part 3 concludes by situa.ting these developments within
the wider social, political and economic conditions of
late capitalism in Britain.
INTRODUCTION:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LATE CAPITALISM: AN OVERVIEW
1. CORPORATE CAPITALISM
It is not my intention here to provide a
comprehensive and detailed analysis of contemporary
capitalism in Britain, but rather to present a brief
overview of the theoretical context-within which the
research and analysis contained within the subsequent
chapters of this work have been developed. In this
respect I will attempt to describe some of the essential
features and developments within contemporary capitalism
in ,Britain which directly relate to the issues raised
within this study, along with some of the key debates
concerning the class structure and role of the state
within the present period.
Since the late sixties and early seventies there
have been numerous attempts to find suitable concepts
with which to describe and analyse the political economy
of the post-war period. Many writers have viewed the
rise of corporate organisation and technology as
signalling some fundamental change in the nature of
capitalist SOCiety. For writers such as Galbraith,(l)
the fundamental features of capitalism, as originally
described by Marx and Engels, had been superceded in
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the post-war period by a 'managerial revolution' which
swept away the old class divisions between workers and
capitalists. For these writers, the all powerful
industrial capitalist had been replaced by professional
experts and the 'great entrepeneur' by anonymous boards
of directors. Scientific and technological developments,
it was argued, had shifted the terrain of the modern
political economy away from the anarchy of market forces
and towards rationality and planning, with control now
in the hands of professional managers with little or no
shareholdings in the big corporations.
This apparent separation of ownership and control
formed the basis of Galbraith's analysis of corporations,
where real power, he argued, had shifted from the owners
to the technostructure. (2)
The theorists of the managerial revolution argued
that as the large companies now had large numbers of
nominal owners, it had become impossi b'Le for so many
share-holders to exercise control, and thereby· they were
forced to delegate this power to paid professional
managers. As Galbraith argued:
"With growing size and complexity of operation,
smaller or more passive owners tend to lose
their power of decision. The number of stock-
holders usually increases; the share in the
voting power of each owner thus declines.
More important is the failure of knowledge.
Those who are not active in the management
of the enterprise have less and less knowledge
of what is happening ...... (3)
Other proponents of a 'new industrial state' argued
that corporations in the 1960s represented a transition
iii
from 'managerial capitalism' brought about by
increasing state intervention and regulation of the
economy. This position, promoted by Pahl and Winkler,
argued that corporatism was neither capitalism nor
SOCialism, but "an economic system of private ownership
and state contro1.,,(4)
All these positions shared the common assumption
that capitalism had been transformed into something new;
it was the beginnings of the new era of the 'soulful
corporation,(5)and the welfare state, all affectionately
embraced by the reassuring arms of the 'mixed economy'.
That significant and far reaching changes did take
place within capitalism during the sixties and seventies
is quite correct, but not so as to have fundamentally
transformed the class relations of capitalism; as the
course of events during the 1980s have shown, the 'new
capitalism has retained the same priorities as the old
one profit maximization and private capital accumu-
lation.
What did emerge during this p€riod however were
corporate managerial systems to control the giant multi-
national monopolies which experienced unprecedented
growth in the post-war period, as a result of
technological developments and lucrat~ve profits in the
armaments industries. (6)
It was not simply 'state intervention' which
attempted to plan and regulate capital. Monopoly
capital itself sought to expand its spheres of extended
iv
reproduction to exert greater control over its expand-
ing industrial empires and created extensive bureaucracies
under the centralised power of its corporate directors.
As Miliband and others(7)later showed in their
critiques of the 'managerial revolution' theorists, the
capitalist class still maintains its cohes~on and power
as a class through the system of 'interlocking director-
ShiPs.(8) Moreover, corporatism has not fundamentally
changed the structure of social relations between capital
and labour, and, of equal importance, the mechanisms of
social reproduction of the capital-labour relation have
also, despite new developments in form, continued to
play a crucial role in reproducing capitalism. In thi's
respect, the state has increasingly become vital to the
maintenance and regulation of .the capitalist. econo~ and
indeed has now become the largest consumer of private
industry in the post-war period. This expansion in the
role and importance of the state to the capitalist
economy has led some writers to argue that a fusion
between state and private capital has taken place.
This approach has been a hallmark of Stalinist accounts
of the recent development of \1estern capitalism, and
e~sentially reflects a basic lack of comprehension of
the political economy of the capitalist state. Under-
lying this position is a false theoretical contradiction
posed between the 'instrumentalism' and autonomy' of
the state in the stage of monopoly capitalism and a
failure to pinpoint the relation between the state and
capital.
v"State monopoly capitalism is imperialist capitalism
in the epoch of its general crisis and collapse,
when the fusion of the monopolies and the state
has become necessary for the extended reproduction
of monopoly capital and hence for the achievement
of new monopoly surplus profits."(9)
This line of analysis by the Soviet writer Victor
Cheprakov was criticised by Mandel in Late Capitalism as
symptomatic of Stalinist ideology in its abandonment of
Marxist dialectics:
"Cheprakov freely declares that every tendency
produces its counter-tendency, but at the same
time completely ignores the existence of any
main direction of development (determined by
the Inner logic of the contradictions of the
process in question). Thus while on the one
hand Cheprakov sees state monopoly capitalism
as the product of the inherent contradictions
of the capitalist mode of production, on the
other, he regards it as the reaction of monopoly
capitalism to a 'new relationship of forces'
(the international and domestic weakening of the
bourgeoisie and the strengthening of anti-capitalist
forces)."(lO)
Thus the 'state monopoly capitalism' theory becomes
a means for defending the Soviet line that the main social
contradiction in the contemporary world is not that between
capital and labour, but between the 'world camps' of
'capitalism and socialism,.(ll)
The central weakness in this analysis lies in its
methodological attempt to stitch together contradictory
tendencies of the phenominal appearances of the late capital-
ist state into a theoretical unity: ,
"Similarly, on the one hand' [state) mon~p~ly ca~i talism
-implies an organic fusion betwe-en the state "
apparatus and the monopolies, but it should not
be denied, on the other hand, that this same
apparatus possesses 'a cer~ain degree of autonomy'
and that there are 'contradictions' between it and
groups of monopoly capitalists."(12)
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Mandel's summary of Cheprakov's position
I Iillustrates this see-saw approach to analysing the
relation between the state and capital and can be
found in the works of Poulartzas and Althusser, for
whom the concept 'relative' autonomy resolved this
contradiction.
This theoretical weakness of Poulantzas and.
Althusser_wi th the (analytical.) contradiction between
'relative autonomy' and 'determination in the last
instance' arose from an attempt to re-construct Marxist
theory in a form which could avoid the accusations of
'economic reductionism' which had been levelled at the
distorted and vulgarised Marxism of Stalinism.
The flight from economic reductionism took the
neo-Stalinists not into Marxist theory however, but
into a form of structural functionalism more analytically
characteristic of bourgeois sociology, despite the
obvious political differences between the two schools.
Much of this theoretical failure resided with the attempts
of the Althussarian school to develop a concept of the
'relative autonomy' of the political form from the
economic in capitalism, but one in which the 'economic'
determines the 'political' in 'the last instance'.
Thus what Poulantzas and friends attempted to do was to
pose this contradictory problem of their own construction
in a dualistic way, and presented this as a theoretical
unity which resolved the problem of reductionism. As
Clarke has argued:
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"In following .Althusser in basing his critique
of dogmatist economism and evolutionism on the
bourgeois conception of production, and in
rejecting the 'problematic of the subject' for
an 'objectivist' account, Foulantzas, no doubt
quite unintentionally, also followed Althusser
in reproducing the theory of society developed
by structural functionalism, and above all by
Talcott Parsons. In Althusser's work the
Marzist elements are purely rhetorical." (:3)
The failure of Poulantzas and Althusser to resolve
their conceptual contradiction between 'relative auton-
omy' and 'determination in the last instance' created
serious theoretical weaknesses in their analyses which
could only lead to further contradictions and an excess-
ively mechanistic style in their social theory. For
example, in Political Fower and Social Classes, Poulantzas
attempted to clarify the meaning of 'determination in the
last instance' whilst at the same time attempting to avoid
a reductionist position:
"•••• the fact that the structure of the whole is
determined in the last instance by the economic
does not mean that the economic always holds
the dominant role in the structure."(l)
This is like saying 'it does - and it doesn't'. It is
a case of attempting to patch up a theory doomed at its
premise. They argue that 'the economic determines in
the last instance' and then argue that 'the last instance
never comes':
"The phrase 'in the last instance' does not
indicate that there will be some ultimate
time or ever was some starting-point when
the economic will be or was solely determin-
ant the other instances following it: "the
last instance never comes"; the structure is
always the co-presence of all its elements
and their relations of dominance and subordina-
tion - it is an "ever-pre-given structure. II(IS)
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The problem with their approach lies in their
narrow conception of the 'economic'. The Althussarians
failed to break with the Stalinist distortion of the
r~rxist economi9 conception of the social relations of
production ~§-_s~9-_upon a narrow concept of the economic as the
'technical realm' of material production. One consequence
of this approach has been the Stalinist line that the
productive forces are the p~imary motor-force of history.
One of the most concise and powerful critiques of
Poulantzas to have emerged, was a :'.paper .entitIed
'Marxism, Sociology and Poulantzas' Theory of the State'
by Simon Clarke. This· paper also made a major contribu-
tion in re-asserting the original and correct dialectical
formulations of Marx and Engels on the capitalist political
econo~. Criticising the 'technicist' view of production,
which originated with Stalin wia Plekhanov) and later
plagued the theoretical works of Poulantzas and Althusser,
Clarke re-establishes the concept of the totality of the
relations of production as social relations:
"These errors derive from the conception of
production on which dogmatism is based. It
is because the 'forces and relations. of
production' are seen as technical relations
of production and social relations of distri-
bution that the relation between them is seen
as a relation alternately of correspondence
and dislocation, and not a relation of contra-
diction. Hence the Marxist theory of history,
which is based on the contradiction inherent
in production in all class societies of being
production of use. values and production of
relations of domination (~ emphasis) is
turned into a metaphysical philosophy of history
in which the dialeetic is an external law of
history which governs the development of modes
of production in a fixed succession by govern-
ing the progressive development of the forces
of production which underlies it. Correspondingly,
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the separation of "forces and relations of
production", and consequent abolition of the
dialectical relation between the two, dictates
that the primacy of production takes the form
of an economistic, or a technicist, reductionism."(l6)
"For Marx, relations of production are inherently
social 'naturally arisen ••••••• historically
developed' 01arx 1973 p.485) relations. The
relations of production are not simply relations
of the immediate labour process, but are the
relations constituted by the valorisation process,
relations of a total process of social production,
whose development is governed by the law of value.
The relations of production are not distinct from
society, rather "the relations of production in
their totality constitute what are called social
relations, society, and specifically, a society
at a definite stage of historical development".
(Harx 1962a p.90). To take the relations of
production as the starting point of analysis is
not, therefore, to introduce a reductionism, for
the relations .of production are already social."(17)
It has been from this 'technicist position' described
by Clarke, that Poulantzas and others have attempted to
develop the theory of state monopoly capitalism as a
technical fusion of the monopolies and the state, whilst
arguing for 'a relative autonomy' of the political super-
structures. When Poulantzas referred to the 'economic' he
employed a narrow conception of economics as a technical
relation. Changes in the productive forces ~ create
changes in society, but these developments themselves can
only occur within the context of change within social
relations of production. It is not that the 'economic' -
or the immediate process of production 'determines in the
last instance' but that capital, as a social relation,
determines the political form of the state in a given
historical moment. This does not mean that the state is
the personal possession of the capitalist class a
simple instrument of domination nor can it be argued
xthat the state has a 'relative autonomy'. What it does
mean is this: that the political form of the state
arises from the character of the social relations of
production. Under the conditions of modern capitalism,
vast bureaucracies and new spheres of extended reproduc-
tion have been formed both within the realm of capitalist
production and within the state. At the forefront of
these developments have emerged the Corporate Directors
of private capital and the state, the modern structural
form of the ruling class.
At the other end of the class system, structural
changes have also taken place in the form and composition
of the working class and the petit bourgeoisie. What has
not changed, as we shall see, is the basic political-
economic derivation of the class system from the capital-
labour relation, and its dynamic
tion process.
the capital accumula-
2. CAPITAL AND LABOUR
This section will attempt to present the main
features of the capital-labour relation and class forma-
tions of corporate capitalism. However, before we develop
this analysis, a brief comment on bourgeois class theory
will be necessary to illustrate its superficial and
descriptive nature, as opposed to the analytical method
of Marxist theory. Whereas the latter is based upon a
dynamic and analytical concept of class relations, the
former exists as a mechanical tabulation in which
xi
arbitrarily selected indices can be inserted for categoris-
ing class positions. Bourgeois class theory, because it is
empirically descriptive in its premises, fails to compre-
hend and explain the nature of class society, how it
changes and why it changes. Multiple class structures
are taken as given,(18)they are viewed as fixed, eternal
and stratified.
By contrast, Marxist theory examines the processes
by which classes are historically formed and socially
reproduced. It shows how the class relations which compose
the social structure express the social relations of pro-
duction. The economic system is shown to be first and
foremost a social process within the totality of the
relations of production. In correct Marxist theory, the
economic form is the dominant sphere within capitalist
social relations. This does not mean that the 'economic'
exclusively determines all the other spheres (political,
ideological etc.) of capitalist society, as they are all
inter-dependent social relations; it is simply the most
dominant and pervasive. Contrary to Poulantzas' view as
discussed earlier, (p.vii ) the economic sphere ~ hold
the 'dominant role' in the social structure (except in
social revolution). To see this otherwise as a process
of 'determination' is reductionism. Marxist analysis is
concerned with the relations of domination which determine
the class system as a whole, where the economic is but one,
albeit the dominant social relation of capitalist produc-
tion and reproduction.
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The starting paint for most modern bourgeois
economic theory is that of the market and its operations.
This is because the commodity market is seen as a relation
between 'things', L, e. money, oil, gold, shares etc.,
rather than as a social relation between people
specifically groups of people. Thus the distribution
of revenues in bourgeois theory appears as natural
relations arising from fixed eternal relations of things,
i.e. the so-called 'factors of production', and thus
reveal a subsequent failure to identify the capitalist
system asa particular form (mode) of production ••••
" •••• of a special kind, with specific historical
features; that, like any other specific mode of
production, it presupposes a given level of the
social productive forces and their forms of
development as its historical precondition:
a precondition which is itself the historical
result and product of a preceding process, and
from whi.ch the new mode of production proceeds
as its given basis; that the production rela-
tions corresponding to this specific, historically
determined mode of production relations which
human beings enter into during the process of
social life, in the creation of their social
life possess a specific, historical and
transitory character; and, finally, that the
distribution relations essentially coincident
with these production relations are their opposite
side, so that both share the same historically
transi tory character. "(19)
It is only from this position that we can understand
the nature of the phenomenal character of revenues, such
as income, which has been widely used as an indice of
class location:
"In the study of distribution relations, the
·initial point of departure is the alleged
fact that the annual product is apportioned
among wages, profit and rent. But if so
expressed, it is a mis-statement. The product
is apportioned on one side to capital, on the
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other to revenue. One of these revenues, wages,
never itself assumes the form of revenue, revenue
of the labourer, until after it has first confron-
ted this labourer in the form of capital."(20)
It is from this process that the class relations of
capitalism emerge:
"The confrontation of produced conditions of labour
and of the products of labour generally, as capital,
with the direct producers implies from the outset a
definite social character of the material conditions
of labour in relation to the labourers, and thereby
a definite relationship into which they enter with
the owners of the means of production and among
themselves during production itself."(21)
Capitalist production holds two distinctive features;
it produces its products as commodities, to the extent
that being 'commodities is the dominant and determining
characteristic of its products. Produced by labour, the
commodity becomes a product of capital(22) - and labour
power a commodity. It is because the commodity possesses
a value as a product of labour, that, "the second dist1nc-
.tive feature of capitalist production is the production
of surplus-value as the direct aim and determining motive
of production. Capital produces essentially capital, and
does so only to the extent that it produces surplus value."
(23 )
It is only because labour takes the form of wage
labour, and the means of production the form of capital,
that a part of the value of products become realised as
surplus value when exchanged as commodities in the
capitalist market, and thus are capitalist revenues of
rent and profit derived. However a certain portion of
surplus value becomes transformed as additional means of
production,
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" •••• which are intended for the expansion of
reproduction, and which constitute a part of
this profit, present themselves as new additional
capital, and the expansion of the process of re-
production in general as a process of capitalist
accumulation."(24)
Although wage-labour is decisive for capitalist
production, it does not determine value:
" •••• it is a question of social labour-time in
general, the quantity of labour which society
generally has at its disposal, and whose relative
absorption by the various products determines, as
it were, their respective social importance. The
definite form in which the social labour-time
prevails as decisive in the determination of the
value of commodities is of course connected with
the form of labour as wage-labour and with the
corresponding form of the means of production
as capital, in so far as solely on this basis
does commodity-production become the general
form of production."(25)
Moreover, it is important to realise that not all
wage-labour is directly productive of surplus value •
.From this point it becomes necessary to clarify the
meaning and definition of productive and unproductive
labour, as it applied in Narx's analysis and as it applies
today.
The basic foundation of the Marxist conception of
productive labour, is that labour which directly produces
surplus value. Under capitalism, productive labour assumes
the specific form of wage-labour determined by the develop-
ment of capitalist commodity production as the dominant
mode of·production. It is from this position that consider-
ation must be given to the question - for whom is this
production 'productive'? And in considering the 'costs
of Circulation', for whom are these unproductive? The
solution·to these questions lies in the recognition of
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the 'standpoints' of social classes to the means of
production and reproduction. Marx argued that the 'costs
of circulation' (e.g. buying and selling, book-keeping)
were, from the standpoint of society as a whole unproduc-
tive, i.e. that these costs are specific to the capitalist
form of production - the costs of reproducing capitalist
markets, which would be transformed under socialist pro-
duction. However, Marx further emphasised that from the
standpoint of individual capitalists, these 'costs' could
become productive of value and thus surplus-value. This
is a very important point and underlines the key to under-
standing the dynamics of capital accumulation, i.e. that
surplus-value is realised, no t at the point of production,
but in the exchange of commodities:
" •••• all labour which adds value can also add
.surplus value, and will always add surplus-value
under capitalist production, as the value created
by labour depends onnthe amount of labour itself,
whereas the surplus-value created by it depends
on the extent to which the capitalist pays for it.
Consequently costs which enhance the price of a
commodity without adding to its use-value, which
therefore are to be classed as unproductive expenses
so far as society is concerned, may be a source of
enrichment to the individual capitalist."(26)
In other words, the ~productive costs' of labour involved
in circulation may, under certain conditions, increase
exchange value for specific sectors of capital. However,
from the ~tandpoint of society' the 'aggregate social
capital' these costs of circulation 'do not cease to
be unproductive in character'. (27)
In critically applying this analysis to late capital-
ism, it must be remembered that these were essentially
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Marx.'s observations of 19th Century capitalism and so
were subsequently formed within the general character
of social production at that time. And with this in
mind it is clear that in Marx's day many of the 'costs
of circulation' and the sphere of extended reproduction
in general were, from the standpoint of the working class,
unproductive of value. It was only when the demands for
social reform, welfare and education provision were
conceded by the ruling class, that some of these costs
assumed more of a collective aggregage use-value for the
working class. (28)
Through greater and greater division of labour and
mass production, the commodity has become more and more
a social product. Circulation·has become increasingly
capitalised and socialised as an extended reproductive
form of capital. Thus capital in the sphere of circula-
tion under late capitalism assumes a specific significance
as a form of reproductive capital.
The social relations of capital have now expanded
far beyond the immediate confines of commodity production.
Circulation has always been integral to capital and the
reproduction of the capitalmlation. However the scale
of capitalisation of circulation in the twentieth century
has meant that within this circuit (the 'noisy sphere of
circulation' has become ear-shattering) the social
relations of capital take specific forms distinct from
those of productive capital a.nd labour forms more complex
than simple 'unproductive' wage-labour. Social relations
within reproduction have been capitalised in a form
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unprecedented in the history of capitalism. 'Costs'
have effectively been transformed into capital for the
purposes of continued capital accumulation. However,
despite the vast expansion of both private and state
r.eproductive capital, the immediate sphere of production
still remains as the 'decisive phase,(29)in the general
relations of production to distribution, circulation and
exchange.
This does not mean, however, that the struggles of
state workers do not express the contradictions of the
capital-labour ~elation, as they remain integral to that
relation. A strike by rail workers can prove just as
disruptive to production and circulation as strikes by
private sector transport workers. In both cases labour
confronts capital in political struggle and thereby the
material interests of productive and reproductive workers
remain identical.
Under late capitalism, reproductive labour has a
much greater significance than in the days of laissez-
faire caPitalism.(30) Thus in the early days of capital-
ism, commodity production and productive labour over-
whelmingly and substantially formed the basis of wage-
labour. The reproductive forces of capital and the state
remained largelY peripheral and only expanded gradually
as obstacles in the path of accumulation became more
numerous with each wave of expansion. (31)
Thus the growth in importance of reproduction relates
classly to general developments within commodity production
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and circulation, class relations and the productive
forces. The rise of mass commodity production has
-entailed a corresponding expansion of capitalist
bureaucracies to handle the complexities of both mass
commodity production based upon increased specialisation
and division of labour (e.g. the parts that make up many
commodities now are manufactured allover the world) and
volatile, contracting markets. The rapid expansion of
automation and mechanisation released a large proportion
of wage-labour from the immediate process of production
for recruitment into these expanding bureaucracies of
capital and the state.
In Volume II of Capital, Marx considers in his
..
analysis of circulation the role of 'book-keeping' as
a wage-labour cost of circulation and predicted its
expansion with commodity production. Book-keeping is a
" •••• part of capital which is withdrawn from the
process of production and belongs in the costs of
circulation."(32)
However, Marx identified a crucial difference between
" •••• the costs incidental to book-keeping, or the
.unproductive expenditure of labour (my emphasis)
time on the one hand and those of 'mere' buying
and selling time on the other. The latter arises
only from the definite social form of the process
of production of commodities. Book-keeping, as
the control and ideal synthesis of this process
becomes the more necessary the more the process
assumes a social scale (my emphasis) (i.e. ever-
~eater and wider division of labour) and loses
{just as the traditional craftsmen had) its purely
individual character."(33)
'Accountancy' is now Big Business itself. The
modern day bureaucracies have become a necessary part of
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the reproduction of capitalist social relations. Indeed
~arx noted that it was the character of commodity produc-
tion which distinguished this 'cost' from previous
productive forms; its significance became greater as
capitalism developed:
"It is therefore more necessary in capitalist
production than in the scattered production
of handicraft and peasant economy, more
necessary in collective (i.e. socialist) (34)
production than in capitalist production.
Our analysis is here concerned with the regulation
and reproduction of commodity production within the
capitalist market, i.e. those spheres of reproduction
that assume their own specific social relations within
capital and which become more and more expanded as society
progresses through ever greater concentration of production
and development of the productive forces. In the stage 'of
late capitalism the reproductive forces almost equal the
productive forces in volume and size as the modern sphere
of circulation has expanded far beyond the quill pen of
the book-keeper. This is the age of the hi-tech computer-
ised accountancy agencies, which serve as a clear example
of capitalised reproduction under late capitalism.
Since the Second World War the rapid increase in the
forces of production of late capitalism witnessed the
'unprecedented fusion of science, technology and production. (35),
For Mandel, the essential feature of late capitalism which
distinguishes it from the previous stages of capitalism
has been the permeation of industrialisation beyond the
immediate sphere of commodity production:
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"Far from representing a 'post-industrial society',
-late capitalism thus constitutes ~eneralized,
universal industrialization for t e first time
in history. Mechanization, standardization,
over-specialization and parcelization of labour,
which in the past determined only the realm of
commodity production in actual industry, now
penetrate into all sectors of social life."(36)
Thus late capitalism is distinguished by the indus-
trialization of the sphere of reproduction. Just as
increased specialization and division of labour has made
redundant the 'all-round electrician' in production, so
too, as will be shown later, in the sphere of reproduction
has the impact of these factors increasingly made redundant
the all-round police constable and the fragmentation of the
preventive form of policing. These developments, coupled
with the changes in the capital relation, as illustrated
by the emergence of centralised corporate organization,
formed the basis for the capitalization of the sphere, of
reproduction:
"As long as 'capital' was relatively scarce, it
-normally concentrated on the direct production
of surplus-value in the traditional domains of
commodity production. But if capital is gradually
accumulated in increasingly abundant quantities,
and a substantial part of social capital no longer
achieves valorization at all, the new mass of
capital will penetrate more and more into areas
which are non-productive in the sense that they
do not create surpl.us value." (37)
As capital has expanded the sphere of circulation,
and more generally the sphere of reproduction, then the
character of this capital has become increasingly signifi-
cant. Late capitalism has been characterized by the
unprecedented expansion of reproductive capital. (38)
For Mandel, these movements have signified a shift in the
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'activity of capital':
"In the age of freely competitive capitalism,
this emphasis lay principally in the immediate
sphere of production, and in the age of class-
ical imperialism in the sphere of accumulation
(the dominance of finance capital); today, in
the age of late capitalism, it lies in the
sphere of reproduction." (39)
The movement of surplus capital from the saturated
sphere of commodity production (over-production) towards
the sphere of reproduction has significantly affected
the relationship between capital and the state and the
composition of social classes.(40)
For the state, this has meant a restructuring and
expansion of its reproductive forces, and as will be
shown later, the restructuring and expansion of the police
force to manage the crisis conditions of late capitalism,
and the subsequent transformation of its preventive forms,
has been a major feature of this process.
Reproductive capital is capital in the sphere of
reproduction. As well as including the immediate process
of production capital also embraces circulation. It is,
from circulation that exchange takes place - the process
in which products are realised as commodites, are consumed
and thereby complete the circuit of productive capital
through the realisation of surplus value.
Within this circuit, the socialrelations of capital
take specific forms distinct from productive capital.
These relations within the sphere of circulation, and
more generally that of the sphere of reproduction, are
reproductive of the relations of production. They
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reproduce the social forms and conditions essential to
the maintenance of the market system for capital accumu-
lation. The reproductive forms of capital now span the
whole spectrum of the capitalist political economy,
assuming forms today even more significant than that
which Marx identified in the late 19th Century. (41)
We have so far only examined productive and reproductive
labour under late capitalism. There remains however a third
category to be discussed, that of surplus labour. (42) This
concept is drawn from the original concept of the relative
surplus population, a concept used by Marx to describe the
unemployed sectors of the working class. Marx identified
three basic forms of surplus labour or population, these
being the floating, the latent and the stagnant. (43)
Floating surplus labour refers to the armies of
casual labourers who regularly move in and out of employment,
depending on the movements of capital. The latent surplus
(or reserve army) labour refers to the potential recruit-
ment of new labour from non-industrial spheres (such as
agricultural labourers). The third form stagnant
surplus labour refers to the residual, expanding army
of permanent and long-term unemployed recruited from the
,decaying branches of industry', its lowest 'sediment' ,
containing the pauperized working class. (44)
Byrne and Parson make the crucial point in applying
these concepts to contemporary capitalism that, concerning
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the surplus population, there is 'nothing new about
.this group,.(45) In the 19th Century they were described
as the 'dangerous classes' by the bourgeoisie.
As with productive and reproductive labour, surplus
labour is a further division of labour determined by its
relationship to the means of production. Marx described
its role within the relations of production:
"The mass of social wealth, overflowing with the
advance of accumulation and capable of being
transformed into additional capital, thrusts
itself into old branches of production, whose
market suddenly expands, or into newly formed
branches, such as railways etc., which now
become necessary as a result of the further
development of the old branches. In all such
cases, there must exist the possibility of
suddenly throwing great masses of men into the
decisive areas without doing any damage to the
scale of production in other spheres. The
surplus population suppl~es these masses."(46)
The massive expansion of surplus labour in recent years
has highlighted the crisis conditions of late capitalism.
The major significant aspect of this growth has been the
increase in the size of permanent surplus labour. This
has been crucial to the political economy of late capital-
ism, given that capital accumulation requires ever
gr~ater reserves of surplus labour.(47) The problem is,
that whilst the late capitalist state has continually
created this surplus through monetary policy and adjusted
its focus to contain and,reproduce this surplus labour,
the absorption of the surplus has diminished leaving
ever enlarging ghettos of permanent surplus labour. (48)
The post-war boom which swelled the ranks of product-
ive and reproductive labour had, by the end of the 1960s,
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fizzled out. By the late 1970s significant sections
of the working class were left de-skilled, over-skilled
and over-educated for the shrinking labour market. This
downward squeeze in the ranks of labour, coupled with
the onslaught of regional industrial decline, has swelled
the numbers of the permanent surplus labour force.
Writing in the late 1970s Mandel identified the
socio-economic character of these new recruits to the
industrial reserve army:
"In order to reconstruct the industrial reserve
army of labour during the long post-war expansion,
capital had incorporated a great number of married
women, youth and immigrant workers from ,less
industrialized countries into the mass of actual
or potential wage earners. These categories were
in general poorly paid, restricted to unskilled
and/or ynhealthy spheres of activity, and employed
only marginally. They were thus vulnerable to
easy and massive expUlsion from the process of
production as soon as a fundamental reversal of
the industrial cycle occurred. It is therefore
not at all astonishing that such an expUlsion
did indeed take place on a grand scale d~ing
the 1974-75 recession. The unemployment rate
is consequently much higher among these three
sectors of the proletariat than among male, adult,
indigenous white and blue-collar workers~'(49)
This latter point is, however, less applicable to the
social conditions of the mid-late 1980s, given the
regional contraction of manufacturing industry inflating
the scale of redundancies.
We have so far examined the structural economic
relationships of productive, reproductive and surplus
labour to the means of production and reproduction under
late capitalism. However, as we shall see, the process
of class formation is more complex than that of a simple
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outcome of the division of labour or the distribution
of revenues.
3. CLASS FORf·'lATION
In his work on class determination, Poulantzas
played a key role in re-establishing the correct Marxist
approach to this'central issue and establishing the
critique of those Marxists who had come to confuse
distribution relations and production relations resulting
in class analyses based upon revenue distribution. As
Poulantzas argued: 'Marx's criterion is the objective
place in production and the ownership of the means of
production'.(SO) Harx himself specifically took up this
.".distinction in method in the final pages of Capital Vol.III:
"Let us moreover consider the so-called distri-
,bution relations themselves. The wage pre-
supposes wage-labour and profit-capital. These
definite forms of distinction thus pre-suppose
definite social characteristics of production
conditions, and definite social relations of
production agents. The specific distribution
relations are thus merely the expression of the
specific historical production relations.It(Sl)
Thus social classes are primarily determined not
by income distribution as such, or other notions such
as status or ideology, but ,by their relationship to the
means of production. However, in attempting to apply
this basic tenet of Marxist theory, Poulantzas failed to
grasp the social character of capitalist production and
thereby, in his analysis of class determination, made a
sharp descent into economic reductionism.
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For Poulantzas, the working class were principally
determined by their relation to the immediate process
of production the creation of surplus value at the
point of production. For Poulantzas the working class
was restricted to productive labourers and therefore
the distinction between productive and 'non-productive'
labour was essential in determining the boundary of the
working class. Those engaged in 'non-productive' work
were deemed to be the 'new petty bourgeoisie'.
In his critique of the bourgeois classical economists,
Marx argued against the tendency to see production
relations as fixed and external. Marx makes the following
point, which could well be critically applied to Poulantzas'
confusion of 'social production with the simple labour
process':
Poulantzas also lost sight of production as a social
process and in this quotation from Marx we are provided
with an important key to understanding class determina-
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tion under capitalism, particularly as under the social
conditions of late capitalism it becomes increasingly
clear that classes are determined by their relationship
to both the means of production and reproduction. It is
from this approach that we can begin to discern the
'boundaries' of class determination.
For Marx, capitalist production was a social process
of both production and reproduction. Capitalism "produces
not merely the material products, but reproduces continu-
ally the production relations in which the former are
produced, and thereby also the corresponding distribution
relations.,,(53) It is this crucial point which has to be
understood before class determination can be considered.
At first glance, it appears that the distribution
of revenues wages, rent and profits forms the
basis of class formation under capitalism. However as
we have shown, distribution is merely the outcome of the
relations of capitalist production the source of
revenues. The reason why revenue is mistakenly seen
as constituting class is the same as the reason why
"•••• surplus value contained in commodities seems not
merely to be realised in the circulation, but actually
to arise from it.,,(54)
Capital circulation is essentially "a metamorphosis
of forms.n(55) In each of these forms the capital-wage-
labour relation assumes specific forms, either productive
or reproductive of surplus value. But this relation alone
does not , exclusively in itself, determine the c'lass
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formations of capitalist society. Classes are formed
-theby more than just~relationship of individuals to the
means of production. They are groups of people formed
in capitalist production and reproduction with common
and opposing interests that have arisen in their relation
to the means of production. Class formation is therefore
a question of ownership and control of the means of
production and reproduction. The clash of opposing
interests arising from the contradictions of ownership
and control form the political struggles of classes.
Thus, it can be seen that what binds the capitalists
" ." )(be they owners of vinyards, f~sheries etc. together ~
a class, is their common material interests in production
and reproduction interests derived from their owner-
ship and control of the means of production, making them
the most powerful force within the ruling class.
Economic relations alone are an insufficient
determinant of class constitution. We have examined the
contradiqtions of productive and unproductive labour as
a determinant, and the contradictions of revenue (or
'income') as a determinant. These relations do have a
considerable role in the determination of classes. -
but not in isolation of the political. This is because
the contradictions in the material interests of wage-
labour and capital are simultaneously economic and polit-
ical. It is these contradictions which form the boundaries
distinguishing the working class, middle class and ruling
class:
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"The separate individuals form a class only
insofar as they have t 0 carry on a common
battle against another class; otherwise they
are on hostile terms with each other as
competitors. On the other hand, the class
in its turn achieves an independent existence
over against the individuals, so that the
latter find their conditions of existence
predestined, and hence have their position
in life and their personal development
aSSigned to them by their class, become
subsumed under it."(56)
Class location is therefore a question of political
economy, i.e. their relationship to the means of produc-
tion and reproduction, and the material interests gener-
ated by those relations.
If follows from this that for membership of the
Ruling Class the 'economic', although the most powerful
determinant, is not an exclusive determinant, as member-
ship may be based on political power,indirectly founded
on the capital relation, in the control of the means of
production and/or reproduction. Furthermore, this power
,
is continually maintained (i.e. their material ~nterests)
by the constant pressure to .maintainand reproduce:
capitalist production. Thus the political rule (and
modest incomes) of judges, generals and chief constables
can only be maintained through the continued political
and economic subordination of the working class to capital.
The material interests of these agents (judges etc.) coincides
with those of the capitalists. These agents of the state
represent the political personification of capital (as
forces of reproduction) within the class struggle. Thus
membership of the ruling class is determined not exclusively~by. -,._ -~-..,--
individual accumulated wealth, but also by political power
-----------------_
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and control over the means of production and reproduction.
v/ealth in this respect pre-supposes social relations of
political power; it is a form of political power. The
fact that the most powerful (the capitalist class) are
the wealthiest, does not mean that the ruling class is
exclusively comprised of millionaires, although numerically
most of them are.
The process of class formation is one in which the
opposition of material interests at the specific level of
the economy form an integral part of a wider political
struggle. Marx made this point clear in his correspondence
with F. Botte, a leader of the American Labour Movement:
"On the other hand, however, every movement in which
the working class comes out as a class against the
ruling classes and tries to coerce them by pressure
from without is a political movement. For instance,
the attempt in a particular factory or even in a
particular trade to force a shorter working day out
of individual capitalists by strikes etc., is a
purely economic movement. On the other hand the
movement to force through an eight-hour, etc., ~,
is a political movement, that is to say, a movement
of the class, with the object of enforcing its
interests in a general form, in a form possessing
general, socially coercive force.tI(57)
It is in this context that class formation is deter-
mined by both the economic and political relations of
capital. Classes therefore express the strud.ture of
the social relations of capitalism, so that society 1s
broadly divided into a numerically large group of wage-
labour, which does not own or control the means of
production and reproduction, and a numerically small
group of owners and controllers of the means of produc-
tion and reproduction, who form the ruling class.
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The essential condition for the existence of the
ruling class is the formation and augmentation of capital;
the condition for capital is wage-labour. Wage-labour
rests exclusively on competition between the labourers. (58)
Hence the material interests of the ruling class lie in
the continued promotion of competition and conflict
within the working class. Racism, nationalism and sexism
~ve, in this respect, been the most insidious devices of
capital for dividing the working class in both economic
and political spheres. For capital, control of tpe means
of production and reproduction means control of the
working class, not just their work, but in the whole of
their daily lives. Corporatism has developed the means
of control of labour and the commodities it produces into
vast bureaucracies which free the ruling class from the
minor detail of production and reproduction. At the lower
end of the corporate bure~racies of capital and the state
stand the reproductive wage-labourers of the working class.
It is here that we find the clerks, office cleaners, typists,
VDU operators, security personnel etc. At the upper end of
uthe corporate bureafracies sit the petty bourgeoisie, the
intermediary class between the working class and the ruling
class the middle class. Whilst this class receive
revenue in the form of wages, they perform neither produc-
tive nor reproductive labour their role is the manage-
ment of wage-labour. Hence the most important fact which
separates the middle class from the working class is that
their role is primarily a capitalist one; the devising of
new forms of work, of control and of surveillance. (59)
xxxii
Their location within the relations of production and
reproduction is quite clear. As Carchedi argued:
"These agents, then, do not own the means of
production and yet perform the global function
of capital; they perform collectively. in a
hierarchical structure, and in new forms, what
used to be the function of the individual
capitalist."(60)
This process is most clearly seen in the modern
capitalist corporation where, as discussed earlier,
teams of managerial functionaries regulate and control
production on behalf of the corporate bourgeoisie, for
whom corporatism has created new heights of wealth and
power. Similar processes have also been at work within
the reproductive forces of the state. Just as the produc-
tive labour of private capital is shadowed by the reproduc-
tive labour of the state, so the middle class of labour
management in private companies have their counterparts
in the state. At the helm of both sectors stand the ruling
class who's membership is not exclusively determined
by'individualjaccumulated wealth(6l)but also by the
political' power (corporate power) which accrues frum their
relation to the capital accumulation process as a whole.
4. STATE FOR~~TION AND T}ffiCLASS STRUGGLE
The State is also not determined exclusively by the
'economic' as such, because, as has been previously
argued, the capital-labour relation is, in its totality,
a social relation, of which the 'economic' comprises the
immediate dynamic of the capital accumulation process.
The inherent, endemic contradiction between capital and
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labour, generated by the capital accumulation process,
becomes manifest as political struggle the power
struggle between the contending classes; the class
struggle. (62)
It follows therefore, from this analysis, that the
form of state is determined by the stage of development
of the capital accumulation process and the character of
the political struggle between social classes at a given
historical moment. In this respect, the state must be
understood as a particular class form of the capital
relation, i.e. of an historically specific form of class
domination. (63) As Holloway and Picciotto have argued:
ft •••• the forms of state are re-established,
.supplemented or reformed as part of the process
of containment of the new contradictions created
by the new stage of development of capital, to
re-create or re-compose the capital relation in
new forms."(64) .
In this analysis there is no room for contradictory and
diversionary concepts such as relative autonomy. To say
the capitalist state is relatively autonomous from capital
is like saying it can be relatively autonomous from itself.
The state is the political form of the capital-labour
relation; a class relation in which capital is the domin-
ant, controlling, political power. In this respect, the
political form of the capitalist state ls determined by
the relative balance of political forces of the contending
classes at particular phases of the class struggle. It is
these dynamics that determine the form of state which
mediates the class struggle and reproduces the social
conditions necessary for capital accumulation.
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Thus the form of state is determined, not by
ambiguous notions of determination by the economy 'in the
last instance', but by the political economy of the
capital accumulation process as a whole.
There is, however, the question of regimes. A regime
must not be confused with the state-form. Regimes may
come and go whilst a state-form may maintain its essential
characteristics over long periods of history. For example,
the post-war British liberal regime and the later reaction-
ary monetarist regime in Britain both span a period domina-
ted by the state-form of bourgeois democracy. Nonetarism
and'its development within late capitalism has however
provided strong indications of movement towards a transfor-
mation of state-form. In different periods of history,
transformations of state-form have also occurred simul-
taneously with changes in regime. Fascist and military
coups are perhaps the most clear examples of this. It is
when changes in regime and state-form coincide directly
that reaction becomes rampant, unleashing in its wake a
reign of terror against the working class. These transfor-
mations are the crisis points in the political and economic
oscillations of the capital accumulation process, and
represent the more pathological aspects of the state's
role in guaranteeing the maintenance and reproduction of
accumulation at any cost.
To control class struggle and reproduce bourgeois
power, the state has to maintain and reproduce conditions
for capital accumulation. As the crisis of late capitalism
increasingly shows, no matter what form the state assumes,
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it is proving historically less and less able to perform
this role effectively, despite the unprecedented expan-
sion of the forces of the state in the post-war period.
The state of late capitalism began with the rise of
fascism and the Second \'1orld\var, which generated a
significant 'increase in the rate of surplus value. (65),
,~Although during the recent~period growth in the organic composi
'. .---,- I -. "_ • •
tion of capital has bee~:significantly slower (i.e. through
reduction in the costs of elements of constant capital
via increased mass production)(66)it does not mean, as
Wright has argued, that lithepivotal contradictions of
the accumulatio? process have shifted from the rising
organic composition of capital to an incipient politiciza-
tion of the accumulation process through state intervention
at the level of production. II (67) Rather, the contradic-
tions of accumulation have broadened through state
intervention. This has not necessarily meant a
'politicizing' of the accumulation process, as if somehow
accumulation has been exclusively an economic process and
divorced from politics. However, it has meant, as Wright
indicates, a significant expansion of state involvement
in the accumulation process:
"•••• political criteria will become more and more
central to production itself."(6S)
although it may be more accurate to say that it is
becoming more apparent, i.e. a shift to the foreground
of political economy as the state moves to desperately
hold together a fragmenting and decaying capitalism.
This process is quite clear in the rise of monetarism,
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which displays even more(state intervention~ in the
economy than Keynsianism did. Privatisation, for example,
despite its archaic and simplistic free market laissez-
faire rhetoric (a reactionary irrationality to evoke
emotional sympathy rather than reason similar to
'national socialism') seeks to obscure the expansion
of the political role of the state in the sphere of
reproduction, i.e. expansion of the forces of the state
especially the coercive forces. Let us make no mistake
about it this is the era of 'high tech', contradicted
by shrinking outlets for investment, and nervous markets.
The state has become more and more vital to capital both
Simultaneously as a sphere of capital investment, as a
consumer of capitalist commodities and as an investor in
private capital. (69)
This is the other side of the dialectic of state
and capital which Wright neglects in concentrating
exclusively on 'state intervention'. It is true, as
Wright states, that the state plays 'an important role
in indirectly expanding surplus value and accumulation'
and that 'many state expenditures have the effect of
reducing the reproduction costs of labour power,f70)
But there is also the expansion of capital accumulation
by the state itself as part of the general expansion of
the spheres of extended reproduction. (71)
It is because Wright misses this process the
economic, political and ideological impact on the state
of the permeation of its form by the capital accumulation
process, 'that he sees state workers as unproductive
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workers and gives guarded support to the out-moded
argument that 'state workers live off the exploitation
of productive workers'. (72) Even though Wright recognises
that, "expanded reproduction constitutes the situation in
which at least part of the surplus value is used to augment
the level of constant and vanable capital in production",
and that "expanded reproduction (consists) of the accumu-
. (73)lation of both constant capital and vanable capital"
he remains within 'unproductive' terms of reference.
The crucial point is that such labour in the sphere of
reproduction under corporate capitalism is more than
simply 'unproductive' of surplus value; it is reproductive
reproductive labour. It is now not just a simple 'deduc-
tion,(74)from surplus value, but of vital economic
necessity to the realisation of surplus value, even
though it is not immediately located at the point of
commodi ty production. Thus in the same vein, Wright
sees the state as simply unproductive(75)but agrees with
O'Connor(76)that the state plays an important role in
indirectly (his emphasis) expanding surplus value and
accumulation. Many state expenditures have the effect
of reducing the reproduction costs of labour power •• ••
(and) •••• have the effect of increasing the level of
(77)productivity of capital as a whole.... • How then
can the 'unproductive' labour of state workers be a
simple deduction from surplus value? The problem lies
with the unsatisfactory application of the concepts of
'unproductive labour' and 'unproductive capital,(78)to
the social relations of corporate capitalism.
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The concepts of productive and unproductive labour
originated not with Marx, but in classical political
economy (see Marx's Theories of Surplus Value Vol.I
for his critique of Adam Smith's use of these concepts).
These concepts were, used to describe the character and
forms of labour under .nascent capitalism.
Today, in the age of hi-tech, capital intensive
mass production and communication systems, the production
of commodities and the realisation of surplus value, has
necessitated the development of the state itself as a
sphere of extended reproduction to contend with the various
exigencies of crisis within the capitalist market system.
The concepts of 'unproductive labour' and 'unproductive
capital' prove inadequate for understanding the process
by which the immediate process of capital production has
become totally dependent on spheres of reproduction which
are not directly operative in the circuit of productive
capital. These spheres can be more accurately concept-
ualised as 'reproductive labour' and 'reproductive capital'.
Vie have seen that the political economy of late
capitalism is essentially that of corporate capitalism.
The term 'late capitalism' must, as Handel reminds us,
be used with caution, as this is a chronological term,
rather than analytical. It must be stressed that 'late
capitalism' is 'not a new epoch of capitalist development.
It is merely a further development of the imperialist,
~onopoly-capitalist epoch,(79) - i.e. the corporate
phase of monopoly capitalism.
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Corporate capitalism, whilst pushed into the future
by the social development of the productive and repro-
ductive forces, is also simultaneously being dragged
into the past, genealogically uprooting its ancestors
and their ideologies in a desperate attempt to reincar-
nate the morality and ethics of the mystical days of
competitive capitalism. Thus we have ••••
"The peculiar combination of market anarchy and
state interventionism is thus faithfully reflected
in the practices of late capitalist corporations:
they both seek to keep their own taxes as low as
possible, and expect the state to supply higher
contracts, subsidies and guaranteed profits, which
presuppose a rapid growth in state revenues. This
ambivalent relationship to the state permeates the
whole of late capitalist society. It reproduces
forms of conduct, thought and morality typical of
a pre- or early capitalist society, to bolster the
valorization of capital in .an over-ripe society ofcommodity production."(80)
These developments have characterized the whole
reactionary ethos of the Thatcher regime in the 1980s.
The eclipse of liberal democracy in the late seventies
became systemized and codified in the reactionary politics
of the following decade. Liberal social democracy, which
attempted to both serve capital and represent the working
class(81)saw its hegemonic forms fragment and later
shatter on the indissoluble rock of class contradictions,
sharpened by the crisis of capital accumulation. The
road to mass unemployment, the expansion of permanent
surplus labour and privatisation of state productive and
reproductive capital became the path of salvation for
capital accumulation. Here the Thatcher leadership
(guided by the prophets of God) propelled itself on
petty bourgeois chauvinism to political power by
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"attempting to represent capital (anachronistically,
but no less effectively) in the 'venerable disguise
and borrowed language', the 'names, slogans and costumes'
of a disappearing class faction the small shopkeel'er!lt
(82)
JvIonetaristpolicies have not had as their objective
the material interests of the petty bourgeoisie, despite
the endless and boring platitudes concerning the needs
of the small businessman. The "wheels of socialism"
have been "rolled back" on these as well as the working
class. The crafty equation of a floundering liberal
democracy with 'socialism', legitimated the coercive
reaction against the organisations of the working class
which had purportedly bolstered up 'extravagance' and
'waste' to the detriment of the 'rate-payer' and 'tax payer'.
"The main objective of bourgeois economic policy
is no longer to dismantle social antagonisms but
to unload the costs of improving the competitive
struggle of each national capitalist industry
onto the wage earners employed in it. The myth
of permanent full employment fades away. What
political integration and seduction have failed to
achieve is now to be accomplished by the reconstruc-
tion of the industrial reserve army, and the cancel-
lation of the democratic freedoms of the workers'
movement (among other things, state repression of
strikes and the right to strike) ."(83)
These movements, however, represent more than a
change of regime, although they do reflect the common
political characteristic of all capitalist states; that
of "disorganising the working class whilst simultaneously
organising the bourgeoisie." (84) \'/hatis crucial is that
these movements represent a shift in the form of the
capitalist state in Britain towards a new formation.
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Given the movement of state-form, it would however
be wrong to assume that the working class (and its
organisations) has sat back and allowed itself to be
dismantled without resistance. Indeed the 1980s have
been marked by a whole series of struggles by different
sections of the working class to defend its interests
against state repression. The restructuring of the
reproductive forces of the state has, over this period,
meant a steady shift instate capital and resources from
welfare to coercion, to police the struggles of the
working class. These movements in state form have, in
this respect, become manifest in the changing forms of
policing and law enforcement policy in Britain. These
have now become central issues of controversy and debate.
This study will demonstrate the class politics at the
heart of these issues.
PART I
FORMS OF POLICING THE WORKING CLASS
- 1-
I) CLASS STRUGGLE AND THE ROLE OF THE POLICE
All class societies have, in their historical
formations, established and evolved various forms of
state embodying the ideological and coercive forces
of the ruling class. In the revolutionary transition
from feudalism to capitalism, the capitalist class
achieved state power through the subordination of land
to capital, and through this process land accumulation
was superceded by capital accumulation as the reproduc-
tive mechanism of class society.
In these transformations the capitalist state was
forged from the contradictions of the new social
relations of production, to maintain and reproduce
social conditions appropriate to capital accumulation
through containment of the class contradictions of
capitalism. (I)
In Britain the rise of the industrial bourgeoisie
and new class relations of labour and capital from the
second half of the 18th century into the 19th century
saw the final completion of the transition from feudalism
to capitalism, and the consolidation of the capitalist
state within bourgeois democracy. In responding to the
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changing contradictions of capitalism as it progressed
into the 20th century, the capitalist state was expanded
and reformed, whilst interventionist policies later
replaced 'laisez faire' policies,which had become fetters
on monopolistic expansion. The class struggle assumed"
new forms at each stage in the development of capitalism)
and avenues of state mediation expanded into all aspects
of social relations, seeking to contain the class struggle
within a bourgeois hegemonic framework. However, whilst
universal suffrage ,gave.· the working class a degree
of popular political expression on matters of state policy,
"1 ( .. .
most of the agencies of the capitalist state have·never 'been
controlled by elected officials, but by non-elected
functionariesj' hierarchically structured in terms
of recruitment and position as a political extension of
the class structure they serve to maintain and reproduce.
Contradictions within the capitalist state have
tended to express the wider contradictions in capitalist
society as a whole. During recession when welfare pro-
grammes are cut back to finance increased spending on,
and expansion of, the more coercive forces of the state,
agencies such as the police, courts, prisons and armed
forces have extended and expanded their spheres of state
power, as the reproduction of capitalism demands more new
and extensive forms of political containment of class
contradictions. Therefore, with the role of maintaining
and reproducing conditions for capital accumulation, the
capitalist state has been faced with the contradiction
between the necessity to reproduce the social divisions
of capitalism, whilst at the same time attempting to
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contain the social consequences of a class-divided society.
Therefore the role of the police in this context has been
primarily that of enforcing the class, racial, sexual and
cultural divisions that have been integral to the develop-
ment of capitalism, (2)i.e. divisions which are essential
for the reproduction of the social, political and economic
relations of capitalist society the maintenance of
conditions for capital accumulation:
"All social institutions combine to serve various
aspects of this capital accumulation function.
The police, however, serve as the front line
mechanism of repression. As such, the central
function of the police is to control the working
class." (3)
The primary role of the police, then, is the control
of the working class, and in this respect policing has
formed an integral component of the relations of capital-
ist production. Changes in the relations of production
have in this respect historically characterised the formal
development of policing and consequently forms of policing
and developments in law enforcement policy have expressed
the contradictions of class society.
2) PREVENTIVE POLICING
-r Ideology
"The mode of production of material life conditions
the general process of social, political and
intellectual life.ll (4) (Marx, 1859)
During transitionary social formations, such as that
of Eighteenth century England, new modes of production
arise from and compete and conflict alongside traditional
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ones. In such conditions, where the class interests of
Land and Capital competed for political power, conflict
also emerged between old and'new ideologies expressing
old and new material interests.
Revolutionary developments in productive forces,
population expansion and changing class relationships led
to a breakdown in traditional local-based systems of law-
enforcement and order-maintenance with the emergence of
masses of expropriated agricultural workers:
"Some historians have suggested that 'urban
alienation' accounts for London disorder and
crime in the eighteenth century. It may be
more correct to say that the instruments of
control there were weaker, in part because
the class relationships that fostered deference
were."(S)
~ ruling class organises its power
in the state, (6)and for the first half of the eighteenth
century class ,struggle took place within the ruling class
itself as conflicting interests competed for political
power and control of the state. In this process the state
itself was trans formed as the contradictory poli t'ical and
ideological demands of landed, merchant, and later indus-
trial capitalist interests competed for domination of
state policy and practice.
With the breakdown of traditional means of controlling
the labouring classes in the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries, the landlord class sought to
reinforce their ideological conceptions of social order by
\
introd~cing severe penalties for both light and serious
law-breaking. with the growth of private property there
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corresponded a significant growth in property crime as
markets expanded in domestic production and trade. In
reaction to the increase of theft of goods the death
penalty was extended to sanction petty theft offences.
Three quarters of all executions during the eighteenth
century were for offences against property.(7)
At the beginning of the eighteenth century the threat
of the 'dangerous classes' in London held little fear for
the ruling Landlord Class buried in their shire estates;
it was the middle classes in the towns and cities who had
most to fear for their property from the 'submerged popu-
lation', as Charles Reith described the labouring poor of
early eighteenth century London. Reith declares:
"From them came the menace of Crime, and the
menace of Mob Disorder, with increasing intensity
which fifty years later began to be recognised as
a threat to the foundations of public order and
even to the existence of authority."(8)
Reith's comment raises the question: 'Whose authority?'
Reith failed to address himself to this question because
to identify the 'authority' he spoke of as class authority
would undermine the universalism of bourgeois ideology.
within the midst of the 'Crime' and 'Mob Disorder'
of eighteenth century London, Reith saw the birth of
bourgeois authority in the career of Henry Fielding:
IIFielding's short career as a magistrate offers
a convenient starting-point for the story of
authority's struggle not only on account of
the recognition of crime as a serious menace
:to the state, which occurred at that time,
but also because it coincided with certain
manifestations of mob disorder which gave
point to Fielding's warnings.II(9)
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Henry Fielding was a pioneer of the new bourgeois
morality and ideology of the rising middle class in the
eighteenth century)which contrasted sharply with the
complacency of the aristocracy and gentry. For the
Landowners, the eighteenth century "remained a golden
age of power, privilege and increasing wealth." (IO)
However, the middle class were expanding and it was later
from these ranks that industrial capitalists such as Watt,
wedgewood, "Arkwright and Peel came." (11)
For the rising bourgeoisie the solutions to the
growth of property crime and disorder lay not in increased
sanctions but in moral reform of the working class. For
the new bourgeoisie it was the 'immorality' of the working
class which lay at the source of crime and disorder. This
ideological conception became concrete in the social and
political development of the nineteenth century, reflect-
ing the material interests of the middle class and, in
its early stages, found expression in the creation of
morality societies in late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century Britain. Some of these societies acted as volun-
tary police safeguarding bourgeois property, others
concentrated on attacking the leisure activities of the
working class. For the bourgeoisie, their morality
-,..
expressed a universalist spirit - an ideological force -
the essence of which rested within economic relations:
"The reflection of 'economic relations as legal
principles is necessarily also a topsy-turvy one:
it goes on without the person who is acting being
conscious of it: the jurist imagines he is operat-
'ing with a priori propositions, whereas they are
really only economic reflexes, so everything is
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upside down •••• this inversion, which so long
as it remains unrecognised, formswhat we call
ideological outlook."(12) ,
This analysis by Engels can be applied, to some
extent, to the ideas and actions of Henry Fielding.
In 1753 Henry Fielding set up the 'Bow street Runners' -
a small firm of private detectives. This was later
expanded by his brother, John Fielding, who was also a
magistrate. Both Fielding brothers held strong ideolog-
ical commitments to the new bourgeois morality. For
these early advocates of bourgeois culture, the working
class was seen as possessed of over-indulgence, bad manners
and immorality, which apart from seriously diminishing
their chances of salvation was also perceived as incompat-
ible to the needs of production; the working class existed
simply for the creation of wealth for the property owning
classes. The immorality of the working class threatened
the fabric of social production. However, the Fieldings
were careful not to apply their moral standards to the
gluttony of the nobility and aristocracy:
.. 'In diversions, as in many other particulars,
the upper part of life should be distinguished
from the lower'. If luxury could only be
confined 'to the palaces of the great', society
would not perhaps be much affected and might
even receive some temporary advantage from it:
IThe more toys which children of all ages consume,
the brisker will be the circulation of money, and
the greater the increase of trade •••• To the
upper part of mankind time is an enemy, and (as
they themselves often confess) their chief labour
is to kill it; whereas with the others, time and
money are almost synonymous, and they have very
little of each to spare; it becomes the legisla-
ture, as much as possible, to suppress all temp-
\ tations whereby they may be induced to profusely
'either one or the other, since all such profusion
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must be repaired-at the cost of the public.
Such places of pleasures therefore, as are
set apart for the use of the great world,
I meddle not with. ' II (13)
Henry Fielding extended this attack to include
demands that all literature which "idealised crime and
low life" be banned. (14)
As the new ethos of capital developed, conceptions
of 'order' developed new meanings leading to new ideo-
logical conceptions of the 'causes' of crime. These
conceptions, during the latter half of the eighteenth
century, focused increasingly upon the leisure activities
of the working class which the new bourgeoisie perceived
as the underlying cause of rising property theft and
street disorder. John Fielding, who succeeded his brother
Henry as Bow Street Magistrate, in giving evidence as a
witness to a Parliamentary Committee 'on increasing
Burglaries and Robberies', argued that the causes of crime
were to be found in the gathering of small crowds by
ballad singers, the freedom allowed to prostitutes, and
the ease with which licenses could be obtained to sell
wine and establish gaming houses. (15)
It is in these perceptions that the early foundations
... of bourgeois conceptions of 'law and order' were crystal-
lized around a process of criminalisation of working class
leisure activities on the basis of enforcement of forms
of morality seen as conducive to the maintenance of order
amongst the labouring masses •
-,
John Fielding was succeeded by Patrick Colquhoun
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in 1798 who founded the Thames River Police to "preserve
for a colonial merchant and an industrial class the
collective product of west Indian Slavery and London
wage-labour.,,(16)Colquhoun also founded the notion of
'preventive policing'. Following his predecessors,
Colquhoun was also of the view that the causes of crime
lay within working class immorality. For Colquhoun,
poverty was essential for the maintenance of 'civilisation':
"It is the lot of man - it is the source of wealth,
since without poverty there would be no labour and
without labour there could be no riches, no refine-
ment, no comfort, and no benefit to those who may
be possessed of wealth."(17)
The task facing bourgeois.author~ty, as illustrated
"
by Colquhoun, was the need to persuade the working class
into acceptance of their condition, abandon leisure
pursuits and improve their morals .A~~~J:lg wi th.-.suchpersuasion,
Colquhoun also perceived the necessity of persuasion by
force. For this purpose, Colquhoun advocated ••••
"••• a good police which would promote the moral
improvement of the labouring classes by the
exercise of supervision and restraint." (18)
The pressure for a new police to enforce bourgeois
ideology was sharpened at the turn of the century with
the increasing threat posed to the industrial bourgeoisie
by labour struggles. The expansion of the capital accu-
mulation process was increasingly threatened both at the
point of production and within circulation. As Cohen
argues:
- 10 -
"As such, the official task of policing was
both to protect the institutions of private
property, and to enforce statutory norms of
public order primarily designed to ensure the
free circulation of commodities, including the
commodity of labour power." (19)
However, it was not until 1829 that the new police
were initially established in London to clear the streets
of costermongers and other street activities to ensure
free circulation. Prior to that, the ruling class were
still introducing increased sanctions in the attempt to
contain rising social disorder and labour struggles:
"During February 1812 a Bill was passed by
Parliament making the breaking of frames a
capital offence, this crime having been hither-
to only a 'minor felony' for which the penalty
was transportation for fourteen years."(20)
(Reith 1938)
For Reith, the Luddite riots symbolised the break-
down of the authority of 'Authority'. With such a direct
transgression of the law of property by anarchic 'mob
disorder', the recourse to the death penalty seemed the
only expedient to the ruling class for the maintenance
of the conditions for capital accumulation:'
"This was authority's only practical legislative
answer to a loud demand for action to restore
order." (21)
Reith again fails to inform us as to who was making
these loud demands. From a historical perspective there
was, in terms of hundreds of years of feudal disintegra-
tion and transformation into capitalism, little 'order'
to b~ 'restored'. Rather, it was not the 'restoration'
of social order which informed the loud demands of
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property owners, but the establishment of a specific
social order - bourgeois order:
itA 'crisis of authority' is spoken of: this is
precisely the crisis of hegemony, or general
crisis of the state.U(22)
(Gramsci, 1929/35)
The bourgeois demand for order was a demand for
bourgeois hegemony in class society. For Reith, and
indeed for many contemporary bourgeois ideologists,
there is only the struggle between 'authority' and 'mob
disorder'. To acknowledge existence of the class struggle
as the axis of social disorder would contradict the univer-
salist conception of 'law and order':
"The Luddite Riots are an outstanding episode in
the struggle between authority and mob disorder,
because they illustrate the temporary failure of
all the forces which were available for their
suppression. It (23)
(Reith, 1928)
It was from a recognition of the failure of these
forces to police the working class in the early 19th
century that the merchant and industrial bourgeoisie
sought the establishment of a 'preventive police' to
protect their property and maintain conditions for capital
accumulation •. With the establishment of the new police
-,. in 1829 and its gradual expansion into the provinces
throughout the 19th century, an ideology had become a
material force.
Policy
\
Bourgeois historians of the police, such as
critchley, (24)are inclined to present the creationT.A.
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of the modern police force in Britain as part of a long
tradition extending far back to the years of the Danish
and Anglo Saxon invaders. However, the 'Tythingman' of
the Saxon settlers, the 'Constable' of Norman feudalism,
or the 'Parish Constable' of later feudal times arose
from different systems of custom and law enforcement,
serving different roles and reflecting different social
relations.
The early tribal systems maintained a collective
responsibility for the maintenance of customs and social
regulation. with the later Norman period each township
appointed one of its members as 'constable', although the
apprehension of offenders was still a collective responsi-
bility whenever the 'hue and cry' was raised. With the
establishment of Justices of the Peace in 1361, this
collective responsibi.lity was replaced by the warrant
system and the 'constables' became subordinates of the
magistrates.
The system of parish constables remained right up
until the 19th century. Occasional riots or revolts by
peasants were dealt with by the militias and it was not
until the 18th century with the rise of industrial capital-
ism and capitalist farming that the ruling class, in the
face of growing disorder,. saw the collapse of the parish
constable system. The emergence of new classes in struggle
with the industrial revolution posed new problems of class
control. The traditional way of life of the labouring
poor was severely ruptured with the emergence of new
social conditions created by capitalist production. The
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traditional master-servant relationship was replaced
by class relationships of capitalists and workers, and
towns expanded rapidly to accommodate the growing masses
of expropriated agricultural labourers who moved into
the new manufacturing towns looking for work. The
Enclosures Acts, and the disintegration of the craft
guilds, caused by the growth of mass production based
on the division of labour, created new social conditions
of widespread poverty and social disorder to such an
extent that the state continually resorted to armed force
as a means of suppression.
The rampant growth in capital accumulation and the
total subordination of wage-labour to capitalist market
forces marked the final transition from feudalism to
capitalism in the late 18th century. The forces unleashed
by rapid capital accumulation, whilst consolidating the
economic and political power of the industrial bourgeoisie,
also fuelled the misery, degredation and despair of the
labouring poor leading to the first tentative moves of
(25 'the working class to organise itself Jagainst capital,
with the first coherent challenge to bourgeois power
-,.
taking the form of machine breaking - the Luddite riots
of 1811-12. From Luddism, the organised protest of the
working class continued to grow. In 1817 the Habeas
corpus Act was suspended by the government, whilst at
the same time the Seditious Meetings Act was passed which
required that licences should be obtained from magistrates
before public meetings were held. (26) And two years later
in 1819 came the peterloo Hassacre, where the Yeomanry
of Manchester charged ~ mass meeting of over 50,000 people
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which had assembled in st. Peter's fields to hear
'Orator' Hunt. 11 people were killed and around 500
badly wounded. (27)
The position of the various outmoded forms of
policing which continued to retain the characteristics
of their feudal origins were increasingly laid bare by
their inability to adapt to the new social conditions
brought about by the rise of capitalism. Capitalists
demanded a more effective and permanent force to protect
their interestz against the expropriated than was offered
by Beadles, night watchman, parish constables and yeomanry.
For the bourgeoisie, a new system of policing was required
which could more adequately contain the new contradictions
which had arisen with capitalist production. Thus, the
creation of the 'New police' in 1829 was more than just
a matter of subjective bourgeois class interest but
represented a vital need of th~ capital accumulation
process for an extensive system of class control to ensure
the maintenance of the conditions necessary for reproduc-
tion of the capitalist system.
The gradual development of bourgeois policing in
19th century Britain represented the unique establishment
of a system of permanent state surveillance and control.
AS a paid full-time professional institution, the creation
of the new police marked a clear distinction as a system
of law enforcement from those of previous social forma-
tions.
\
For the ruling class, the use of troops for dealing
with popular protest and civil disorder had proved an
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inadequate means of class control and security of
bourgeois wealth. ~Vhilst the Landlord class feared the
potential of centralised state power implicit in the
creation of a new police force and preferred the trad-
itional remedies of executions and other forms of severe
punishment coupled with the use of militias to suppress
popular protest, for the merchant and industrial bourg-
eoisie the radical changes in social conditions caused
by the rise of capitalist market forces and new means of
production meant the emergence of a new ethos of class
struggle, in which the growing mass of discontented and
disorderly proletarians posed a continual threat to the
fragile social structure of early capitalism. The tradi-
tion of 18th Century crowd protest which characterised
the struggle over specific issues between Landlords and
plebeians, as analysed by Thompson, (28)had by the turn
of the century embraced new forms contradictory to the
new social relations of capitalism. 'The crowd' were no
longer plebeians but masses of proletarians forced into
the towns and cities with nothing to sell but their labour-
power; whilst directly counterposed to the mass of destitute
wage-labourers stood the wealthy merchant capitalists and
the new industrial bourgeoisie accumulating wealth via
the rapid expansion of trade and mass production. For
the bourgeoisie, every instance of public disorder posed
a threat to the acc~~ulation process, whilst the poverty
and destitution of the labouring poor constantly threatened
the security of capitalist property and merchandise.
"'Containment of those threats for the merchant and indus-
trial capitalists lay effectively in the creation of a
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permanent visible force of bourgeois state authority
for the security of capital accumulation.
Patrick Colquhoun, in recognition of these needs,
argued for a Preventive police, to act as "•••• the
constant and never-failing attendant on the accumulation
of wealth." (29)
Colquhoun's ideas were set out in his Treatise on
the Commerce and police of the River Thames which was
written in 1800. The magistrate was concerned at the
substantial threat to the profits of the merchants posed
by the growth in theft of goods from London docks by the
dockside workers. In response to this threat, Colquhoun
established the Thames River Police, which was given
official status in 1800, (30)and represented the first
preliminary step towards the later creation of a full
time professional police force.
However, it was nearly 30 years later, following a
long period' of parliamentary wrangling, before Colquhoun's
conception of 'preventive policing' was given a wider
extension. Whilst the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829
was only confined to the establishment of a new police
~ force in the London area, its essential historical impor-
tance lay in the precedence it set for the formation of
future forces in the provinces. Sir Robert peel, the
founder of the new Metropolitan police and himself a
cotton industrialist, clearly envisaged the later
expansion of the new police force into the provinces where
labour had begun to effectively organise itself in the
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factories, mines and mills.
The importance of property relations was clearly
reflected in the Act, with reference to property crime
forming its introduction:
..•••• offences against property have of late
increased in and near the Metropolis: and
the local Establishments of Nightly Watch
and Nightly police have been found inadequate
to the prevention and detection of crime." (31)
Moreover, the importance of maintaining public order
in the streets of the Metropolis had not been neglected:
"And be it enacted That it shall be lawful for
any Man belonging to the said Police Force,
during the Time of his being on Duty, to
apprehend all loose, idle and disorderly
Persons, whom he shall find disturbing the •
Public peace or where he sha lL have just
cause to suspect of any evil Designs and .all
persons whom he shall find between Sunset and
the Hours of Eight in the Forenoon lying in
any Highway, Yard, or other place, or loitering
therein, and not give a satisfactory account of
themselves •••• tI(32)
The Act followed the recommendations of the 1828
Committee, defining the new police office as the
"Metropolitan police District', which was to be funded
from a police Levy on the rates and to be administered
by two Justices under the authority of the Home Office. (33)
r Of the two new Justices appointed, one was of a military
background, the other a lawyer, and for many years later
the military background remained a regular feature of
Justices appointed.to administer the ne~ police.(34)
.The gradual development of bourgeois policing from
\
1829 onwards represented the unique establishment of a
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state institution which was to combine both ideological
and coercive features for maintaining the social rela-
tions of capitalism. The attainment of this character
was not however a homogeneous process of development;
the form, character and practice of the new police was
not only shaped in the day-to-day policing of working
class communities, but also by economic, political and
social developments in the class struggles of the 19th
century.
As the bourgeoisie strove for hegemonic power, the
expansion of the new police into the provinces was under-
lined by an ideological crusade in an attempt to legitimise
policing amongst the working class. The bourgeoisie
clearly recognised that exclusively coercive policing
practices would not provide a lasting means of maintaining
hegemonic domination over working class communities.
'Preventive policing' was presented to working class
communities as a means of affording some protection to
their limited possessions by an ever present external
authority. However, if the new police were to cultivate
a permanent presence, the open hostility given to 'Peel's
bloody gang' needed to be subdued; and in many parts of
London that hostility was extensive. As Ignatieff has
stated:
"•••• the poor of London experienced the coming
of the new police as a massive intensification
of outside supervision over their ways of living
and surviving - an intrusion which broke the
casual callous contract of disregard between
\ rich and poor in the 18th century:'(35)
Resistance to the new police was not as emphatic
amongst the better-off working class. Here the protection
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afforded by the police to their limited possessions
gained some ground in legitimacy. As Bunyan argues:
"•••• the need to give some security for the
working man and his family was essential if
they were to accept that policing was in their
interests."(36)
Policing in the 19th Century underwent a protracted
struggle to establish its legitimacy. Moreover this
desire was continually contradicted by the frequent
recourse of the new police to coercive measures in order
to control the streets for the security of capital.
The introduction of beat patrols into working class
communities led to regular confrontations and a war of
attrition that was, in many cases, to extend to the
present day. On the streets of London Hackney coachmen
and street-sellers waged a verbal battle with the police
for control of a pitch; (37)loitering and drunkenness were.
re-defined into degrees of toleration by external authority
depending on the district concerned. In effect, the
activities which the police suppressed and those they
didn't greatly depended on the state of play of the war
of attrition in each district. (38)The extent to which the
new police achieved legitimacy in the districts of London
r is debatable; whether the acceptance of the new police
on the streets was attained by 'negotiation' or simply
persuasion by force, there is little doubt that to a
greater extent the new police did succeed in managing
to achieve a permanent presence. As Ignatieff argues:
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...... The success of the police in securing the
cooperation of the public depended less on
keeping a rosy image of impartiality than on
securing a near-monopoly over the market in
violence and redress." (39)
Resistance to the new police was perhaps at its
most fierce in public order situations. The plebeian
heritage of direct action in making demands of the ruling
class was not lost with the growth of the working class
in the 19th century. Indeed, this heritage probably
served to strengthen working class protest by providing
the social foundation upon which the class developed its
collective solidarity in their overcrowded and destitute
communities.
A significant change had occurred from the old
plebeian single-issue crowd cause- to working class protest
based upon more radical and general issues. Popular
protest had become more class-orientated and politically
coherent. One year following the formation of the new
police in London, crowds were chanting anti-peel and
anti-police slogans amidst ones for reform, (40)Resentment
against the new police as an infringement on civil
liberties were running high in 1833 when police using
the flats of their sabres dispersed crowds gathered in
Coldbath fields for a radical political meeting. (41)..
During the confrontation a policeman was killed, but
the general hostility felt about the new police was such
that a coroner's jury gave a verdict of justifiable
homicide. (42)
\
The role of the new police in breaking up political
meetings became a regular activity after 1829. Any
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crowd situation was in itself a public order threat
for capital, but an overtly political gathering posed
a direct threat to bourgeois political power, as the
state held little legitimacy for the working class in
the absence of universal suffrage.
Whilst for the rising bourgeoisie the existence
of a working class was essential for the continuation
of the profit system, the political and economic combi-
nation of workers into their own organisation for
resistance to capital was something the ruling class
had to repress whilst the new power of the bourgeoisie
was consolidated. Anti-combination legislation forced
many trade unions, particularly the smaller ones, into
forms of action which directly threatened capital.
Machines were no longer saboutaged in symbolic defiance
of the power of·capital, but in order to harass blacklegs.
This was particularly the case in the north of England
where the class struggle was'so intense that many of the
millowners felt compelled to fortify their offices for
protection during industrial disputes.
with the growth of trade unionism and chartism in
the first half of the 19th Century, the struggle between
r labour and capital reached critical proportions. Whilst
the new police in London were establishing their presence
on the streets of the Metropolis, the industrial towns
and cities of the north were fermenting with discontent.
The increasing use of military force to repress popular
disturbances could not provide a lasting means of
containment of working class protest. The expansion
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of the new police into provincial working class commun-
ities was a long protracted affair with many newly
created forces meeting strong local resistance. Even
when new police forces had been established in certain
areas, the bourgeoisie had often to resort to the use
of troops to repress political and trade union struggles.
For examples, although the new police had been established
in the black country in 1835, the Chartist-led miners'
strike in Staffordshire in 1842 resulted in clashes with
troops, as again happened in 1855 with the Black Country
Riots. (43)
The introduction of new police forces to deal with
the labour struggles of the provinces met strong local
resistance. In some cases, new police forces could only
be established after persistent parliamentary pressure
with statutory legislation, as for example, with the
county and Borough Police Act of 1856. Much of this
resistance was due to radical influences in local councils.
Foster, (44)in his historical research on 19th Century
Oldham, shows the degree to which the radicals succeeded
in gaining control of the Vestry and local parish
constables by means of subverting the electoral system
which was based on property ownership. As enforcement
-,.
of law rested with the Vestry, through which the parish
constables were selected, the radicals were able to
appoint sympathetic constables who refused to intervene
in political and industrial activity. The subsequent
wea~~ning of local bourgeois power led the state to
respond by increasing voting rights (which failed) and
then to appoint a crown nominee to appoint constables
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(which also failed) and finally after pressure from the
local bourgeoisie, the Oldham Police Act was passed in
1826 to establish a police commission made up of employers
to appoint armed watchmen and patrols. After a five year
struggle the radicals managed to subvert the police
commission and subsequently dismissed the armed patrols.
It was only with the introduction of the new police in
the 1840's that the radicals eventually lost the battle
for control of the police. (45)
The primary motivation therefore for the establish-
ment of new police forces in the provinces was to safe-
guard capital.
By the middle of the 19th century the bourgeoisie
came to see in all crowd situations a potential threat
to the social order. As Storch notes:
"By this period public disorder of any type,
even manifestations usually devoid of overt
political content - public house affrays,
dog-fights, races, popular fetes of any
type - seemed to constitute a clear and
present danger to the social order. II (46)
The position of bourgeois policing in this respect
was quite clear; with the supercession of feudal patern-
alism, bourgeois authority created 'novel types of
-,..
surrogates - modern bureaucracies of official morality'. (47)
The working class was generally seen by the bourgeoisie
as undisciplined and 'exempt from restraint of other
classes'. (48) Capital clearly ruled and dominated the
wor~ place, as bourgeois authority was essential to
production; however, for the capitalists there was also
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the need to police labour outside the factory without
recourse to military intervention. As the Home Secretary
commented in 1855:
lilt is of great importance that there should be
a sufficient police force in all large towns,
not only for the protection of life and property
under ordinary circumstances but also with the
assistance of Special Constables, for the
repression of any sudden disturbance of the
peace without requiring as has often been too
often the case, the aid of a military force."(49)
Manufacturers complained of local parish police
failing to protect blacklegs during strikes and demanded
new police forces under 'independent control' to frustrate
the attempts of strikers - as one employer put it - lito
deprive the capitalist of his free choice of agents for
the employment of capital." (50) A millowner, Thomas Ashton,
no doubt echoed the thoughts of his fellow employers when
he argued:
"In case of turns-out it would be desirable to
have a force to protect people that are willing
to work. II (51)
The partisan role of the new police in the class
struggle was again made quite clear in the words of
Sherriff Alison of Glasgow who spoke in terms of a 'remedy'
-.. for 'intimidation' being the stationing of 'forty to fifty
police night and day around a struck mill to protect the
manufacturer's property and the right of entry of
blacklegs'. (52)
Hhilst then, the bourgeoisie of the 19th Century may
have 'felt concern over the growth of crime and a desire
to instil bourgeois morality into the working class, the
overriding material interest behind the establishment of
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the new police, particularly in the provinces, was a
recognition of the threat posed to capital by the
organised political and trade union struggles of the
working class. Chartism, according to Critchley, was
seen as a direct challenge to 'constitutional authority,(53)
and was initially repressed by the use of troops and
special constables:
"•••• In the face of the mounting threat, and
government had at their disposal only levies
of troops scattered about the country, and the
Metropolitan police. The Horne Secrerary set
up as a sort of general officer commanding horne
forces, ordering troops here and there as the
threat developed in one area after another."(54)
The problems and inadequacies of using troops in
public order situations was no more acute than in the
provinces. Critchley argues that because the provincial
towns and cities were without police forces structured
along the lines of the Hetropolitan police, they found
difficulty in suppressing Chartist protest and thus, in
(55'many cases, had to rely upon the military. ) However,
he fails to mention the fact that the introduction of the
-r
new police into many towns frequently resulted in increased
protest and disorder directed against the police them-
selves. Indeed, storch's research has shown how in many
cases an anti-police riot was initially sparked off by
confrontations between police and troops~(56)
Parliamentary debate concerning provincial policing
naturally focused,on the tmvns with Chartist movements.
ToWl!:slike Birmingham, Hanchester and Bolton - all
Chartist strongholds - were some of the first to estab-
lish bourgeois policing in the provincial areas of
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Britain. In fact Chartist struggle in these particular
towns was so strong that Parliament took the unprecedented
step of rushing through bills to set up new police forces
in these areas under the direct authority of the Home
Secretary. This legislation was effectively emergency
legislation and signified the extent to which capitalism
felt threatened. This disregard of the notion of policing
under local authority control - in part probably due to a
degree of Chartist influence in some local councils - was
probably one of the first examples of panic legislation
that has periodically characterised the history of the
capitalist state in Britain.
The hostility expressed by large sections of the
working class against the new police was not purely a
result of political intervention (although working class
political leaders clearly saw the new police as a 'political'
and not a 'protective' force given the large degree of
surveillance practised) but also because of the policing
of working class leisure activity. storch gives as an
example the Lancaster races on July 22nd 1840, when the
arrival of a detachment of Lancashire rurals led to a
series of police-crowd confrontations of a violent nature.
-,. This was certainly not an isolated incident, but reflected
a general trend of anti-police behaviour in this period.
Storch found that:
"In a significant number of cases episodes of
violent resistance were directly traceable to
police interference with established or customary
,leisure activities or with pub or beer houselife."(57)
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In many cases the Chartists articulated the resent-
ment to the new police, in the recognition of them as a
threat to many aspects of community life. Confrontation
within this context was inevitable, but what is perhaps
surprising is the extent to which resistance was shown.
Storch again shows that more often than not resistance
by local communities was carefully coordinated and planned
rather than spontaneous. (S8)
The bulk of anti-police protest occurred between
1839 and 1844, reflecting a period of general resistance
and open hostility to the very presence of the police1
and as Storch indicates, feelings did not so much subside
later on but became expressed on a smaller scale and over
more specific issues. Certainly the legitimacy of
bourgeois policing was still weak generations after its
first appearance.
The protection of capital and the maintenance of the
conditions for accumulation through the control of labour
was initially at least the primary role of the new police
under early capitalism, particularly in the provinces
where Chartism, industrial disputes and organised labour
were making an impact. AS a long term state practice
r policing was to develop its role of safeguarding the
conditions for capital accumulation through its commitment
to the ideology of 'preventive policing'. In terms of
policing public order, the renewed influence of Chartism
around 1842 finally brought the new police to the fore-
grouhd in containing working class struggle. By 1842
it was estimated that three million people had signed
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the Chartists petition and with renewed unrest and dis-
content troops were moved into positions in preparation
for mass civil disorder. However discontent was apparent
amongst many of the troops themselves, (59)and it was this
that finally established the new police as the first rank
in the defence of the state and capital. The Staffordshire
Regiment in the west Midlands was particularly prone to
discontent amongst the ranks, and after the reluctance
of local magistrates a police force was created to replace
the troops. (60) There was no disguising the purpose of the
new force; as Philips argues:
"The early Staffordshire force seems to have been
based, at least partially, on a paramilitary model
with emphasis placed on the repression of riots
and disorders."(61)
In this respect, para-militarism underlined the
primary role of the new police as a force for maintaining
conditions for capitalist production in the face of working
class struggles:
"By the mid-1850's, the Staffordshire force had
become skilled at handling riot situations, strikes
and public meetings, while it is not evident that
they had reached the same degree of skill in prev-
entive and detective work involving more routine
crimes."(62)
During the latter half of the 19th century, once the
new police had established their presence in working
class communities, their function was broadened to the
policing of the day-ta-day activities of the working
class. As Storch notes:
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"The police had a broader mission in the nineteenth
century, however - to act as an all-purpose lever
of urban discipline. The imposition of the police
brought the arm of municipal and state authority
directly to bear upon key institutions of daily
life in working class neighbourhoods, touching
off a running battle with local custom and
popular culture which lasted at least until the
end of the century. II (63)··
For Storch, the new police had a crucial role as
'domestic missionaries', and moreover they had the power
to enforce bourgeois morality on the daily lives of the
working class. Along with the establishment of watch
committees (Municipal Corporations Act 1835) under the
control of the local bourgeoisie, there emerged the
beginnings of law enforcement policy primarily directed
towards the repression of working class activities
considered responsible for immorality, disorder and
crime:
liThe initiatives of the police authorities in these
areas of course cannot be viewed apart from the
attitudes, prejudices and momentary reformist
enthusiasms of the municipalities, magistrates
and local elites who employed them. This was
especially the case outside of London where the
police were much less independent of local control
than in the metropolis. For this reason police
actions must be considered as forming the cutting
edge of a wider and larger effort in northern
industrial towns to impose new standards of urban
discipline.II(64)
,. Particular targets for law enforcement included a
tightening up on drinking and drink-related activities,
the imposition of the 'move-on system', suppression of
working class blood sports, gambling, street entertain-
ment and Guy Fawkes celebrations.(65) 'Preventive policing'
was therefore 'the installation of the eyes and ears of
ruling elites at the very centres of \'lOrkingclass daily
life'. (66)
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Coupled with the development of new 'preventive'
policing strategies in dealing with working class political
and trade union struggle in the first half of the 19th
Century, by the end of that century the capitalist state
had at its disposal a historically new form of class
control: formed from, on the one hand, the synthesis of
the disintegrating feudal forces of order-maintenance
(army, militias, special constables) and on the other,
the forces of law-enforcement (parish constables, night-
watchmen, BOw Street runners etc.) there emerged a new
form of policing established as a permanent presence for
the enforcement of both law and order. Moreover this was
to be the enforcement of new laws - constituting a new
legal form of class domination - and the enforcement of
a new order of social class. (67)
(From P.F.Speed, 1974. p.39)
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The formation of a preventive form of policing as
an integral component of the state-capital relation was
therefore a direct result of the inability of anachronistic
feudal systems of policing to cope with the contradictions
of early industrial capitalism. The formation of the new
police effectively synthesised the various separate law
enforcement and order-maintenance systems which had
historically characterised previous class societies.
These two basic forms of class control were fused under
early capitalism; the new police combined elements of
the previous systems, expanded them and sought a new
hegemony based upon bourgeois ideological conceptions
of 'law and order'.
Transformation
When the British Police were established during the
19th Century, the new forces were effectively at the fore-
front of state power, but as a tool of government and the
military. From the Chartist struggles to the New Unionism
at the turn of the 19th Century, the police were increas-
ingly deployed as a para-military tool of government, in
lieu of the military, to repress the struggles of the
working class for the right to vote, the right to join
a trade union, the right to protest and the right to
strike.
At the turn of the 19th Century, a new period of
intense class struggle was reached with the growth of
the new unionism. Initially the bourgeoisie attempted
to smash the new mass unions, as Lane commented:
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"This whole period after 1889 is one of a
developing counter-attack by the propertied
classes against the industrial organisations
of the working people. II (68)
The growth of the new unions as a mass movement
potentially threatened the fabric of capital. However,
even by 1910, the police had failed to be fully consoli-
dated as the first line of defence of capital. At the
time of the Tonypandy strikes only 60 out of 200 forces
had entered into mutual aid agreements, and the govern-
ment called in the military to take control of the
policing of the area. General Sir Nevil Macready was
appointed by Winston Churchill to take co~~and. In his
memoirs Macready recalled his first meeting with the pit
owners:
liThe idea seemed prevalent among them that the
military and police were at their disposal,
to be increased to any extent they might
demand, and to be allocated according to
their advice. I had to point out that the
numbers were dependent on what the Government
might consider necessary and find available,
and that the decision and responsibility for
the distribution both of police and military
rested with me ••••" (69)
Macready may not have been at the 'disposal' of the
pit owners, but both parties held in common the need to
-.. repress working class protest. During this period both
police and military were deployed to repress workers in
struggle:
"Striking miners were shot at Featherstone in
1893 and Tonypandy in 1911. Gunboats were
anchored in the Humber during the 1893 dock
,strike and in the Mersey during the Liverpool
General Strike in 1911.
Frightened police going beserk in baton charges
was almost a commonplace during a large strike. II (70)
(Lane, 1974)
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However, as the twentieth century progressed,
military interventions against working class struggles
became more specifically directed towards blacklegging
and guarding transport movements, (7l)as police forces
developed and expanded 'preventive policing' to embrace
the law enforcement and order-maintenance needs of
capitalism.
The paramilitary aspects of preventive poliCing
became tailored to the need to establish and expand a
permanent police presence within all working class
communities on the basis of foot-beat patrols for day-to-
day surveillance, information gathering and law enforce-
mente
Whilst preventive poliCing retained para-military
characteristics, particularly in public order situations,
it had also by the 1920's expanded and consolidated
information gathering processes with the establishment
of the C.I.D. and Special Branch. Preventive policing
acquired two arms, those in uniform and those in plain
clothes. (72)
-r
prom the 1920's the character of preventive policing
began to change. Between 1883 and 1939 local forces had
been reduced from 231 to 183 through amalgamations. (73)
These movements, coupled with the introduction of
technological developments in crime detection, radio
communications, telephones, tele-printers etc., facili-
tated the further expansion of information gathering,
processes and plain clothes policing.
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Preventive policing, which had been established
in the 19th Century and early 20th Century as the central
form of policing embracing the law enforcement and order-
maintenance needs of capitalism, continued to retain its
essential purpose, but amalgamations and technical
modernisation widened its scope. The system of local
foot beat patrolling had, by the 1940's, been supplemen-
ted by specialised departments concerned with crime
detection and information gathering under the central
influence of the Home Office and Scotland Yard.
By the 1950's preventive policing was fast losing
its traditional character. Police headquarters now had
Information Rooms, the use of motor vehicles for area
patrols, traffic patrols and C.I.D. work had begun to
erode the traditional local foot-beat patrol system
central to preventive policing.
By the late 1960's new forms of policing began to
supercede preventive policing. These transformations,
as argued by Bunyan, brought about 'qualitatively new
directions in policing'. (74) Preventive policing, which
had maintained its essential form since its establishment
in 1829, began to fragment in the late 1950's under the
pressure of changes in the productive forces and relations
of capitalism.
3) REACTIVE POLICING
In America during the 1960's policing underwent a
radical restructuring in terms of organisation and
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operational strategies. In The Iron Fist and the Velvet
Glove the Center for Research on Criminal Justice outline
what they describe as the development of a 'military-
corporate model'. Their analysis bears a close resemblance
to changes in policing in Britain from the late 1960's
onwards:
"Initially, police strategists responding to the
crisis of the 1960's relied mainly on adapting
already tried and tested managerial and military
principles to problems of domestic 'order'.
Confronted with the inefficiency and lack of
coordination of local police units, many govern-
ment and corporate reformers found it natural to
look to the corporations and the armed forces
for more effective models of organisation and
planning. The result was a concentration of
money and research on the development of improved
technology (especially in weapons and in com~uni-
cation and information systems), and on devising
sophisticated planning strategies, often based on
'systems analysis' and usually borrowed from the
military. Although from the beginning some lip
service was paid to the need for more subtle
approaches involving improved 'community relations',
the primary focus was on technical and administra-
tive problems, and the overall thrust was toward
reorganizing the police as an effective combat
organisation."(75)
Through the transformation of preventive policing
in the 1960' s, t\-/onew forms of policing emerged which
were closely interrelated, expressing new forms of para-
-..
military policing. Both 'pre-emptive' and 'reactive'
policing continued to combine law-enforcement and order-
maintenance, but the distinction rests firmly in the
specialised roles and modes of operation which they
developed through the 1960's and 1970's.
As noted in the previous section, the information-
gathering aspect of preventive policing was gradually
expanded in the twentieth century through increasing
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specialisation. Intelligence gathering on criminals
and political activists has of course been around since
the establishment of the new police: however in the 1950's
la concentrated effort was made to rationalise the storage
of information I. (76) By the 1960's a qualitatively new
form of policing was emerging from these processes -
pre-emptive policing. Bunyan describes its essential
features:
"This involves two assumptions - firstly, that
those convicted of a crime are likely to commit
another criminal act and, secondly, that the
police have to keep themselves informed about
those people who are likely to commit certain
crimes even though they have as yet committed
no criminal offence."(77)
Bunyan acknowledges that these tendencies have been
present for many years in British policing but points to
the fact that these have been largely localised, ad hoc
and informal. For Bunyan, what has distinguished pre-
emptive policing has been the 'formalisation and central-
isationof information of this kind'.
The formation of specialist intelligence units such
as the Regional Crime Squads and the National Drugs
Intelligence Unit, Bunyan described as a concomitant
development(78)of this process:
"•••• the pre-emptive emphasis of policing which
was at first directed towards the professional
criminal soon extended to more political and
social areas like immigration and drug-taking. II (79)
The development of pre-emptive policing has been
interconnected \vith the corporate centralisation of
policing in Britain and the introduction of capital-
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intensive systems of information gathering and communi-
cations. The provision of extensive communications
systems, coupled with the rapid increase in mobility
which laid the basis of the formation of reactive
policing strategies, aided the development of 'command
and control systems' (80) ~uring the 1960's and 1970's.
The center for Research on Criminal JUstice describe a
similar development in the United states:
"If the organizational forms and techniques are
modeled after the corporations, the actual
operational strategies derived from this perspec-
tive are borrowed from the military. Military
terms and concept like 'command and control' or
'operations research' have become a common feature
in many police departments since the late sixties.
In the police context, 'command and control' means
devising the organizational and technical means of
helping the police commander 'facilitate his command
of policemen and police vehicles through control of
communications networks and equipment at his disposal'."
(81)
The organisation and technology of 'command and
control' has been widely documented and examined in
detail. (82) For the purpo~~ of our .analysis at this point,
it will be sufficient to summarise the implications of
these developments.
AS noted by Reiss and Bardua, (83) the organisation
and structure of police command relations is essentially
'quasi-military' a 'rigid chain of command,(84) -
and coupled with developments in technology, the material
basis of mass surveillance and control has been forged:
liThe police literature stresses command as the
basis of control. Historical changes in the
\ nature of police work and organisation have
increased the importance of more subtle and
perhaps more important developments in methods
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of control, however. In the dialectic of
dispersion versus centralisation of command,
every development in the technology for police
control of the population is accompanied by
changes in the capacity of the organisation
to control its members. II (8S)
of the many social and political consequences of
this development is the fact that with the introduction
of command and control systems leading to greater super-
vision of policing 'on the ground', there is a reduction
in the degree of discretionary power afforded to patrol
officers. with the development of reactive forms of
policing in conjunction with new communication systems,
the autonomy of the rank and file constable has been
greatly reduced.
The major outcome of these developments has there-
fore been a strengthening of the power of senior command
over policing and law enforcement policy. As Lewis noted:
"The principle behind computerised control is
centralised deployment in response to rapid
and very sophisticated analysis of incidents."(86)
Thus policing has increasingly become reliant upon
mass surveillance systems:
"Thus the entire police situation down to the
streets in which foot patrolmen are walking,
is visually recorded from moment to moment
centrally and divisionally."(87) (Lewis, 1976)
The fear which Lewis expressed of the constable
becoming an 'arresting machine,(88)is perhaps not
unfounded, nor indeed perhaps science-fiction writer
\
Ron Goulart's future nightmare of automated 'lawagons,.(89)
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According to Baldwin and Kinsey:
liThe increasing resort to intelligence gathering
that typifies pre-emptive policing can be seen
as a response to the lack of public contact
engendered by reactive policing."(90)
This has been a common misunderstanding of the
relation between reactive and pre-emptive policing.
The restructuring of intelligence gathering into
centralised 'command and control' systems has not necess-
arily been a simple response to 'lack of public contact',
but has been integral to the development of reactive
policing. In this respect, pre-emptive policing was
developed simultaneously with reactive policing back in
the 1960's, not as a surrogate system of intelligence
gathering but as a new and more formalised means of
intelligence gathering and processing, taking full advan-
tage of developments in new technology. The 'lack of
public contact' which Baldwin and Kinsey refer to, has
been the outcome of both pre-emptive and reactive policing.
It was the so-called 'community policing' schemes which
Baldwin and Kinsey favour, which were later developed in
the 1970's as the response to the 'lack of public contact'
engendered by pre-emptive and reactive policing. The
r relationship between 'community policing' (now an integral
component of pre-emptive policing) and reactive poliCing
is complementary, not contradictory.
The central point then, is that pre-emptive and
reactive policing have characterised the formal changes
"'in the system of policing in Britain, reflecting develop-
ments in the productive forces of capitalism and the
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steady deterioration of the social and economic conditions
of the working class. This relationship is particularly
exemplified in the post-war policing of urban areas,
especially those defined by police management as 'high
crime areas', where 'reactive policing was first developed
in the 1960's based on the unit beat policing system. (91)
The key link between pre-emptive and reactive
~
policing is the 'Collator', who gathers and disseminates
information between mobile patrols, C.I.D. and the Force
Control Room. Reactive policing, which is based on the
concept of quick response to reported incidents relies
effectively on what John Alderson has described as the
'technological cop,.(9~) This is the standard definition
of reactive policing. However, reactive policing exists
not just exclusively for immediate response to incidents -
the 'fire brigade' notion coined by Sir Robert Mark - but
has a broader political purpose.
The essential feature of reactive policing is
mObility. A 'fire brigade' is static and only becomes
mobile during emergency. Reactive policing is perman-
ently mobile. The daily routine patrolling of working
class communities has a specific role in itself - a
r mobile and often intimidatory presence. This is partic-
ularly the case in the patrolling of so-called 'high
crime areas' - the inner cities and urban estates where,
according to the authors of the state Research Bulletin,
"••• policing is not a question of protecting the
community but of keeping it under control.,,(93) Indeed
state Research goes on to argue: "The same ideology
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also leads to the creation of specialist 'heavy' squads
like Special patrol Groups.II(94)
The origins of reactive policing can be traced back
to the late 1950's where experiments were conducted with
'Team Policing':
"Team policing consists of the transport of a small
number of constables, under a sergeant, to a partic-
ular portion of a police district or division, where
they are given specific duties to perform and defined
areas to patrol. After a period of hours the whole
or part of the team is taken to some other part of
the district. Thus the team or some part of it moves
from one point of concentration to another at the
discretion of the sergeant. The members of the team
remain individually responsible for the area or duty
assigned to each of them and are only controlled as
far as the day-to-day area of operation is concerned •••
Its success appears to depend on the features of the
area to be policed, coupled with the facilities
available in the form of wireless, emergency tele-
phone (999) and Information Room Services. II (95)
We see here in prototype the essential elements which
formed the basis for the development of unit beat policing
and later the more overt para-military special Patrol
Groups - the combination of mobility and centralised
information and communication systems. The paramilitarism
implicit in the reactive policing of working class
communities became increasingly pronounced in the 1970's,
and as ~pecial Patrol Groups began to be regularly deployed
r in industrial struggles and political protests it became
increasingly clear that a movement was in progress towards
what, for mainland Britain, Was to be a new form of para-
military policing; the development of a 'third force'.
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4) THE FORMATION OF A THIRD FORCE
Unlike most other European countries the British
state did not develop a 'third force' to deal with working
class protest. (96) Instead, the regular police, with the
occasional deployment of troops, have handled public
order situations up until the early 1970's when the miners'
strike of 1972 saw the beginnings of the development of a
third force capacity. Unlike the previous miners' strike
of 1926, the regular police failed to break the mass
picketing organised by the N.U.M., particularly at the
Saltley Coke Depot. In the 1926 miners' strike, which
continued following the General Strike, the dispute lasted
for 6 months and by the end of that period, weakened and
exhausted through months of hardship, the strike began
to collapse; a trickle of miners back into the pits was
met with mass picketing, but the pickets lacked the strength
to resist the police tactics employed to break them up.
At Pemberton, near Wigan, on October 14th 1926 around
2000 pickets assembled to confront some 300 miners who
had returned to work:
-..
liThe crowd refused to go, with the result that
the police charged them with their batons and
several men are reported to have received
injuries to the head. The men scattered in all
directions and some of them who went into a
field began to stone the police."(97)
The use of the baton charge, whilst being a regularly
employed policing strategy for use against political
protest and disorder throughout the 20th century was
not ¥sed again against picketing until the events at
the warrington N.G.A. dispute in 1983 and the miners'
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strike in 1984, where it became a regular event.
The turning point, in relation to the creation of
a third force capacity, goes back to the 1972 confronta-
tion between police and miners at the Saltby Coke Depot,
where the failure of the regular police to break the
mass picket saw the first stages in the development of
a para-military third force, which would be put to full
effect twelve years later in policing miners' mass
picketing in 1984.
Up to the 1980's the enforcement of public order in
industrial disputes during the post-war period had tended
to rely on force of numbers with the occasional use of
the truncheon. Given that industrial disputes are perhaps
the most visible expression of day- to-day class struggles,
in such situations the bourgeois democratic state strives
to uphold its appearance of 'non-intervention'. police
presence in such situations is legitimised as a force
for the prevention of infringements against the criminal
law in what the state regards as essentially a civil
matter. It is on this basis that when interventions do
occur they are made to prevent 'breaches of the peace',
'obstruction', etc. With the Saltley Coke Depot confron-
~ tation in 1972, the police had behind them the weight of
the new Industrial Relations Act which had been designed
to further strengthen the policing of mass picketing.
For the ruling class, particularly since the 1970's,
any mass picket is inherently a threat to state power
and a recipe for confrontation; as the editorial of the
Police Journal in 1972 argued in the wake of the police
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defeat at Saltley Coke, the mass picket in the eyes of
the state is a prima facie challenge to the rule of
bourgeois law:
"The nub of the problem lies in the definition
of 'peaceful picketing'. Let's not mince words.
Thousands of miners gathered outside a coke
depot in Birmingham, miles away from the nearest
pithead, or hundreds of Hull dockers besieging
the entrance to a Lincolnshire warf, are just
not interested in 'peaceful' picketing. Their
argument is 'might is right'. (98)
It was on this same principle - 'might is right' -
that the police confronted the miners of Saltley Coke
with a show of force for several hours, but lost after
failing to clear the gates of the depot. The police
at that point had reached the limits of their organised
power of coercion. The regular police force could no
longer guarantee its capacity to confidently maintain
conditions for capital accumulation. As a last measure,
short of calling in the army, the Chief Constable ordered
in a makeshift riot police. As Arthur Scargill recollected:
"These blokes in white steel helmets who came were
supposedly motor-cyclists, but without actual
motor-cycles, and with heavy jackboots on. They
were marching them down, seventy at a time, and
they were changing them every hour. seventy
marching down like stormtroopers, you could see
them both sides. Then they started to bring
them down every half hour to intimidate."(99)
In the meantime the arrival of hundreds more pickets
ensured that the gates continued to stay blocked despite
the use of a makeshift third force. The Chief Constable
had to make a quick political decision - support for the
mine,rs at this time was daily strengthening, policing
at Saltley Gate had failed to break the picket and man-
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power had been stretched to its limit. A baton charge
may succeed in temporarily clearing the gate, but for
how long? There were also other considerations:
"Of course the Chief Constable of Birmingham could
have exercised his discretion differently. He
could have surveyed the massed thousands at Saltley
and ordered his men into battle in the time honoured
fashion. Assuming for one moment'that the outcome
would have been the dispersal of the crowds and the
uninterrupted passage of vehicles in and out of the
depot, what would have been the cost? In some
quarters the police would have been the heroes of
the hour. In others, the reaction would have been
so bitter and intense that no one can say what
effect it might have had on the eventual outcome of
the entire national dispute."(IOO)
\'1ith such crisis situations, senior police command
are faced with the decision of either going for all out
strike-breaking with baton charges and therefore facing
the serious risk of escalating the disorder rather than
'scattering strikers to the wind', or making a 'tactical
withdrawal' and conceding to the demands of the pickets
to 'close the gates'. As Anthony Deane-Drummond, ex-
Major General and government specialist adviser on
counter-insurgency wrote in Riot Control:
"Even if he had 18,000 police available, or three
times the size of the crowd, it would have been
impossible to make use of them in a confined area.
The result would have been many casualties and
the gates would have remained closed."(IOI)-..
For Chief Constable Capper there was the likely
prospect that a baton charge by a disorganised makeshift
riot police would fail and thereby undermine the image
of authority and legitimacy of the police and strengthen
the resolve of the miners; so the Chief Constable ordered
the gates to be closed and the state embarked on some
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serious reconsiderations of its means of breaking strikes
without the direct intervention of troops:
liThe need for a third force again became an issue
after the mass confrontation between the police
and strikers at the Saltley coal depot in the
miners' strike of 1972. Faced by vastly superior
numbers the police capitulated and the strikers
succeeded in stopping the supply of fuel to power
stations (on this occasion army units, armed with
shields and truncheons, were available but not
committed).II(102)
It was from the experiences of defeat at Saltley
Coke that the government decided that year to create a
part-time third force by giving the Special Patrol Group,
which was originally set up in 1965 as a police support
anti-crime unit, a wider para-military role for mobile
response in strike breaking and policing other public
order situations. The objective was to maintain a police
identity for the part-time third force rather than a
full-time military orientated force permanently stationed
in barracks. As the continental experience demonstrated,
riot police generated more hatred and counter-violence
(103'than the ordinary police. ) It was from this point
that training in riot control and firearms was stepped up,
joint police-military exercises established(104)and a
police intelligence unit set up to. gather and collate
-,.. information during major strikes and deploy forces accord-
ingly. (105) The National security Committee (later renamed
Civil contingencies Committee by the Wilson Government
of 1974) (106)was also established and included represen-
tatives from the police, military and key ministries and
it was essentially their recommendations (107)whi ch lay
behind the establish~ent of the new form of policing
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public order.
The creation of a 'third force' capacity marked a
new stage in the policing of working class struggles.
The tradition of a regular police force charged with
the task of maintaining both law and order in mainland
Britain had begun to disintegrate by the early 1970's.
Encouraged by developments in technology and mobility
in the 1960's, policing in the early 1970's underwent
radical changes in -enforcement practices. By becoming
increasingly distant from local government senior police
command had a free hand in developing the new para-
military capacity for order-maintenance. Whilst there
was nothing particularly new historically in the degree
of coercive policing employed against the struggles of
the seventies, the establishment of new specialist forms
of policing these events with para-military units marked
significant changes in law enforcement policy.
Following the confrontation between police and
demonstrators in the June 1974 Red Lion Square anti-
fascist demonstration in which the SPG figured prominently
in cutting through the demonstrators "like knife through
butter" (108)and in which a demonstrator, Kevin Grately,
was killed, the SPG were in action again on the industrial
front at the Grunwick mass pickets of 1977. Deployment
of these new para-military units for industrial and
public order situations in the 1970's was defended by
the state with the argument that 'mass picketing' was
a new phenomenon to the streets of Britain. As the
Police Federation stated:
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"Since the miners' strike of 1972, however, a new
dimension has been added by the organising of
'mass pickets' which would more correctly be
termed demonstrations." (109)
It was not mass picketing, however, which was new
to Britain in the 1970's, but the establishment of a
part-time third force. At the forefront of the police
attempts to break the Grunwick pickets, charged the SPG:
their tactics were ruthless:
"For three minutes you can see them wading in,
chasing people through gardens, pulling them
out of crowds by their hair, thrusting them
against walls, with such force that the walls
come down~lt(llO)
Since the Grunwick dispute, the SPG and their
provincial counterparts were expanded and strengthened
and regularly deployed in public order situations, backed
up by police Support Units. Comprised of regular police
with specialist para-military training, a new form of
policing was established in the 1970's to provide a third
force under the control of police command with specialist
training and equipment to strengthen the coercive forces
of the state in policing the deteriorating social conditions
of late capitalism without recourse to military intervention.,
For the state it is relatively easy to pass anti-
-,.
union laws, but theIr enforcement is another matter.
\vhen the Heath Government passed the Industrial Relations
Act in 1971 to weaken by legislation the power of trade
unions it did not foresee the extent to which its attempts
to enforce the Act would politically rebound and lead to
an actual strengthening in trade union solidarity.
Following on from the previous Labour Government's
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failure in this sphere with the 'In Place of Strife'
white paper to repress unofficial strikes, the Industrial
Relations Act introduced a number of legal sanctions
against trade union practices, including the requirement
for trade unions to be registered, restrictions on the
closed shop, compulsory secret ballots if the Secretary
of state considered national security or public order
was at risk and the making illegal of strikes for union
recognition. These new laws were to be enforced by an
Industrial Relations Court established under the Act.
However the first blow to the new legislation came
soon after it bec~~e statute. The T.U.C. Annual Congress
in september 1971 voted to oppose registration. The next
'pillar' of the Act to be demolished came when the govern-
ment forced the railway unions to hord a compulsory
ballot on a national pay strike. The membership voted
ovenvhelmingly in rejection of the pay offer and the
Government, following the massive publicity surrounding
the ballot, conceded to the pay claim. (111)
Bet\veen the years 1971-1974 a whole series of
disputes, including the miners, dockers and building
workers disputes tested the enforceability of the Act.
Trade Unionists were jailed by the Industrial Relations
Court, union assets were seized but 'successful flying
picketing by miners and building workers defeated police
attempts to enforce the spirit of the new legislation
on the ground. The whole machinery of the anti-union
legislation collapsed along with the Heath Government
in the 1974 election. The Act was repealed by the
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incoming minority i'lilsonGovernment and it was to be
another five years before the Conservatives could begin
to avenge their defeat at the hands of the trade union
movement. In the meantime, it was again the turn of the
Labour Party to attempt to being the unions under the heel
of capitalism.
In recognising the principle weaknesses of the
Industrial Relations Act, successive governments since
1974 have sought to introduce legislation in a piece-meal
fashion. As C.A.C.T.L. noted on the failure of the 1971
Act:
"The state learnt some lessons from the defeat of
this law. Firstly, it had made the mistake of
putting the who Ie 'framework' into one document,
and of attacking not only the tactics of the trade
union movement (strikes, pickets etc.) but also
the rule-books and internal procedures of the
unions themsel,ves. It sought in one move to place
the whole structure of trade unionism, from top to
bottom, under the direct control of a court, and
to keep it there with the threat of fines and prose-
cutions. The framework was there for all to see,
and it was obvious to the entire movement that it
was damaging to its interests."(112)
The Labour Government of 1974-1975 sought to restrict
trade union powez' by voluntary agreements over wage claims
and collective bargaining machinery such as ACAS with
government concessions such as the Employment Protection
Act 1975 whd.ch purportedly strengthened the ability of
r
unions to obtain recognition from employers. However,
by 1977, the 'Social Contract' had collapsed. For the
capitalists this was seen as no great loss as 'rising
unemployment could be expected to impose some restraint
on a wages explosion amongst semi-skilled and unskilled
workers I. (113)
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Moreover, in that same year legislation against
trade unionism again began to reach the statute books.
The 1977 Criminal Trespass Law, whilst not making occupa-
tions illegal in themselves, gave considerable leeway to
the courts for interpretation ·and strengthened the power
of the police to enter and search occupations if they
(114)
believed that an offence under the Act had been committed.
With much of the anti-union legislation passed by
successive Labour and Conservative governments, the real
test of the effectiveness of the legislation has rested
on the state's ability to enforce the new laws. Moreover,
as CATCL noted:
"The police are used both to test the practicality
. of new interpretations of the existing law and to
also create the kind of incident which serves as
an argument for changing it."(115)
Early use of the 1977 Criminal Trespass Act was
against squatters. In August 1978, 160 squatters including
3J children were evicted from flats in Huntley Street,
London, by 800 police. This show of force also included
100 SPG officers equipped with riot shields. As CATCL
commented in 1979 just prior to the return of the
Conservatives to power:
"certainly the Huntley Street eviction was planned
to prepare the public (and train the police) for
similar action to be taken against any future
occupation. At present it is obviously easier
for them to attack groups such as homeless people (116'
squatting rather than large industrial occupations. I
~uccessive occupations saw increased police inter-
vention such as the 1978 Drylanders dispute in St. Helens,
HUNTLEY STREET MASS SQUAT EVICTED BY 500 POLICE
"', .......
At 6 AM on August '16tli,'In''~~t' ~ clearly a training exercise for the
future as well as an,arrogant display of torce, over. 500 police, 'led by
units of the Special Patrol, Group and using riot shields, sledgehammers,
bulldozers and wagons with hooks and tackle, evicted the sleeping occupants
of the masa squat in Huntley Street London, and arreated 18 of them.
The buildings ~d been occupied for 18 months by some 160 homeless peopl.,
having previously lain empty for four years. roll~ing possesaion orders
being granted last month, Camden Council bad prepared housing tor the
, families living there, but many ot these were still waiting to move out.
Meanwhile, the evening before the eviction, the Camden and Greater London
Councils had agreed ~o help find alter.uative ahort-life housing for the
single people living at Huntley Street '_ 110 tbe Squatters' had gone to bed
confident that they would not end up back ~n, the' streets.
The eviction vas not justitiable in e;'~nthe authoritiell language, and it
was met with outraged defiance trom those who woke up in tim ••
or those arrellted, THIRTEEN ~v~ bee~' charged under Section 10 ot the
Criminal Law Act. 1977 (the Criminal Trespass Law) with 'reeisting or
obstructing a bailiff or sheritf'. Although the police case baa yet to
emerge in court, it seems that they may be preparing to b.. e their charges
on the building of barricades at Huntley Street. rather than on th& event.
of the .viction itself. If this were the e.... it would have considerable '
implications tor the development of the us. of this offence against future
occupations. , ,
After the eviction, tbe CACTL Office'issued a press statement condemning
both the .viction and the us. of the police (se. over).
CACTL affiliates are urged to wiite to the Hom. Office as soon as possible
to protest at this eviction, at the way in which the police were ueed to
make homelessness into an iSllue of law and order. 'and at the use ot
, criminal charges against those arrested. They are also asked to raise this
matter with any MPs who may be connected with tbeir organisation. either
by sponsorship or by constituency.
Affiliates are also urged to support .. far as pOllsibl, any action which'
may be called in support of those arrested. The charges under Section 10
of the Criminal Law Act, 1977 have been remanded until September 21st.
Details of action which maY be decided upon will b. circulated ",aoon
as possible.
-..
\
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where only the mobilisation of 200 workers from local
factories in support of 50 women who had occupied the
factory forced the sheriff and police to turn away on
arrival to evict them. At the Staffa occupation in 1930
300 police evicted workers occupying in protest against
redundancies. Police occupied and held the factory until
relieved by guards from a private security firm. In the
1981 Holman Mitchell dispute in St.Helens, strikers were
evicted by police and bailiffs who entered the premises
by punching a hole in the perimeter wall.
With the return of the Conservative Government in
1979, pledged to strengthen 'law and order', anti-union
legislation was seen as a top priority in this respect.
During the latter half of the 197~'s the 'law and order'
mandarins had concertedly orchestrated for anti-union
legislation. The 'law and order' lobby basically pressed
for:
1. Limits on numbers of pickets.
2. picketing only of places in dispute.
3. unofficial strikes to be made illegal.
4. No right to strike in essential services.
5. secret ballots for industrial action.
6. ,Refusal of benefit to strikers' families.
7. Abolition of the closed shop. (117)
Most of these demands have since been implemented
by the Thatcher Government and represent a direct political
challenge to the trade unions, who have become considerably
weakened by the growth of mass unemployment. In practice,
however, the policing of mass picketing has largely relied
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on the use of existing criminal laws which give police
wide powers to deal with such situations. Even before
Priorls Code of 6 pickets the police, on the grounds of
public order, had already placed limits on picketing, as
in the Garners strike of 1978 where a limit of 6 pickets
was enforced by the police. (lIS)
For chief constables, a mass picket is not a picket
but a mass demonstration:
"When you get thousands of people turning up to
a picket, it is no longer a picketing situation,
it is a demonstration situation."
(Chief Constable Alan Goodson, 198J) (119)
And in redefining mass pickets as violent demonstra-
tions, police chiefs have attempted to legitimate para-
military policing strategies characteristic of a third
force. As James Brownlow, Chief Constable of South
Yorkshire, questioned at an ACPO/Local Authorities
Conference in the wake of the 1980 steel strike:
"is there a need to mobilise a standby force when
national emergencies or problems arise, formed
from officers seconded from police forces on a
temporary basis and \vith the units being on
permanent standby, and totally financed and
equipped from national resources?" (120)
-.. with the formation in 1981, following the widespread
inner city riots, of the Instant Response Units this
question had largely been answered. AS the GLC Police
Committee Support Unit com~ented in July 1983:
"Together the SPG (24u strong; and IRUs (at least
1,100 strong) are in effect the Hetls front-line
~para-military force for use in public order situa-
tions - such as riots, street confrontations, pickets
at strikes and demonstrations. They are, in effect,
Britain IS Ithird force I dr-awn from the ranks of the
uniformed police. II (12L
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The Instant Response Units were later re-named
District Support Units with 'specific and continuing
roles in districts when on standby. These ••• include
anti-burglary patrols, rowdyism patrols, searches, road
(122'blocks, observations and execution of warrants' 1_
what the GLC Police Committee Support Units referred to
as a 'blurring of any distinction between public order
and crime'. (123)
Britain's third force was effectively consolidated
during the NGAdispute at Warrington in 1983 where the
Manchester police, Tactical Aid Group (T.A.G.) made a
series of baton charges against the pickets in an effort
to clear the road for scab lorries. As a forerunner to
the miners' strike of 1984, the motorway and road blocks,
baton charges and driving of police vehicles at the
pickets proved to be a practise run for the big confron-
tation with the miners a few months later and the
consolidation of new para-military policing strategies
for breaking strikes.
With the miners' strike of 1984, Britain's para-
military third force had become well established as a
national riot force under the control of the National
,. Reporting centre and commanded by the Association of
Chief police Officers (ACPO;. (124) According to Nick
Davies, writing in the Guardian, this 'new form of
police operation' had 'marshalled' 2u,JOG officers from
allover England and Wales into one centrally directed
effort. (125) On visiting the NRC at New Scotland Yard,
Davies noted various wall charts including one chart
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listing 'the National Coal Board areas with a breakdown
on ballot results and "intimidation" as well as local
intelligence'. (126;
The use of snatch squads also figured prominently
in police operations in the coalfields, consolidating
experiences gained in policing political demonstrations,
the inner city riots of 1981 and - in relation to the
early years of the new para-military police in mainland
Britain - the experiences of the police and army in
Northern Ireland. Other tactics, such as the use of
'wedges', random stop-and-searches and roadblocks adopted
by the Special Patrol Groups and other similar provincial
para-military forces in mainland Britain were all first
developed and tested by the R.U.C. Special Patrol Group
and the British Army on the streets of Northern Ireland. (127)
The development of a new para-military third force'
in Britain during the 1970's and 198J's has been closely
related to the general development of reactive policing
in this period. It has gradually resulted in the blurring
of the operational distinctions between the policing of
public order and the policing of crime - between the law
enforcement and order-maintenance roles of the police.
~ These new para-military policing strategies are now
directed both tO~r.,ardsthe policing of public-order situa-
(128)
tions and the daily policing of working class communities;
and it was in the policing of the coalfields during the
1984/5miners'strike that any distinction between policing
public order and the policing of communities became
negated with the establishment of an overt para-military
police presence in these areas. Reactive law enforcement
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thus increasingly assumed an overt para-military form
underlined by a policy reflecting A.C.P.O. 's ideological
affinity with the Thatcher ~overnment and its political
commitment to the maintenance of bourgeois power by the
coercive subordination of an increasingly militant working
class. As Mandel has argued:
"The working class can now potentially use its
organised power, by direct popular actions and
mass strikes, to solve the profound social
problems created by the internal contradictions
of late capitalism. But the exercise of this
proletarian power increasingly collides with
another tendency inherent in late capitalism,
the subordination of all the elements of the
productive and reproductive processes to the
direct control of monopoly capital and its
state. Wage-struggles by trade unions and
unrestricted rights to strike, 'normal' liberal
freedoms of the press, assembly and organisa-
tion, rights of demonstration - all these are
becoming increasingly intolerable to late
capitalism. They must therefore be legally
restricted, undermined, and abolished by the
State. " (129)
.The policing of public-order situations underwent
significant changes in the 197'J's and 1980 's. Ne have
already examined these changes in relation to the policing
of strikes and picketing, but it was largely in the
policing of political protest in the formative years of
reactive policing in the 1970's that the strategies,
tactics and the whole paraphernalia of riot equipment
and technology were first developed in mainland Britain.-..
Mass demonstrations such as the CND and anti-Vietnam
war protests of the 195~'s and 196u's were not seen as
precipitating a fundamental crisis of policing; nor the
Notting Hill race riots of the 195",,'s,or even the
fascist and anti-fascist confrontations of the 1930 's wher e,
for example, the police retreated during the famous' battle
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of Cable street when anti-fascists succeeded in breaking
up a march of Mosley's blackshirts. Again in the 1950's
and early 1960's confrontations between fascists and anti-
fascists did not lead to the introduction of riot police,
CS gas and other paraphernalia. of repression. In 1962
police and anti-fascists clashed in Trafalger Square whe n
members of Mosley's Union Movement attempted to hold a
rally. At the climax of the battle 'wooden staves, flags
and microphones were used as weapons and as the battle
reached its climax bottles, lumps of cement and bricks
were thrown'. (130) The anti-fascists eventually succeeded
in totally breaking up the fascist meeting and a police
superintendent turned to the fascists and told the organ-
isers to stop their meeting:
"Get out~ II he shouted. "Get out all of you,'
Take the flags and all your gear and move off
as quickly as you can." (131)
It was not until the early seventies that policing
strategies in dealing with popular protest began to undergo
significant changes. The turning point was undoubtedly the
confrontations of Saltley Coke, whez-e not only did the
police appear to lose, but the Government as well.
In the early 1970's the fascist movement began to
gain momentlli~,feeding on the racist ideologies dis semina-
ted by the mass media. I'ath the growth in unemployment
and decline in living standards, the black population
became a target for both state racism - with increasing
police harassment and brutality - and the fuelling of
racism amongst sections of the white working class and
middle class with the orchestration of the notion of the
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'immigrant problem' designed to affirm the prejudices,
chauvinism and xenophobia instilled in the heads of the
masses through schooling and the media. Such developments
gave confidence to the small minority of fascists in
Britain, feeding on the racial prejudice orchestrated
by the State. They were, in effect, a by-product of
state racism. When Hartin Webster, founder member of
the fascist National Front said in the 196",'sthat they
were busy building 'a well-oiled nazi machine' in Britain,
it was effectively the state that provided the oil.
Fascist movements grew rapidly in the mid-seventies
as the recession began to take hold. In response, the
left began to organise counter-demonstrations and the
first major confrontation took place in Red Lion Square
in June 1974. Units of the SPG were deployed against the
anti-fascists and a baton charge by mounted police led to
the death of one man - Kevin Gately - from a blow to the
head. Chris Hyany of the Morning star described the police
attack:
"A horrible crunching noise built up as the police,
mounted and on foot, truncheoned and kneed their
way into the rally. They swamped all in their
way in an indiscriminate onslaught." (132)
-.. Police cordons across roads re-formed into fighting
units:
"What had been a police cordon with linked arms,
backed by the weight of the horses, became a
punching, kicking, truncheoning, arm-twisting
mass driving the marchers up Old North street."(133)
The National :Frontmarch had been organised by Hartin
webster as a demonstration against 'the amnesty granted to
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illegal immigrants".(134) 6~d in evidence to the Scarman
inquiry which was set up to inquire into the events of
Red r.Lon Square, Nebster alleged collaboration with police
Special Branch officers prior to the march setting off.(135}
In a report to the Home Secretary on the events of Red
Lion Square, Hebster also alleged detailed collaboration
between himself and the Special Branch on the policing
of the anti-fascist march. (136)
Confrontations between fascists and anti-fascists
continued to grow during the 1970 's '1..lith policing
strategies geared! more and more to dispersal and repres-
sion of the anti-fascist counter-demonstrations with the
use of SPG and mounted police baton charges. In election
year 1979, the police had built up a considerable third
force capacity with the use of SPG's and PSU's armed
with riot shields, batons and occasionally using police
dogs. At Leicester on April 21st, just two days before
the confrontations at Southall, in which Blair Peach was
killed, a dress rehearsal took place whi ch included 5,~a([])
police officers drawn from 21 forces in riot gear plus
dogs and a helicopter. 4,000 of the officers were from
other forces and were comprised of SPG's and PSU's. The
-..
whole police operation was conducted viith military precision.
Units of PSU's marched to and from locations and running
battles took place between police and .;NL supporters.
Repeated baton charges by police officers, who a~so used
their shields as weapons~ fragmented the counter-
demonstration, in their attempts to protect the National
\
Front march. As the ~Jeicester Mercurv recorded, it was
only when the N:;' march "las halted by the force of numbers
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of the ANL that the police brought out their riot
shields. (137)
The shift towards new and more overt para-military
forms of policing political protest during the seventies
Was justified by the state and the media as a response to
what was essentially defined as increasingly violent
protest, which the regular police using 'traditional'
methods were unable to handle. In the Leicester confron-
tations "bricks, bottles and the occasional smoke bomb"
were thrown over the heads of the police at the fascists,
although the Leicester Nercury described these as being
aimed at the police. (138) The point is, however, that
whilst this action led the police to reach for their riot
shields, in contraBt to the anti-Mosely confrontations in
Trafalger Square in 1962 where similarly "bottles, lumps
of cement and bricks" were thrown by a minority of the
anti-fascists, the police did not react by deploying para-
military units but called off the fascist rally. The
difference lies in~the collapse of post-war liberal
bourgeois conceptions of 'law and order' and the emergence
of more reactionary conceptions in the 197~'s. ~loreover,
the essential contradiction endemic to reactionary 'law
and order conceptions' is that they actually feed off
rising social and political disorder and exacerbate such
-,.
situations to legitimate further repressive measures,
which whilst legitimated on the grounds of temporary or
emergency contingency (such as the P.T.A. IS) become a
permanent feature of state practice. The correspondence
between on the one hand the rise of fascism, the develop-
ment of counter protest and the development of a third
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force capacity to deal with working class struggle in
the 1970's and on the other the election of a particularly
reactionary Conservative Government in 1979 on a platform
of 'law and order', is not a coincidence. Such factors
are characteristic of the politics of reaction.
The watershed ,of this shift from liberal to reactionary
forms of law enforcement was undoubtedly the period of the
1979 election when the killing of Blair Peach by the SPG
during a full-scale police assault on the Asian community
of Southall marked the consolidation of reaction, not by
the National Front, but by the incoming Conservative
Government. Indeed, it was from that moment that the
National Front dwindled and virtually collapsed as a
(139)political force.
Fascist rallies and counter-demonstrations did however-
continue for the next two years or so after the 1979
election but their numbers had·dwindled and organisation
collapsed. However what was significant about these events
post-1979 was the manner in which the police continued to
r
consolidate and strengthen their new para-military forms
of policing public order. In less than ten years, the
whole strategy of crowd-control techniques had shifted
from the "deployment of the minimum number of uniformed
police to cordon off sensitive areas or to separate rival
factions" (140) to the deplo~ent of a maximum number of
uniformed police to saturate whole areasJwith the use of
para-military units to cordon off areas but ready to re-
form ~nto combat units on the order of senior command.
This has been a maj or feature 0:[: the trans formation of
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preventice policing into reactive policing and the
subsequent formation of a third force capacity.
Eighteen months after the events of Southall,
fascist and anti-fascist confrontations were still con-
tinuing but largely in small localities around the
country. On the 23rd November 1980 one such event
occurred in Bolton, Lancashire. A detailed study of
that occasion illustrates the extent to which new para-
military forms of policing public order situations had
been established as a matter of routine by the beginning
of the 1980's.
Bolton is an average size Northern town, historically
a part of Lancashire but now within the boundaries of
Greater I1anchester. Ten miles or so north of Bolton
lies chorley, a small town still within the boundaries
of Lancashire. A demonstration by the N.N.F. was also
scheduled for chorley on the same day, with A.N.L. counter
demonstrations.
In demonstrations of this nature, the police tend
to rely on 'mutual aid' i.e. manpower assistance from
neighbouring forces, and in some cases, forces lying some
distance away. In this case it was decided to cover the
Bolton event, as a previous event of a similar nature was
alleged to have resulted in a complaint from the local
constabulary about the heavy handed tactics of SPG type
contingents drafted in. It would thus prove interesting
to observe policing strategy for this event. The fact
\
that both constabularies L,ancashire and Greater
Manchester) were both having to deal with public order
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situations of potential volatility, most probably ruled
out 'mutual aid' between them. Other nearby constabu-
laries which could have provided mutual aid were Cheshire,
Merseyside and ~"lestYorkshire. All of these had PSU's
and SPG 's.
Police activity ~rior to the demonstrations:
Prior to the demonstrations, police activity was
centred around the sides and back of the Town Hall.
This area was cordoned off later as the police moved
into positions (the NF were to assemble in the Town Hall
vicinity). I arrived on the scene a little early whilst
the police were still arriving and organising (approxi-
mately 11.30 a.m.).
Numerous police vehicles were parked around the
street and coaches were arriving containing teams of
police officers. These teams of police officers (probably
PSU's) all entered side doors in the Town Hall (p 5).
Some could be seen carrying protective pads.
AS mentioned, parked around the area were a variety
of police vehicles. Of particular interest were small
vans containing police dogs (p 1). In the same vicinity
-,.. was a large green van, probably a 'Black Haria'. On the
side of this vehicle was the Greater Manchester police
insignia (p 2,. Nearby was another road containing police
horse vehicles, also displaying the Greater Hanchester
police insignia (p 3 and 4). Apart from these, other
vehicles included a variety of transit vans and patrol
cars. It was clear that a·large police presence was
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planned from the beginning.
The ANL were rallying some distance away at Bolton
College. The police presence here appeared to be a token
presence, largely to monitor the size and activity of the
counter-demonstration. (p 6)
On returning to the Square, the back and sides of
the Town rIall were now being sealed off by police cordons
(p 8 and 161 and the town Square itself \Vas also being
cordoned off, with all entrances via side streets and
the shopping precinct being blocked by lines of police
(p 7;. Inside the square, police officers formed lines
around the perimeter (p 9, 10, 13, 14). The Square and
the surrounding area was being heavily policed by
12.00 a.m. A conversation with a police officer on the
Square proved interesting. (N.B. No demonstrators had
arrived yet, and only odd members of the public passed
around the Square; •
r-
The officer approached me as I paused at the entrance
to the Square to observe the scene (with camera). His
manner was informal as he asked me if I was free-lance;
I replied that I was, more or less. During our conversa-
tion I asked him about the police in the Square. He said
most of these were from the local force, but had previous
experience (and training?) of this kind of situation.
He also drew my attention t.o the fact that mos t of the
officers were wearing mackintoshes. The reason he gave
was that the short jackets (e.g. P 24) were often confused
with SPG's and thus perceived as such. So the officers
all wore macs instead. (This may have resulted from the
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local force IS previous complaint about SPG tactics, and
thus the wi sh to differentiate themselves}. Despite this,
however, officers were observable (especially laterj in
short jackets. FoLlow.inq this I asked him if Manchester
had an SPG. His reply, after some consideration, was
Inot reallyl. (TAG?). He also pointed out that if trouble
occurred, the officers in the Square would re-group to
work in teams. This indicated that most of the officers
in the Square were probably PSUls. The constable later
said that held been to the ~eicester event in 1979 and
had also been available for policing picket lines during
the steel strike.
policing the Demonstrations:
-.
On returning to the High Street near the Square,
this was now also being heavily policed. Teams of officers
(p 17; moved into positions on the High Street, breaking
up to form lines along the pavement (p IJ., 12, 18). This
was obviously part of the route along which the HP were
to march. Members of the NF started to arrive in the
Square shortly after 2.00 p.m. The main body was led by
police officers at the front and a police Range Rover at
the rear (p 19 and 20;. ANL supporters must have been
held back, as there was no sign of them around the Square.
The NF supporters walked across the heavily policed Square
and round into the side of the Town Hall. The Square was
now accessible to the public, although the police still
maintained their positions around the Square.
It was in the side street where the police had
originally gathered, that the NF rally began to form.
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In all, there were approximately 100 supporters. Police
cordons sectioned off the street in which the rally was
forming. These officers were mainly in short jackets,
and formed the :Eront line in protecting the NF from the
.~s supporters now slowly gathering (p 21 and 23). The
rear of the NF rally was heavily policed by (approximately)
four lines of police officers in short jackets (p 22 and 25~ •
A brief scuffle led to one demonstrator getting arrested
(p 24 - far background) •
The NF rally proceeded to march off under heavy
police escort (p 26 - far distance) with ANL supporters
held back. Some ANL supporters broke away from the
stationary protest to protest against the NF further
along the route. What emerged was that the police moved
to cordon off all exits from the Square which these .WL
supporters approached (p 27 and 28). The bulk of the
AN.~., rally had now fragmented down side streets whd ch were
blocked by police officers as the NF marched past (p 28).
Eventually the }\NL managed to flank the NF march
which was in turn heavily flanked by the police (short
jacketed) (p 29, 30, 32). ANL supporters were squeezed
along the pavement as the march progressed.
4~ incident occurred at one point on the march.
I observed two police officers abruptly leave their
position flanking the NF march, and dive into a section
of the ANL crowd which was inside and around an alcove.
The officers with no hesitation aimed straight for a
young black man, who appeared to be standing at the back
of the crmJd, and dragged him between them onto the
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street, arms around his neck, punching him in the ~ace
(p 31;. I could not discern the reason for the arrest,
apart from the colour of his skin. (He was subsequently
charged with threa"tening behaviouri.
Eventually the NF arrived back where they started.
This time all streets were cordoned off by heavy police
lines, and movement between streets was impossible (p 33).
The _~L rallied some distance away under heavy police
escort. The NF were finally allowed to disperse under
heavy police protection, the bulk of them returning to
coaches. Dispersal passed off with little incident.
No dogs or horses were used, as far as I could see,
during the events, al·though mounted police in crash
helmets were present around the courtyard in the Town Hall
rear vicinity (p 34 and 35;:. These were probably the
Greater Manchester Mounted Police. (N.B. They had earlier
l.edthe _i\N~..J march from BoIton CoJ.lege and were reportedly
used at Chorley for a similar event on the same day;.
In conclusion, the situation appeared to have been
policed mainly by PSUls largely from Greater Manchester;
some 0= the short-jacketed officers may have been either
T]\G or SPG IS from another force, but this was uncertain.
Although the policing of the Bolton event did not
compare with that of Southall or ~eicester in terms of
coercive repression of anti-fascist protest, what it did
show was the extent to which by 198~ new para-military
[arms' of policing had become routine. Indeed the mili-
taristic approach, with marching platoons, roadbloc}(s,
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cordons, mounted and dog contingents, riot equip~ent
(either in reserve or in use) and specialised para-
military units have featured prominently in the policing
of a wide variety of public order situations in the 198~'s.
Since the riots of 1981, the para-military capability of
the police has been significantly strengthened with the
practical advancement of reactionary conceptions of
maintaining 'law and order'. Hith the miners' strike of
1984, the third force, based at the National Reporting
Centre, effectively marked the consolidation of a national
para-military police force and one step nearer to fascist
forms of policing.
liThe most centralised of law enforcement systems
are those organised explicitly for the purpose
of political control. Governments which have
maintained such systems have been known in their
time as 'police states'. (141)
The Conservatives came to power in 1979 determined
to restore the profitability of British Capital at the
expense of the working class. Their means to achieve
this objective, developed through the enthusiastic embrace
of the kind of monetarist dogma popular with fascist
dictatorships, has been based on three principal strategies:
-..
..
the creation and maintenance of mass unemployment as a means
of forcing down wages and living standards to'strengthen
monopoly capital, a severe contraction of state Capital(142)
and privatisation of the 'profitable' residue. This was
essentially the basis of the Gover~~ent's pit closure
programme and its attempts to smash the N.U.Ivl. Hithin
the ~it com~unities there was an acute awareness that the
miners were fighting not just for the future of their
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industry, but for the future of their communities. The
solidarity of the mining communities was a·solidarity
against what wou ld effectively be the run-down of their
cornmun.Lta.es as well as the collieries. .ll.S l'lalkerand
Miller argue in A State of Seige:
"The miners' strike was a strike in favour of
community, in favour of working class culture,
a class strike against capital and its power
to move families and workers about or throw
them into poverty. II (143)
Coal mining is the last of the great heavy industries
to be run down and hived off to private capital. Dockland
communities in Liverpool were fragmented and scattered
into ghettoes of mass unemployment by the state which has
also developed the means to police the social consequences
of these policies. Similar processes later faced many
pit communities, as Walker and Hiller argued:
"When there is a crisis of profitability or when
the owners of capital decide to re-locate labour
or abandon it, civil liberties become dead
letters." (144)
To break the miners' strike and open the way for pit
closures, a massive police operation was initiated which
-,..
consolidated the national riot pol~ce formed in the
aftermath of the 1981 riots, and involved over 500 officers
(145)on permanent 'standby'. For constabularies such as
Greater Manchester , it meant a reduction of up to 50%
cover in police patrols as ,officers were transferred to
anti-picket duties.(14~) All Iorces by 1984 were equipped
\.,ithriot gear, including plastic bullets and C.S.
gas ~rojectiles. (147)
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This para-military mode of police organisation has,
since the beginnings of the miners' strike, been consoli-
dated as a national force under the direct control of
A.C.P.O. and politically structured through the National
Reporting centre. The most significant aspect of this
development has not only been the emergence of a nationally
controlled and directed new form of policing but the
extent to which it has facilitated a further extension
of the political autonomy of A.C.P.O. Walker and 1-1iller
however argue that the N.R.C. is simply a 'tool' used
by the Home Office; (148)what needs to be understood is
the fact that the national para-military force as directed
through the N.R.C. represents the development of a form
of policing under the political control of A.C.P.O. It
is a significant indication of the extent to which the
Police Force as a whole has become increasingly ~ a
tool of government and increasingly more a tool of its
reactionary and quasi-fascist corporate police manage-
ment. (149)
Many of the consequences of this movement have already
been realised. We have witnessed the invasion by para-
military police of pit communities, whose sole crime was
to be engaged in an industrial dispute, where the role of
-,..
the police, according to their manuals, should be to
"••• ensure that the gathering is peaceable.,,(150)N~e~
the police turned around and guided pickets, heading for
the Notts coalfields, into the waiting 'arms' of the
para-military police at Orgreave they were carefully
preparing battlefield conditions for an·'offensive against
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the N.U.M. with the purposeful creation of a situation
of violent confrontation.
In the four years from the widespread anti-police
riots of 1981, when A.C.P.O. effectively established its
national riot force, that force had, by the time of the
miners' strike, been expanded into a permanent para-
military police. This move combined police operations
against pickets with the occupation of pit communities
and violent repression of the inhabitants; thereby at
times exercising conditions akin to martial law.
According to'Walker and Miller:
"The violence that the police were able to use at
Orgreave has given them the confidence to move
into the pit villages and use that same violence
against the community." (151)
..
It is true to say that the Orgreave confrontations
strengthened the confidence of the poli~e in using violence
against pit communities; however some communities had
.. ~.
already witnessed police violence prior to Orgreave, as
for example in the Rainworth incidents. Para-military
policing operations against pit communities had throughout
. . .the strike increasingly revealed a policy of directing
anti-picket operations via the occupation of whole
communities in a similar, but more widespread manner to
. .
the Sw~~p 81 police occupation of Brixton. A.C.P.O. now
have an efficiently co-ordinated national mobile para-
military organisation. Nalker and Hiller described
conditions in Nottinghamshire:
~The majority of police officers in Nottinghamshire
are para-military police officers. They travel to
their destination in long convoys of white support
uni t vans, Lf.ke an occupying army." (152)
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For effective strike-breaking the para-military police
assumed the role of escort and bodyguard for scab miners.
For the police it was essential that a valuable commodity such
as the scab was as far as possible alienated and isolated
from the strikers. The dailr delivery of handfuls of
scabs into the pits became an extensive, almost counter-
insurgency operation for the police. On a daily basis
massed police ranks surrounded dozens of pits throughout
the country in order to enforce the individual's right
to scab, often not even at his 'place of work'. The
Tory M.P.s and men of destiny, such as David Owen, who
enthusiastically urged the Government to take more legal
action against secondary Picketing(153)kept very quiet
about secondary scabbing.
In the policing of the miners' strike, para-military
operations were conducted not just for strike-breaking
but also to politically enforce the pit closure programme
and the eventual dissolution of the mining communities.
Profitability once again became the maxim for running
down a major industry and natural resource; the fact
that the working class communities which built the
industries are shattered and t.hr own on the dole is, for
the ruling class, largely incidental - as long as the
-,.
police manage to contain resistance. In criminalising
the mining communities, the state attempted to legitimate
its actions to those sections of the working class and
middle class who have as yet not born the brunt of
recession and crisis. Hotvever it has been increasingly
\
difficult for the state to legitimate the kind of brutal
and coercive measures it has previously deployed against
- 73 -
the Irish working class and the Black working class.
For the state and the media, striking miners had to be
made into out Ia...se ; as a group of workers who ...,ere alien
and opposed to its public (unlike the noble scab).
Pickets were defined as 'pit ,bullies' and classified
under the general 'hooligan' category:
"When men formed themselves into gangs intent on
terror, whether they were National Front thugs,
soccer hooligans, or pseudo-pickets they had to
be faced as they ...Jere at Orgreave by firm and
determined police aggression." (154)
This identification obscured the reality faced by striking
miners of persistent and intensive police harassment.
As Gifford and Christian pointed out:
"To be a miner on strike is to be an outlaw, watched,
checked, prevented from using the roads, and often
intimidated and abused.1I (155)
Even pickets' cars were entered into the stolen and
suspected vehicles index of the police national computer~156)
The enforcement of Conservative anti-union policies
-,.
by the para-military third force essentially represented
the political enforcement of monetarism against working
class communities under the pretext of ~ enforcement.
AS Home Secretary Leon Brittan stated in a speech at the
Tory Party Conference in October 1984 on the problems of
implementing the Party's 'law and order' policies against
the miners:
"Hhat He're facing at the moment is not essentially
a problem of law - it's a problem of order -
'\enforcing the law." (157)
In thiD respect law enforcement beca~e a pOlitical
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problem of policing the pit-closure programme, to the
extent that the enforcement of the Government's monetarist
policies (i.e. the closure of 'uneconomic' pits) required
the deployment of the police as a nationally structured
para-military third force to implement law enforcement
policies specifically directed towards the criminalisation
of pit co~~unities.
Small pit villages, miles from the nearest 'high
crime' areas of the inner cities and usually patrolled
by one or two rural bobbies (lS8) (the last remnants of
preventive policing) were suddenly infested with criminals
and hooligans 'jumping on the bandwagon of the miners'
strike situation'. (lS9) And so, as illustrated with the
Hemsworth confrontations for example, a village usually
policed by l2crficers suddenly found itself occupied by
300 para-military police. (160) In such situations the
third force becomes a vehicle for martial Law without
recourse to the use of troops.
5) CONCI,USION: REACTIVE POLICING AND THE NEH
P .-'\RA-NI LIT ARI':;!VI
Preventive policing emerged in the 19th Century as
a means of policing the contradictions of early capital-
-.. ism. In this respect it was formed as a general system
of la\<1-enforcement and order-maintenance directed t.owards
the maintenance of conditions for capital accumulation.
As the 'constant and never-failing attendant on the
accumulation of wealth' (Colquhoun) preventive policing
was'established and developed primarily to safeguard
capitalist property from illegal expropriations, to
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combat trade unionism, and to enforce bourgeois rule
against working class political activity and within
working class communities.
For the bourgeoisie, the preventive form of policing
was viewed as necessary for the 'restoration of order' by
combating the 'menace of the mob', the improvement of
working class morality and the regulation of working class
leisure activities •. AS a political force of capital,
preventive policing had a much broader political role
than simple crime prevention. As the class struggle
intensified in the 19th Century, through industrial
expansion and working class political organisation, para-
militarism became integral to preventive policing as the
new police forces gradually replaced the military as the
regular state force for repression of domestic dissent.
During the late 1950's and 1960's preventive policing
began to lose its traditional form as the introduction of
new technoligical developments led to specialisation and
greater mobility. In addition, changes in the structure
and character of many working class communities provided
the impetus for the development of new policing strategies
and together these factors played a crucial part in the
emergence of reactive policing in the 1970's.-,....
Reactive policing has been developed as a new form
of policing the \'lorkingclass and particularly the policing
of working class communities experiencing deteriorating
social conditions.
The distinctive feature of reactive policing has been
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the emphasis on mobile patrols backed by increasingly
advanced communication and computer systems, geared to
the para-military policing of working class communities.
Reactive policing, with this emphasis on permanent
mobility, has effectively mad~ the para-military poIicing
of working class communities a matter of daily routine.
Many urban areas have been designated by chief constables
as 'high crime' areas to legitimate the new para-
militarism of reactive policing.
During the late 197.'"s and 1980 's, the para-
militarism of reactive policing in working class commun-
ities and the development of a third force capacity for
public order situations was defended by police chiefs
and right-wing politicians as a necessary response. to
what they defined as a 'crisis of law and order'. This
political relation between reactive policing and reaction-
ary ideology formed part of a broader historical relation-
ship between forms of policing, law enforcement policy
and ideology. The contradictions engendered in society
by capitalist production are identified and reacted upon
as the causes of crime and disorder - whd ch undermine
social order - rather than these contradictions being
endemic to the social order of capitalism itself.
This false identification of causal relations between
sections of the working class and their adverse conditions
of existence has formed the ideological basis of the
law enforcement policies of Govern~ent and Senior Police
Comm~nd in the 198J's. Given the strong ideological
af±ini ty between Chief police Officers and the Thatcher
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Government, the chief constables have been given scope
to further consolidate their political autonomy from
government in the formulation and implementation of
reactionary law enforcement policies. In Part 2 we vlill
examine more closely this relationship between ideology
and law enforcement policy, and the impact of these new
forms of policing on Merseyside working class communities
during the 197J's and 1980's.
-,..
./
PART 2
POLICING KNO';{SLEY
-r
\
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1) r-TE~SEYSIDE POLICE A_NDTHE FORMATION OF K DIVISION
Centralisation
A critical examination of changes in police structure
over the last twenty years reveals a distinct tendency
towar-de a r-apf.dcentralisation of policing. Since the
introduction of the Police Act 1964 the number of constab-
ularies in England and Wales has been reduced from 117 to
43. This centralisation process has effectively meant a
shift of power from local borough levels to regional and
national levels. These moves were closely in line with
local government reorganisation, particularly with the
passing of the Local Government Act (1972).
Centralisation was achieved by two processes; the
amalgamation of local forces and the restructuring of
~
police force boundaries. The creation and development
of police forces in England and Wales has historically
been closely related to local government reorganisation.
Each stage in this development has reflected a process
of centralisation of political power. In line with the
historical development of local government based upon
county and borough administrations, local police forces
-,..
also reflected this arrangement. The Municipal Corpora-
tion Act (1882) represented the first real attempt by
tho state to regulate the size of local police forces.
The Act stated that no new borough with a population
under 20,000 could maintain a force independent of the
particular county. The intention was to restrict the
growtn of small forces and encour-age amalgamation. (1)
\
The Local Government Act (1888) created the county boroughs
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from existing municipal boroughs with populations of
overSO,OOO. Political power was made equal to that
.of counties.(2) Centralisation of policing continued
with the merger of borough forces policing populations
of less than 10,000, \'Jiththe county force. This was
raised to 75,000 by the Local Government Act of 1926.(3)
The 1946 Police Act pushed through the amalgamation of
municipal borough forces with county forces.(4)
Thus, in line with the development of local government,
police forces existed on a 'two-tier' system composed of
independent county borough police forces, with areas not
covered by county boroughs policed by a separate county
force. Viith the Police Act 1964 most forces of non-county
boroughs merged with county forces.
Through the process of centralisation police forces
began to attain regional dimensions, with the transformation
of many small constabularies into fe\'rerbut larger forces.
This movement was also accompanied by regional centralisa-
tion of police management and organisation. Following the
Police Act 1964, the process of centralisation accelerated.
By 1969 many borough forces had been incorporated into the
larger County Forces and reduced to divisional status.
-..
The largest force to emerge from the reorganisations
of 1969 was the Lancashire Constabulary. Prior to the
reorganisations of 1969, there were 19 county borough
forces, with the cotmty force covering areas outside
borough boundar Les , (I.!AP I). Each borough had its own
chief constable and wa tch commf ttee. Liverpool and
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St. Helens had their own separate forces, whilst Prescot,
Kirkby and I-Iuytonareas were part of the Lancashire County
Police Force.
I'lith implementation of the statutory provisions for
amalgamation of county and borough forces, the structural
arrangements of the police forces in the Lancashire County
were radically altered. Nost borough forces such as
St. Helens, \'ligan,V/arrington and Bolton were amalgamated
into the Lancashire County Constabulary. Liverpool,was
amalgamated with BootIe to form the Liverpool end BootIe
Police, and r'lanchester was amalgamated with Salford and
Stockport. (5) The Liverpool and r'~anchester forces main-
tained their independence from the Com1ty Constabulary.
Following the amalgamation of county and borough
forces the Lancashire Constabulary was divided into 5
districts each under the command of an Assistant Chief
Constable or District Commander.(6) (HAP 2). This re-
organisation meant, in effect, the reduction of chief
consta~les in the area from 20 down to 3. The power-
and status of the position of chief constable was thus
expanded from the control of thousands to the control of
millions of people.
Each district of the new Lanc-3.Ghire Constabulary
Vias then divided up into divisions. St. Helens, '.'J'idnes,
Huyton, Prescot, Knowsley snd :lainford compriocd the 'J'
Division of District 3; Kirkby became part of 'G'
Division, also in District 3. (EAP 3)
-\1ttlOugh, as \'/illbe seen, this nev .c-:rr:::ngernentonly
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proved to be temporary, its importance in relation to
the centralisation process cannot be underestimated.
The reorganisation represented a significant shift in
political power; in relation to the police force itself,
the reorganisation and amalgamations meant the creation
of a police force of regional dimensions with an admin-
istrative system that dwar f ed previous arrangements.
At the headquarters at Hutton, four posts of Assistant
Chief' Constable were created, ,'lithone position designated
exciusively for administration.(7) Reorganisation, there-
fore, revealed a significant shift in power marking the
early stages in the formation of regional corporate
organisation.
The ease with which this reorganisation took place
(like so many of the developments in ,policing in recent
years) with little public debate and awar eneae , is striking.
In a letter to the Town Clerk of St.Helens from the Chief
Superintendent of the new 'J' Division, we read:
'IFlany of the changes will go by almost unnoticed
by the general public, and where they affect
local authorities, their officials and other
bodies, I hope the present good understanding
and relations with the local police Vlill not
be upset." (8)
-.. No formal objection to the reorganisation was made
by St.Hel~~s Corporation to the Inquiry into the proposed
amalgamation of the 13 Police Authorities 3,tBlz.c1:poolt
althoug~ ob j ections wer e raised by Darrow, B'LackpooL,
·j/ieant ',larringtonand Southport. In rejecting these
aI1plications"the Q.C. presiding over the Inquiry,
f'!r. D.r. Croom-Johnson, descrtbed the amalgamation as
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•••• an evil, but a necessary evil.n(9) A more critical"
vt ew of the proposed amalgamation was given to the Inq_uiry
by Blackpool Corporation;
"Blackpool said the scheme would endanger the
link between local government and the police,
would weaken democratic control, provide an
unbalanced police authority, and might lead
to two upheavals within a few years if another
reorganisation resulted from the Royal Commission's
findings." (la) .
Although St.Helens made no formal objection to the 'Super'
police force,(ll)~eputy Chief Constable J. Eall described
the merger as "a retrograde step,,(12)and Councillor A.E.
Lycett stated:
"One hopes it l/ill be a better set-up and wor-k
out for the best but it is the tendency these
days for centralisation, but we seem to be
becoming more and more remote from the centre
of things." (13)
This criticism was to become increasingly pronounced as
centralisation accelerated through the seventies. The
new Lancashire force was establis~ed. with 7,000 police
officers covering an area of 1,151,600 acres,(14)Which
made it the largest provincial force in the country'.
Each division of the 5 districts of Lcu1cashire
Constabulary was in turn divided into sub-divisions.
-,. 'J' Division (later partly reformed into ~ierseyside
Police 'X:' Division in 1974) was divided into t:1ree sub-
divisions based around St.Helens: ~'lidnesand Euyton \'Ii th
each sub-division commanded by a SUperintendent.
These processes not only facilitated a further shift
i"1power a\'layfrom the comuunf ties to the police, \'li tIl
the abolition of local watch committees and strengthening
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of the powers of chief constables, but also marked a
significant movement of power' VIi thin the police force
itself.
The er-eat Lon of District Commanders was specifically
for operational purposes, \>/ith the local administration
l.'emai:1.ing in the hands of uivisional Chief Superintendents.
The headquarters of :rurnber ~ District wer-e established at
Knowsley 1-:al1, and this coincided \</it~l the creation of a
mobile task force under t:'le control of a Detective Super-
intendent, "for service anywher-e in the District." (15)
It \"il1 be seen later how this Tas\: Force developed.
r·:any of the objections which were raised agams t
tile new force wer-e not so much concerned with i ts sd ze ,
as 1f/ith the combination of rural and urban police forces. (16)
The amalgamations between 1966 and 1969 were vdewed
as an 'interim' arrangement touards further regional and
national centralization. The amalgamation schemes -
introduced by Roy Jen~cins who was Eome Secretaxy at the
time - sought to reduce the number of forces in England
and ~'!ales from 117 to 45 (now 43). The original intention
vias to Lup'l emerrt the amalgamations to co Lnc Ld e \ii th the
r'econuuenda t Lona of. the Naud commi safon on Local Government
r ReorCaI1isation, but Jen1::ins decided to push ahead before
the recommendations «ex:« published. As Spar'-;:s commented:
:'It might havs been :iesirable to postpone amal-
gamations urrt i.L after the Es.ud Commission had
reported, but Roy J enldns felt strongly that
rising crime rates and growing traffic problems
made r-eorganisation of the police neceseary ,
even if it meant furt.her reorganisation in a
\ fe\'! years' time." (17)
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'/1l1ateverJ'en~:ins'intentions \',ith regard to amalgamc::.tions,
the one singularly most important cOl1se;uence was the
significant reduction of local government control by
central government in one legislative move. To significant
sections of the police, such ·as the Police Federation,
this vas supported as essentially a positive move in the
direction of the formation of a national police force.
As Sparks noted:
"But in fact the amalgamations have for practical
purposes abolished local control of the police
in most parts of the country •••• Instead of having
their own police forces, most local councils \'lill
have only a voice (in some cases, a very small
voice) on a COQoined Police Authority responsible
for the police force of a much larger area.
This scarcely provides even the appearance of
'local control' in the traditional sense, let
alone substance."(18)
For Sparks, this change was not a 'bad thing' as by all
intents and purposes the British police had "increasingly
become a national force with the real political controls
•••• being exercised by the home Secretary. Of (19)
Follm'ling the publication of the report of the Royal
Commission on Local Government in ~lgland in 1969, the
Local :Xovernment Act of 1972 vias pasaed implementing the
Commission's recommendations on local gove=nment reor6an-
isation. On April 1st 1974 1.101iceforce boundaries ',,'ere..
re-aligned. to coincide wi th 11e\,1 local au t~10rit;/boundar-Lea,
The changes marked another further step towards the
centrali3ation of policing, '.:hichincluded the establish-
ment of six r·Ietropolitan Counties, four of whf.ch wer e
cr03ated in the north of :England (r.~AP4). Tilie second
\
phaas of reorgaaisc;.,tion"1::lS to again havo ~',radical
effE:ct on tile Lancaahf.r-a force. In rc-aligning police force
- 85 -
bOillliaries to coincide with local government boundaries,
the Lancashire force was reduced with the creation of two
I'letropolitan forces wi thin the area. The vast connurba-
tLon bet','ieenLiverpool and f·1anchester was divided bet v,een
the new Eerseyside and G'reater r·~anchester Constabularies.
This, in effect, reduced the Lancashire force to half the
size that resulted from the amalgamations of 1969, from
7,000 officers to 2,500. (20) However, despite this reduc-
tion, the overall effect, with the establishment of the
two I':etropolitan areas, was to advance the centrali::::ation
movement, with the densely populated Liverpool-Hanchester
connurbation becoming one part or other of two forces.
(Hotable exceptions to this development being the trnnsfer
of ldidnes and ':/arrington :3oroughs to the Cheshire Constab-
ulq.ry) •
All the districts of the previous 'J' Division of
the Humber 3 District of Lancashire wer-e transferred as
one (with the exc eptLon of ~'lidnesand St. I-Ielens)to the
new 'K' Division of the Merseyside Police. In addition,
the Iie',,;Town of Kirkby and rural areas of Sirnol1swoodwer-e
added to the new 'iC' :Division, the new divisional boundary
coinciding with the boundaries of the new Knowsley Borough
Council undez the r~erseyside CO~'lty Council (r.:A.P 5).
r The Lancashire Force was vocal in it::::objection to re-
alignment "/i th local government. As Jac~{ ':latson,(21)
Chief Superintendent of St.}:elens Division stated prior to
his transfer to 'iC' Division:
"The new boundaries don't take account of police
.requirements - they're more for local government
"mariagemen t , "(22)
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The ~ditorial of the Police Federation Journal equally
expressed objection to re-alignment with loco.l government
boundar-Leas
"Unless the police service moun ts a united front
against them, the Government's intentions to
alter police bound~ries ,to coincide with the
reorganisation of local government represents
a serious threat to future efficiency."(23)
The Police Federation were not in principle against
regional centralisation, but the particular direction
it took:
UTa us, the argUr.lentthat police bound.aries and
local government units must coincide is wltenab1e.
~omldaries are of major significance to local
government, not the police." (24)
Indeed, the relative increase in power to the police
which centralisation would achieve, was clearly recognised,
not least by the editors of 'Folice' Journal:
liltwould be foolish to pretend that there is not
a case for the r':etropolitan forces. Each area is
closely knit, heavily populated and it would be
fairly simple to create efficient police units
for each."(25)
The Police ]'ederation's objection to re-alignment with
local government boundaries centred on the recommendations
of the Redc1iffe-r~aud 3.eport on Local Government re-organ-
isation. :!1edcliffe-r~aud"looked at the police purely
from a local government viewpoint,,(25)and did not take,.
into account policing needs. This reaction was essen-
tially a reflection of the Fed8ration's desire to diminish
local Government influence 1:1 policing matters and
strengthen its determination to aeek the esta.blis::ment
("...,.of r~gional ,'"'I,ndeventually a national police force. '-I)
In effect, however , as the n ew arrangeuerrts ver e implemen-
ted, the police force coriai.der-acIy stren,:;thenedits
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poll tical autonomy, and follo\ving the 1974 r-eor-ganfsa-
tion3, furt:1er consolidated its incre2.sing :.utonomy from
local influence. :\.sone dis3enter f!'om tlle FGder~tion
line commented:
"Unfortunately, the temporary solutions of the
Horne Office mad e vii thin the confines of the
Police ~ict 1964, could not be treated as the
basis for new local government units.
Particularl~/ from the socia-economic criteria,
the existing (pre-1974) ~olice force boundaries
are aomewlia t clumsy. If (28)
This view reflected the basic position of the R.edcliffe-
r':audReport:
HOur survey of England convinced us that over
the country as a whole the 41 new police areas
are neither appropriate areas for the operation
of the other main local government services nor
coherent socia-geographic units."(29)
A closer ali6nment of police org~lisation with tie re-
orga...."1isedboundaries of local government was therefore
seen by the Royal Conmission as essential to the main-
tenance of structural, cohesion wi t~lin the State.
';liththe metamorphosis of the short lived 'J'
Division of the Lancashire Constabulary into the 'K'
Division of the ~erseyside Folice following the creation
of Knowsley Dorough, tIle policing of large ar eas of
;.. working class estates on the outer edge of Liverpool
city was ll.."'ldertG.kenby one police ,j_ivision. .:'t.l'easvd th
large middle class r2sidential belts such as Eccleston,
Rainhill and ·,/indlewhf.ch .:ere previously under the
Lancashire 'J' Divf.sf.on, wer e joined wi th 3~.~IelenG area
to f~rm Mersey=ide rolice '1' DIvision adj~cent to
Division.
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!liGht from its inception, 'K' Di".;ision was given
part.tcul.az- attention by the Cllief Constable (thell
Eaugh+cn) and t~e ne\dy formed combined Police Authority.
Twomonths prior to tile date 011. which ':r~' Division
officially became operational, the Police Corimfttee
called for the :::ubmission of J. report on I::' Division
to be submitted three inorrbhe from the date on which the
new Force became operational. (30)~he subsequent report(3l)
concerned itself primarily 1;iitho the manpowerand strength
of the Division. ':!ithin three months, from its ince:-;:tion,
the uniformed strength of the Division was increased by
1 chief inspector, 3 inspectors and 7 constables(32)
(see Table I). :'lhilst manpowerat that time was below
the official establishment, (33)it was a lower figure than
the force average for establislunent deficiency. (34)
The only reference in the report that related to
Lav enforcement policy concerned crime statistics:
"Tn the fil.'st two months of operation the division
had the third from highest figure for recorded
crime and the detection rate was 45. G?~as against
the force average of 36.5~~. (35)
From tr..is extremely vague st<.;.tefllent, the Chief Constable
concluded that: :'~hese figures indicate that the Division
~... has a high crime rate but is coping with it well. II (36)
A careful examination of tile report fails to reveal
lIthese figures" (i.e. the figures for recorded crime)
although a rather stranGe composition does appear in
thG earlier report of the Chief Constable (De3ignate)
(-,..'rnade\prior to reorganisation. )() This arubiguous compo-
si tion was constructed by re-:::rronging and Gra..':'ting
TABLE I
'K I DIVIsrON
CNIFORM .PERSONNEL (April - Aup,". rq74)
Ch. Supt. Supt. Chief Insp. Insp. Sgt. Con. Tntal-
Est abli shment (Hale 2
I 3 5 14 29 203 255
strength on rst.April. 1974.
I 3 4 II 31 170 220
strent.'dh on 6th. AUP'\1st • Iq? 4.
I 3 5 I4 30 177 230
Force recruitrr·.ent from I.4.74.
Losses from I.4.74.
38 males and I5 females
54 males and II females
Racruits posted to 'K' Div. from I.4.74.
Losses in 'K' Div. from I.4.74.
9 males and no females
4 males and I female
Reproduced from:
Establishment n.nd strel"r;th 'T~' Dlvisj on
(POL 1),/7"1) Report of the Chief G::>nst.'1ble .
6th,A'1;-;tlGt.I974.
\
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figures for reported crime ill1972 onto a map of the
new r':;erseysider--:etropolita.."'lDistrict Boundaries which
came into be tng in 1974. However, eV311 if ve take 'K'
~ivision as District 'D' (being the s~me area) it could
be interpreted that the area.in fact had the second
Lowe st crime rate of all the f-!etropolitan Districts. (38)
HO\'1ever,whe tner the crime rate in the Knowsley area,
based upon these ambiGUous statistics, was the
second lowest or 'third from highest' crime rate 011
Eerseyside is a matter of conjecture. The crucial point
is that the new Division was immediately defined upon its
establishment by the Chief Constable as a 'high crime'
area requiring particular attention. ',le will examine
later the ideological foundation of these definitions and
their translation into the enforcement policy for the
Division.
Corporate I-ianagement
The creation of r.Ie:cseysideFolice meant an extensive
excansd on of political power and administration in terms
of police organisation wi thin the new r·~erseysidearea.
Run by a small rightly knit executive comprised of 3
assistant chief constables, a deputy chief constable
r and the c1:ief constable with overall command , the 1·:ersey-
siue force on its establishment commanded a level of power
and authority far greater than any previous police force
arrangement wi thin the area. AB part of the \'1idertendency
tov.Jcxdsnational centralisation of policing with the 1'e-
\organisations of 1974, the basis had been laid for the
corporate national organisation of chief constables and
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their regional forces - the Association of Chief ?olice
Officers - to coordinate a national police force. Chief
Constables now occupied ~ corporate national executive
posi tion in :..8?O as well as command of regional-size
forces.
At divisional level, followiut; the reorganisations
of 1974, chief sUPerintendents now occupied posi"tions at
a level previously occupied by chief constables; the power
and status of the position of chief constable asswned a
neVf dimension. This re!'larlcableshift in power can be
illustrated if the power structure of the Lancashire
Constabulary prior to the 1974 reorganisation is compared
wi th that of the r'~erseysideforce created after the re-.
organisation, remembering that a sizeable ChW1k of the
new I\:erseysideforce had previously been under Lancashire.
(Table 2)
..
For example, in Table 2 we see that wi ti,lthe I·Iersey-
side rorce, Training and Traffic are subsumed within
larger departments headed by an asat stant chief constable
(Inspectorate) and rulassistant chief constable (Operations)
respectively; the Training and Traffic sections being
managed by a superintendent and chief superintendel1t
respectively. I-iowever,it must not be assumed that the
ran!~ of chief superintendent lias become of little conse-
quence; the position, it must '!:leremembered, affords a
post of significant power' that ranks with the posi tLon
of Chief Constable prior to reorg~nisation. The crucial
point is that celltrali.jatioll,in the context of corporate
management, created new heights of political power wi thill
tile police.
HF.ADr;,UART:SR3 ;3TRUCTtJRE
TA"P.LE ?.
j:'"'fIIVl.' CONSTABLE IoJ.••..• ~
I
'.ol:;l?UTY CIIIElt' CONS'l'AI3LE.- I II
ASSISTANT ASSISTANT ASSISTANT ASSISTANT
CHIEF CONSTABLE Cl·IIE? CONS'l'ABLE CHIEr CONSTABLE CHIEF CO:JSTABLE
(CP..H1E) (TRAFFIC) (ill::rN. ) (TP..AIXnra)
(2) MERSEYSIDE :'OL1C:8(1974)
IC~IIE1!' CONSTABLE I
I
_-----_-----IOEPUTY CHIE.l!'COlmTABLE IT
ASSIS'l'A."fr
CHIEF CONSTABLE
(INSPECTORATE)
I
All Territorial
Divisions
Training
l\!ounted & Dogs
Racm ting &
Special Canst.
staff Appraisal
& Personnel
~~isCiPlinel
..
\
ASSISTA)JT
CHIEF-- CONSTABLE
(ADI1IN.)
I
I
Secretariat
Research, Develop-
-ment &
Planning
Firearms &
Explosives
vlarrant Dept.
'lIar Duties
Property
Office
I
ASSISTANT
CHIEF CONSTABLE
(OPERATIONS)
I
H • 0.. Admi n • 1Jnit
Pay & Pensions
Drawing Office
Housing &
Building
IIanagement
'.:elfare Dept.
Catering
1"/p1n8' Fool
.Printing
Statistic3
Accounts &
::';urplies
C.I.D.
Traffic
Corrmundca.td ons
Community Relations
8·")lP'~(>S: (r ) Chief Superintendent (St.llelens Div.) letter to TOiffiClerk 26/3/69
(2) Th') Report of the Chief C..-mstable(Desi[,rnate) to the
Fblice CO:i.mittee of the l-:ameysid.3 C.C.
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.,'ii th this expansion of t:1epolice power structure
and the creation of Forces of regional dimensions in 1974,
the civilian administration was expanded lItocope with
increased centralised functions.,,(39) Eoreover, not only
were additional civilian staff employed but, as in the
case of the new Nerseyside Force, ".... all posts in
Divisional administration, including that of the officers
in charge, \'1illeventually be filled by civilia:l staff.,,(40)
Using police figures from the Report of the Chief Constable
Designate, tllis wo ul.dhave eventually led to an increase
of 51 operational police officers for the Nerseyside Force.
Hypothetically this would have meant an increase of 1 chief
inspector for 5 of t~e 12 Divisions and ffil average increase
of 1 sergeant and 3 constables per Division. ','Iith 545
administrative a~d clerical personnel on establislunent in
1974,(4l)the replacement of police officers in Divisional
administration would ha.ve increased the civilian establish-
men t by 8.5~'~. Ilowever-,although this was the objective,'
a later report by the Chief Constable on the civilian
establishment of 'K' ~'ld 'L' Divi::ions revealed that both
Divisions still retained tlleir Divisional administration
police officers, fow:: apiece and including one Chief
Inspector each. In this report (lS75), the Chief Constable
stated that the officers wer e to remain in these posts.
The report st~tes:
;1T:he civilia:l authorised establishment of tIC , Division
is 23. This figure includes 4 yosts which are
occupied by police officers and it is not proposed
that thes e a.ioul.d 'be civiliailised at present. On
1st ..;'pril 1974, 27 civilians who wer-e performing
duties at the five police stations in 'K' Division
'were transferred to-r·:erseysiderolice and during
the ensuing period this number has been found to
be essential :for t:'.i.8efficient running of the
lJivisiol1whf.ch contains not only the :Divisional
Police Officers and Civilian Emoloyees (England and Wales)
(Source: Social Trends 1980 and 1984)
POLICE OFFICERS CIVILIANS
1951 62,000 4,500
1961 75,800 11,800
1966 86,900 18,200
1971 97,300 28,100
1976 109,500 34,600
1977 108,200 34,100
1978 109,100 35,000
1979 113,300 35,800
1980 117,300 37,700
1981 119,500 37,700
1982 120,900 37,700
r
liThe advance in technology has only served to
closet personnel more tightly and securely
within the corridors of power, and from which,
once in, they seldom emerge. After all, how
many scientific and technical aids really
prevent crime? In the majority of cases they
only come into effect after a crime has been
committed. Civilianisation was to release men
for street duty it has only created huge
empires which now exist to house them all.
Nhere have the beat men gone,?11
Police Review 1975, quoted in N.J. Braslavsky,
'Towards the idea of community policing - a
note I in HOLDS vlORTH LAW REVIEW VOL. 6 Spring
1981 No.1.
\
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Headquarters at Knowsley, but very busy sub-
divisions v;ith Courts at Huyton and Kirkby (4"')
where some of the civilian staff are employed." ~
On the basis oZ this statement, the Chief Constable
recommended the recruitment of 8 more civilia.."'ls for the
administration of 'K' Division' (increasing the civilian
establishment there by 4270 and 2 for 'L' Division. (43)
Coupled \'Iith the increase in the strength of u.."'li!ormed
personnel, "receiving a generous allocation of the recruits
available,,(44) 'K' Division was becoming a successful
subsidiary within the Corporate or-gandsa+Lon of r,1erseysid~
Police.
~'lith t~e headquar ter s of 'K' Di..,ision established at
K110W3le~'rhll in the private estate of Lord Derby (better
known as Knowsley Safari Park) , sub-divisional stations
were allocated to Huyton, Kirkby and Halewood. Out of a
Divisional total of 272 police officers, 138 were attached
to :r:uyton, 72 to Kirkby, 43 to Halewood and 19 at KnowaLey
Hall. (See Fig. I). I:owever these figures, based on the
operational commandstructure of 'K' Division as shown in
the Report of the Chief Constable ~esignate, ~ailed to
include the 52 police officers of the ~orthern Task Force
based at Knowsley Hal.L and whose mobile patrols included
'K' Division. The fact that ICnowsley hall housed both
the headquarters of ' ...e' Division and the lJorthern Task
Force meant the eetiabLfshmen't of a rela-lii-vely large,
centralised centre of political, administrative and oper-
ational power within the ~erseyside ~orce. Indeed, the
very fact t:1at the new j)i-visioll required ,the rental of a
Stately hall to accomrnodc:te its hendqus..rters actually
'K' DIVISION: OPERATIONAL Cm-TI'1.'\NDSTRUCTUTIE
I Chief Superintendent
I Superintendent (Deputy)
IDivisional Administ.ration
I Chief Inspector
I Sergeant
2 Constables
C.I.D. Administration
I Superint end errt
I Sergeant
I Constable
Collator
2 Sergeants
Crime Prevention
I Sergeant
Prosecutions Department
I Chief Inspector
I Sergeant
I Constable
H .Q. Total :I9
Scenes of Cri!l1e
2 Constables
DruB's Squad
I Sergeant
Traininrr Officer
Divisional Total:272·
I S3rgeant
H~y.ton S'.lb-division Kirkby Sub-(Hvisi_on
I Superintendent I Superintendent
I Chief,Inspector I Chief Inspector
i , I
Uniform C.I.D. r.«, TJnjform C'.I.D. 1'.1:1.
5 Insps I Ch.lnsp 4 1nsps I Ch.lnsp
12 Sgts 4 Sgts I Sgt 7 Sets 2 3Gt;s I Sgi
90 Cons tlI2 Cons 7 Cons 41 Cons 8 Cons 6 Cons
I Pt/.Con-.. Doe: Handlers
3 Cons
Sub-rlivislonal Total :138 Sub-divisional T~)tal:72
\*-illC. I Con on Special :Br3.nchDuties)
Hale\.,rood Sub-cH vision
\
I Gh:Lef,Inspector
U of' C Tin l·I'Jt11 Cr:n •.l • JJ • L:.::...
I Insp
4 Sgts
30 Cons
I Szi;
4 Cona 2 Ccna
Sub-di visional T·)t8.l:13
Source:
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underlines tnis point, especially when the Chief Constable
at the time stated that there was " •••• no other premises
in that division sui table for the purpose \1it~:out sub-
. , ,
stantial alterations.n\.45J
Renroductive Canital(46)
The reorganisations Wllich followed the ?olice ~;'ct
1964 strengthened the power of the Chief Constable in
facili tating a greater exer cLs e of political power over
the management and control of policing.
Centralisation may have strengthened the power of
the police, but thio centralisation could only be achieved,
in this context, 011 the basis of an expanai.on in the
aCCUll1ulation and concentr::tion of reproductive c:"pi tal
financed by the local and centr-a'l state. 'lIe see here the
centralising charac te» of capital extending to the poIi tical
-,..
relations of the state: Tne new !Ilerseyside Force assumed
corporate dimensions char-act er-Ls tLo of private capital. (47)
I'ioreover, this relation was clearly expressed in the
planning, investment and organisation of the new j;'orce.
In IS?7, three years following the creation of the r·1ersey-
side Police, a private:; firm of 'mailagement COllBultants,(48)
was employed to report and make r ecoumenda tiOllS for
further reorganisation \1ithin the 1~ersGysid3 Force. (49)
The final report of tlle company - 'I' .A. l·:anagement
:;onsul tants Limited' - was approved by the FoLdce COllH:iittee
in April 1978. (50)
\ ~'l:ilenthe Chief Constable Designate presented his
zepor-t on the es t.abLdsnmerrt of the Force in 1974, a
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significant part of' the report was concerned \Ii tl'l plans
for a raajor 'capital building programme'. (51) By far the
most expensive item on the inventory was the proposed
building of a new "purpose buil til (52 )headquarters at a
cost of £5,293,000. (53) This, .according to the Chief
Constable, was tlle most pressing priority(54)and, in effect,
amounted to nearly half the ZlO,545,290 estimated cost,of
the capital building programme.
The 'interim' headquarters of the new r·~erseyside
.i!'orce was established in the :Building of the headquarters
of the previous Liverpool and :BootIe Constabulary in Hope
Street. According to the Chief Constable at the time, the
headquarters was already Itotally inadequate' for the
previous Liverpool and BootIe police, wi t!l the new Force
aggrav~ting tile situat~on still further. (55) In other
\'lords the demands of reorganisation for a rapid expansion
of the bureaucr~cy required a 'purpose built accornmod~tion'.
The immediate problem was , however, t11at the new premises
had yet to be built(36)to accommodate this ex.panding empire.
According to the Chief Constable:
!I ••• The best solution would appear to be to use
the building for as many elements as it will
accommodate and seek other temporary accommoda-
tion.!1 (57)
The expansion of Divisional Ileadquarters such as 'D' and
'E' Divisions for udditional office accommodation, and
Knowsley Hall with its 'ample' accommodation provided
some tempocary accoinrncda tiOll. However, the Chief
Cons~able described t~is as a 'folicy of decentralising
heauquarters administ:cative fUnctions f. (58)Consi-lering
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that the new ]'orce at this conjuncture had not oficially
come into existence, there is 110 detail given in the Chief
Constable Designate's report of this 'policy' of decentral-
Laa't Ion , Indeed the statement contradicted tile Chief
Constable's earlier statement :from the same report
concerning the need "to appoint additional staff to cope
wi t~l.increased centralised functions."
Cor;;mandand Control
Eerseyside Police was established in the mid-seventies
as a corporate organisation. Launched by its capital
investment programme \'lithlocal and central government
funding, it had become by 1904 fully modernised with
aophf.stLcated computerised systems of administration,
communication. and information processing. The introduction
of new techi.1ology into radio communication systems created,
in addition to the overall Force r:::.dionetwor-k, direct
COi1lil1lli1.icationa b etwe en patrols arid su"b-divisional , divisional
an.d :::?orceheadquarters. (59)
::fUl'therexpansion in reproductive capital occurr-ed in
the late lS70'3 and early 1<;30'3 to coincide with further
centralisa tLon in the divisional structm:-e of t}J.e~orce,
reducing the number of territorial divisions from eleven
to seven , (60) ~his add i.tiol1al reorganisation was corio.Lned
with 1 ....1'a "c omp.Lex co.nput ar and tec;.molo,;ical programme', \o I
\'Ihicnincluded t~e creation of a highly centralised and
..cullycomputerised 'command and control system', at a
cost of ~2 million. (62)and scheduled to have uecome fully
\ (- ,operational by Au~ust 1984. b3J ~s well as providing the
I·:erseyside :'olice Force Control l{oom wi tll a uo st e::tellsive
7in:. 3.
~·~P.''''seysiCle Foli cC> - COr:J"'llt, eri. sat i.on
Provisio~al Time-scala (::-i.evised nov0mber T97i1)
November I978 Drafting Opera.tional Ruquirement and Commandand
Cont:rol liUnctional Specification. rrepare for Dasien
Study. Issue fir3t draft of Operational Requirement.
]ccGmber I978 Co:nmenceDesi",-n Study. Refir:e Operational Requirement.
Continue Commandand Control Specification.
January I979 Continue refinine Operational 3equirement. Continue
Command and Control Specification. Issue Desi,3n Study Report.
February I979 Consider ]esicn Study Report. Amend Operational
TIequirement accordingly. Pir3't issue of CommandMd
Control Specification. Compile list of possible suppliers.
Prepare covering doc~rnents.
I':arch I979 Issue Operational Requirement and Commandand Control
Specification.
Earch,April,
Bay I979
Discussions 'IIith suppliers. Exchange memoranda
to clarify details.
June I979 Invite tenders. Receive tenders. Zvaluate tenders.
July I979
August I979
Continue evaluation of tenders.
Select supplier. Finalise contractual details.
January 1980 Coa'TIandand Control F~'1ctional Spp.cific~tion r~~zen.
June I980 Police National Computer interface 2i"J...":ctionalSpecifi:::ation
issued.
June I981
June 198I -
June I982
June 1982
Co;x1and and Control handovcr ,
Prepare Cri7:lc Functional SIJecii'ication ivith suppl Lez-s,
C:r:i:ne Syste:ns Functional ;';pecification Frozen. I3s'J.e
of Punc t iona.I Specification to euppl.Lez's and invite tenders.
June 1981
Go Live-Phase I-CriI~e
Go Live-Thase 2-Crirr~c
Go LiV'C-P~lasc3-Crime
lLpriJ,. I984,.
August 1984
Reproduced from: ':'Ierseysido Thlice - 'ReorG'Ollisation and Comput.::risation'
(rOL 6/79 ):lE-port (Ii' :''1-,,,. C'),{ f_) [' 8:m:1b.blfJ (ApPo'1dix)
"
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and powerful apparatus of information gathering and
pr-cceaafng , the computez-Ls ed Commandand. Control system
he.s also facilitated the extension of centralised corrtz-o l,
over operations. For exanrp'l.e , 'a l1UIUOer'of incident
vehicles dare allocated to each of the divisions wit~in
the ::force. ::llese' Iric Lden't vehicles' and other 'resources'
en t~le UiL]' band came under the d.irection and con'ta-o L of a
specially appointed Chief 3uperintendent (Cor.nllul1ications)
based at t~e Force Control Room.(64) Overall direction of
tlle Force Control Roomrested with the AasLstan t Chief
Constable (Operations).
fhis centralisatio~1 of.' communication cys tems away
from local divisional and sub-divisio:i.1al levels strengthened
further the corporate organisation of the ]'orce al1d the
political power of its corporate management. This process
of centralisation, ultimately tow2.rds the formation of a
corporate natioaal police force, has inc=easingly made
redundant the aotion of policing as a local authority
service. ~ schedule in the Chief COl1stable's Report on
reorganisa tLon and cO;:iputerisation in 1979 emphasLsed this
rnovzment.
!!The police dedicated corrput er s \'Jill not ue linked
to Local ~;'uthority systems. II (65)
The link-up of herseyside Police to the :201ice
!Jational computer(66)f...u'ther illustrates the centralisation
of :policing towards national corporate organisation. In
1984, the year in which Eerseyside' s Commandand Control
system became operational, anothsr 'Commandand COl1tro~
SYDtGruI coordinating regional forces, b ecarne opera timlal
at national level - blre ~;atio:t1al :\eportinG Centre.
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1:!hen tbe N:tC"ueca!!leop or-a.t.Lona'L during the miners' strike,
a corporate national force \Jas further consolidated
through this step into the field of operations.
This combination of a nationally centralised commWli-
cations system (the F1W) and 't:le establishment of an
cpe.ca't Lone :b.eadguart;ers C~RC) under t:te control of the
self-aJ,Jpointed Association of Chief rolice Officers (ACI'O)
created t:le 'basic frawewor:;.cfor a national po Ldce force
with political autonomy from both local and central govern-
ment.(67)
The movement towards a national centralised police
force has created new heights of political power for the
police \ihich have broken through the historical barriers
of the local state. Indeed this has been a char-act er-Latdc
feature of centralisation under capitalism in geuer-a'l ,
The centralised power of mul,ti-national capitalist
corporations over individual nation-states is well known,
As r·:andel has argued:
" ••• The international centralisation of capital
must "ue understood as capital's attempt to break
through the historical barriers of the nation-
state." (68)
Centralisation within capltalist production completes
the worl~ of accumulation by enabling capitalists to extend-,.
ti.le scale of their operatio ..as , The analysis similarly
.).pplies i:1 the cxte:i.lsion of the scale of operations that
has been a chaa-acber Lst.Lc of the corporate centralisation
of police forces at I'zgional and national levels. r~ore-
over 1 tl:e develo;men t of corpo:cate-:nili tary commandand
control systoms llas conao.Li.da ted cor por-a'te control over
oper ati cns and Law 8:i.1forcsr.:e~ltlio1icy. ~hese l:-.ove;neilts
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have for:ned major component s in the development of reactive
and pre-emptive policinG. 110\lI~Ver,~'lhilst }:.olicing
str::te;ies at erie level ,nay be related to deyelovment3
L: ::::'2proiucci "le force:J, t~ld;Yare also d.~terminei by the
char-ac t er- of social conditions and cl.asc relations wi t:ain
police areas, and the priori tised Law enforcement policies
dr-awn up "uy senior police command.
2) ,~~, DIYI3IGN: IDEOLOGY A~7D LA-V;ENii'OrrCE7·7.81~TrCLICY
"lj"hentHe fTerseyside Force came into being in April
1974, involving a radical restructuring and centralisation
of political and administrative power within the police,
pcLl.cy formation and management acquired more of a Board-
room char ac ter and a more cl ear Ly defined bureaucratic
corporate structure. TIle report of the Cllief Constable
Designate at the time of reorganisation cle':!.I'ly defines
operaticn and policy ill terr;:s of police management and
control. The only aspects 01' the report that the Chief
Constable tll0Ught in need of :201ice Authority ratification.
conc exnsd mainly fiscal item.:; such as the employment of
civilian staff by the folice Committee and tIle Capital
I)uilding }rot,'Tamme.
-.. ij 'Community t Relations
!'It is intended to COiltinue any local arrangements
which are In being, but for tIle aake at ul1iformi ty
it is proposed to make t~e sub-divisional conmanders
~rilllarily responsible for CO"lmunity :-~elations in
their areas and to ccor-dLnaba t:Lleir efforts throuGh
a central office to be entitleJ 'The Youth and
Corrraun Lty "Srancll. n (69)
\
The statement aoov e comprises the auc s tanc e of the
short 3ec tion 011 'COlli,JUlli ty :i:' .31ations' i:1 t~le report.
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It is qui to clear t:18.t the policing of y out.h figured as
a priori t:y policy issue far the :1e\1force. .\s ve sha'l l,
see later ill more det::.il, policing the youth of ICir:~by
and. otlJ.e~ parts of ,:~, Division vas a priori tLaed policing
task for the area. Indeed, only 2. fev'; weeks ::lfter re-
org=.nisation (April 1974) a 'large-scale' disorder broke
out in ra:;:kby involving over 200 young people; " ••• cpecial
police reinforcements consistins of the dog and mounted
sections had to "Je called in to re-establish order ••• ,,(7C)
Part of the 'YlOrlcof the Youth and Community :3ranch
in the IS7:)' s stemmed from tile original 'Youth and
CommunLty I'rogramme f introduced in 1970 by Eaughtion when
he \'las Chief Constable of the Liverpool and :BootIe
Constabulary. ~he },>rograrnmeemphasised 'liaison with
Community 'Lased organisations, such as neighbourhood
councils, tenants t bodies .8.ndother similar associations ~71)
It is important to note t:lat even a to~\.e!l consideration
of any form of liaison with youth t:1emselvcs VIas totally
absent; moreover it; vias moves SUC:-i as this that formed
the gr-oundwor-k for the later development of so-called
t community policing'. The ideological L;port:::nce of this
policing strategy, apart from ~:le rnateria.l it proviu.es
for tIle bourgeois press to articulate Saine courrter=ac tLon
to offset the negative effects of coercive for=s of
policing, is tllat it lirovides a means of formulating some
vestige of legitimacy for a pervasi-ve mean a of surveillance
and control of t:le wor~ing c l.acs coramun I t.Lea, ~h8 dividing
Lf.n e b etve en commun.Lca t.Lon i;i tL til.e cO::iillu.nityand surve i.L«
la:1c~ 01' the coramunfty is a tenuous one; as the Youth
and Corimundty :8ranc:·l.l}rob~'al!imestat8u ill 3eptcIii"oer lS76:
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It ••• although t::.ese organisations are not always
tru.ly representative of the community, they none-
theleS3 pr ovLde va.Luab Le r:iec..us by whicll it is
poas LliLe for the poLf ce to coumundca t a -,Ii tIL large
number-s of people." (72)
Desp It e the "communf ty-~ased' appear-ance of tile proGramme,
the entire s tir ucbur e of the depar-tmerrt waa controlled by
t:le police; the 'Go~r.:lli1ity Liaison Officers' being Sil11ply
the" commander-s of each DiiJ"ision and superintendents of
each sub-division. ~he pro,:;=:.rr:'"Je\'J8.8 coorcli::.ate:i '!::lj. t!:e
"O--Ull'; .'-y n~la·;o""s/' TT", Departmerrt d-s"r-f~'e·~ a"... an1.1 .... ,' .... '" .. ~ .......... v • .u. v. J.J" j ... , 1::.........., 1..1. .:I J.
'Ciilcillary department' in the report of' the Chief Constable
Designate. In the Youth and CommunLty Pr05ral~Jllleit vent
under t:le name of ';~clvisory COi11:;littee on Youth and
CO!:l;uunitj .:tela tions f • (73)
:i:h1..:Sa significant part of the initial policy for
t{le Eerseyside l?orce on its es taal.Lshmen t was directed
towar-ds redefining relations vii th communities on a 1!10re
systematic, structured arid managerial level.
Given tile reorgaLlisatiOlls of 1966-69 and 1974, the
creation of constabularies witIl corpora.te characteristics,
the Sllift in e•.:phasis from Labour intensive to" capi t::::.l
int,.'-:ilsiv-~ fvrms of oper a'tLcn and t:le increased cent::c·al-
isation of :politiac::.l power and ::dministration in the
structure OI"police forces beyond tlle confines of the
local state, local relations between police and ccmcun.l ties
becams ::>ignificantly wea.cen ed in varying dec;-rees. ..;l.gainst
a backgr ou...nd of other deteriorating social corid LtLona ,
tJ18 pos t.-war conaenaua'l, Lmagezy of ::3ri tis:! policing
\
increashlgly assumed ~ contr.:.dictory position to the
developments III policing which camd to the forebl.'oUJ.lu
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in the l'~70's. In terms or t:he mafn+enancs of legitimacy
and the management of Law enforcement, police forces have
inc::-ea::3ingly come to rely on their public relations
industry to offset sone of the neg:ltive co~sequences of
these developmenta.
:i~ilst policing is a basic relation of coercion,
the relation lias a.ssumed a variety 01' historical :forUls,
and a key feature of British policing has been the extent
to ....;hich it has relied on traditional popular ideological
conc ept i one of Law and ord~r in exorcising power. Dev al.op-
rnent3 in tha late lS60's and 1970's significantly eroded
police hegemony and subsequently police c!liefs b agan to
develop new strategies in 'p'll.blic relations f. Th"J.st::..a
lS70 "c ca';: the rise of t!1e med.La-consc.Lcus chief ccns t cabLea
expo1.l..'1.dingand orchestrating 'law and order' ideologies.
The subsequent growth in the police-public relations
industry represented an a.tt empt to counteract the effect
of new developments on local relations. In 1978, r,:ersey-
side's Chief Constable, r:r. Kenneth Oxford, launched a
'major campadgn ' against crime and vandalism. ::JntitIed:
"Jn to the ::2ighties \vith :Pride!!, t~le strateQ', not unlike
most Law and order strategies, sought to reinforce donunan t
ideologie~ concerned with 'rising crime' and its solution
via more police powers. The par-t Lcul.ar specification of
'vandalism' in this campaign effectively represented the
ideological reference point at a more general' lru; eniorce-
inent policy directed towards legi tiiilc.ting the coercive
policing of llil increasingly JisaIfecte~ youth.
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\ii) Law Enforcement 1'olicie8
During the 1970's 'vandalism' emerged as a prioritised
policy of law enforcement in the r':erseyside area. In 'K'
Division, Qnd particularly Kirkby Newtown, the policing
of vandalism 1Jecamea central politic in the development
of police relations with other state agencies, the media,
and with the policing of youth. As the Chief Constable
commented in 1976:
"~lith regard to the high rate of crime and vandalism
committed by juveniles in the t.own it is considered
that the present policy wherel>y Juvenile Liaison
Officers forge a close working rel=:.tionship with
headmasters, teachers and social woz-lcer a provides (~\
the right approach and that it should "oe coutil1ued." 14/
The establisl1ment of 'vn.ndal and crime patrols,(75)
inevitably increOlsej existing antagonistic relations
between "'larking class youth and the police. The develop-
ment of policing strategies in ,:: ' Division to deal \'Iith
van~alism expressed specific ideological conceptions of
the causes or.' vandalism. The problem ..las defined in terllls
of
" • •• sheer apathy on tile ~t:iart of so many selfish
.or thoughtless parents, who make no effort to
exercise control over the movements of their
children. :1 (76)
This 'ohjective assessment' according to a former Chief
r
Super Ln'tenden't of ,~.\.r Division - rrorrn:mChapple - and
contained in a police study of ICirkby \.;ri tten Ln 1975
just prior -Cohis ap.f}ointment to the position uf ahief
Supe:cintendent must, he argues, II ••• be placed high on
the list uf causa ti ve factors. " (77) lio·...tevex , despite the
...
Report's reactionary conclusions and the ext ent to wnich
such ideology has had a bearing 011 the formulation ,..nd
i/
---- .. _---
..~,-.-..
• ,
8:::;~
(!)
:z::
I)
f-'.
et'
f-'.
~I
.o
0
~
et
~
CD
<"~.
(lJ
I-'
I-'
,
\
- 103 -
implementation of policing policy in 'Kt Division, the
Report does make some a.ttempt to examine tIle object of
vandalism in a more serious manner than the usual rlletoric
of the Law and order mandarins. For example, the case of
the almost systematic destruc~ion of specific types of
council flats in Kirkby by juveniles was examined. These
flats, of the three-storey (Low rise) type built by the
council, are a standing example of the l-~indof jerry-built
accommodation into which many of the post-war inner city
working class in Liverpool have been dumped. Chapple
records a 25;~ turnover of these flats per year compared
with a figure of l3.5;~ for high-rise and mid-rise flats.
The three storey low-rise flats account for 24;~ of all
dwellings in Kirkby. (78)
The.:destruction of these flats by juveniles illus-
tra-ces the fact that 'vandalism' is not necessarily
'mindless'. The flats are far too emaIl for many of the
families living in them, thus creating intolerable conditions
of overcrowding. ~':allsbet-oleenflata are paper-thin \.,ith
ver""oJ"Ii ttl.;; aound insulation - whi-ch can often create
friction b etwe en neighbours. For aoiue youth in Kirkby
the only effective solution is to destroy t.hein as they
-,.. become vacant. For Chapple, however, the main cause of
friction between neighbours living in such conditions vias
defined in terms of social inadequacy on the part of the
people themselves:
~I ••• there is little doubt tllat a great deal of
noisy annoyance is caused by anti-social neighbours
,-whodo not take into account the feelings of others."
(79)
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",.hat we have here in a nutshell exemplifies the pr oces s
wnereby the intolerable living conditions of the wor-kf.ng
class are defined as a problem created 1y the working
class itself. To recognise the real causes as arising
from social conditions deteamfned by the form of social
relations in Kirkby would undermine the very role of the
police in a~tually revroducing 8uch relations along with
other state a,sencies. The role of 'anti-vandal' patrols
in the disciplining of working class youth represents more
of a wider public order stra tet,7 than simply an a'tt en.p t to
reduce vandalism.
According to 'wTiters such as I·:awby,who analyse
policing largely through the prislll of police ~tl?-tistics,
differences in crime statisticCl between residential areas
are not the result of 'differential policing' but are
largely a result of public reporting. (80) This posf,tion,
basad all the premise tilat 'tl!e day-ta-day life of the
average policeman is oz-Lent ed t.owards tIl~ control of crime:r,
(31) evades tIlt:! ..ridzr public order role of J:iolicing in
:3ri t3.in and leau.s to the rather dubLous conclusion t~lat
"citizens exercise consLder'ab'Le control ovei- police patrol
work through their discretionary deci.af.ons to call tlj,e
'''''2'police. n \.U J In this aacumpt i.on Ii ea a failu..t:e to corilpr'ete!ld
~r ·i;;:J.6 fac"t ti:lat 'crime (';ontrol' Is only 011e a.spect of the
more f'undamenta'l, rublic or-:1er role of the police, and
moreover, a public order role c'efined uy the particulb.:::'
cnar ac ter of class relatio:ls.
It ",:e examine tile s ta~i::;t::.cs or' Eerscyside Pollc~
O~4 er irninal .:laluageper d.ivi ai cm
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Return of Crime - Recorded Crime
1980/1931. ()?OL/67/81).
we see that as far as fI~ , Division is concerned, the
figure is not particularly significrult; even when compared
with 'L' Division, which ha::3roughly the Bame size popula-
tion, t:here is little difference. (In fi::l.c'tfigures for
1931 show a higher rate for 'L' Division than 'Kt Division).
If we take I-:awby's use of public reporting as an index of
'police \York' then the public of t\.nowsley record vandalism
as a pr ob.Leu of less significance than the ]'orce average.
Howev ar , for t:J.e police, as previously shown, I~irkby was
defined as an area meriting particular attention for tile
control of vanda'Li.sm, ~herefore, tl'!e day-to-d.ay life 01'
the 'average' policeman in t:irkby was directed +ovards a
pr-ob'lem defined "uy the police as serious rather than by
the .Kirkby people; moreover, this crucial point indicates
a policy dir.::cted towards a ~'fider orien tatiol1 them 'the
control of crime' - in the saue way t~l~t Llie vanda'l Lsm of
tile three-storey Low-xLae fli::l.ts as discussed above, vas
"
but one effect of the more f'undamenta.l, to tlH~ :~i1.·l~by
wor\ing class of the tl~ee-storey low-rise flat itself.
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::?or Chapple, the policing of vanda.LLau "uec8.me one
concrete ztr~te6Y in dealing with a more fundamental
::1n addition to the und cndaoLe i'act -tl:at l'ar .nore
er...ime is c0IJ1111itteu. tl.l.8.1lis :L'eported, is t1:e fo.ct
tllJ.t ~:irkby, for various reasons, presents a
'special' police pro'ulem. A much larger than
average proportion of tne _b)opulation falls within
":",1'1.e aze .... anze 'IC v ear-s ";:0 ~I"\ .... eai .. n\ "'n" Lc h Ls mo s t... c:;I,t:>'" c:;I,J,Lt:> \ ,J ... ... ..;v" ...i::> I I. ... J,J, O.h II
re::1,)ollsible for e:;eneratinc; policc-\lOr:.: and cven
't~lis situa.tio~l is aggravated uy an unusually
aggressive anti-police attitude among large sections
of the coumunf ty. ::(83)
The task for the ~arkby police then vas not Just sir,lply
the 'control of crime', so much as control of the Kirkby
working class:
"••• a great many Kirkby children are receiving
a very incomplete education· indeed (truancy) and,
in consequence, are forming at an early age some
extremely anti-authoritarian and anti-social habits
whdch are likely to be passed on from generation to
generation unless some very firm and concerted
action is taken on a veriety of fronts.:: (C4)
The en.ror-cemerrt of' such di.3ciplinarian, bcur geods
LdeoLogy on wor~dng class communities such as that of
:arkby has been an exercise in political control of an
impoverished community facing ever-growing ma.3Sunemploy-
ment. It has meant for many youth the experience of
harassment on the streets uy the police, and also the
~'" regular invasion of the privacy of homes by social wor:cers,
juvenile Lf.af ecn officers, educa tion welfare officers,
probation officers and other such forms of policing •
..:\.swr'Lters such as Stinchcombe (85) and li!aw'uyhave
argued, it since more lower class acti vi ty too:~ place on
the streets, more lower L:lad8 behaviour was open to
scrutiny,!1 and t:ler8fore, "~~1eLower class appear mor-e
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frequently ill pubLl c statistics because their activities
are more open to surveillance. I, (86) :b'or many working class
ch.i.Ldr on and adolescents it is the street wnich provides a
focal point for recreation. Kirkby has a dispropo::::'tio!'lately
higii.er chiltl population compared 'Ilith tile TT --u. i~. average.
50;6 ui the popul.at i on of' ICirkby are under the age of 15. (87)
It is t~eJ.'efore not surpri=ing that witil such a dispropor-
tionately grec:.ter number of children and YO'U..'"lg people out
on t::":::l st:-eet= Jn ~ grossly overcrowded environment,
'vanJalisrn' has a high visibility. ~~sa priori tised law
enforcement policy tIle development of 'anti-vandal' patrols
reflected reaction:;~~'y ideological explanations of the
causes of juvenile delinquency. These were, as the Chapple
Report illustrates, based upon notions of parents abrogating
their responsibilities anu allowing their children to roam
the streets unsupervised. The fact that st:ceet life has
tradi tionally 'been part of workfng class culture is ignored.
For Chapple the first priority was to tliscipline the
Kirkby working class and particularly its chd.Ldz-en , They
were seen as a threat to 'autnority' requiring some very
fir:Ll and concerted action on a variety of fronts. (80)
In otiler words, if the par ente refused to e..xer-c i s e authority
over their children then it was the task of the ~Cirkby
-,..
police to do so. The parents or ~arkby •••
~r ••• must accept a large part of the blame for
the ui sconduc t of tli.e younger generation and
hence, their own squalitl env.i.ronment, II (89)
This ideological aLe.l grrt of hand obscures t:le es seri-
\
I;iul .fact tl1at the 'squalid environment' is an endemi.c
characteristic oi tile town. .aiGuaticn was builtin with
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the oricks and mortar of the town. The vandalism began
with the wholesale uestruction of the inner city \'larking
class com.runIties and their re-location in new town ghettoes
in conditions of enforced misery. ~he misery and the
t squalid envdz-onmerrt t wru cl; perpetuates it has teen the
outcome of local and central government policies, as
opposed to any perceived irresponsitili ty en the part of
Iarkby par encs ,
Chapple further :xgued in his report:
". •• t:lere is now general d.e:;reerllent among social
sciE:ntists and crirr:iIlologists tl:at family enviz-on-
rnen t is one of tile most cri tical factors in the
deveLopment of tlie anti-scci::.l and. crir::inal mind••• II
(SO)
",:orldng class culture in ~irkoy' «c.z pr es errted as the
cause of criminality. hany Kirkby families were seen to
have 'the wrong priorities'; their homes were ' unclean
and disorderly t; they have 'a lack of ambLtiOIl' • All are
':ractors I which Cl..apple attributes to 'a lack of organizing
ability' and. "downr-Lgrrt laziness,.(9l)
The reactionary ideology whic~l formed the basis of
C!"J.apple's :t'..;;port, was at the time of its publication in
1975 a reflection of t>.e broader c:la.racteristics and
ideologies underlj-ing the 'law -nd order' crusades orches-
-,..
trated by chief constables, the ~edia and ·the Conservative
Party, v/hicil began in t11Gearly lS70' s, crystallized in
tile eLectLon of a Conservative government in 1979 and
became consolidated in the 1930's. 3ach stage in increas-
ing·use of coercive fo~ce has been ideologically justified
on the gr cunds of tile need. to re-assert 'trQ.d.itiollal '
values and maintain "Law and oruer'.
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In attempting to discipline the working class,
policing in iCirl:;:byduring the 1970 's represented an attempt
to assert i)ourgeois author ity on Kirkby working class
families. 'Abrogatiun' of parental responsibility vas
seen by Cha~:,plein, for example, the fact that •••
:r. •• physical punf ahmerrt does not play a very
conspicuous part in family relationships."(92)
The various instances of co.nmuna ty solidarity whi ch
have arisen ill confronting officialdom have repeatedly
illustrated the determination of Kirkby people to collect-
ive1y struggle for survival against external authority:
!'Ev-snif en offender is on his own at the time of
appr ehens.Ion the ~arkby policeman is fa~ed with
the likelihood that local people ',till form a
hostile 'Land with the sole intention of preventing
the offend3r's arrest. It has been known, 101.'
Lns ta..nce , for housewf.ves in one big sto.ce to cause
a large sca'l e dI sturbance Whenau officer has been
attempting to arrest a juvenile sIlOp-lifter.!! (93)
~.Jhilst t~le Chapple neport was illustrated with figures
relating to the socia-economic proolems faced. by the working
cl.aas of Kirkby ~;ewTown, the r-ecommendatLons and conclusions
of the :\.eport, in cc.rtr-ad i.c t.Lon to its own empirical evidence,
situated solutions to the poverty and deprivation ultimately
w i,tldll t er-us o.f coercing the Air~{byworking class into
passive acceptance of its det er'Lo ra ti.lg social condLtLon , ,
rreactio,i.1ary Lde oLo gy displaces t~i.e aoc i.o-eeconomi.c contra-
dictions of capf, ca Lf.sm by apportioning the cause of such
conditions to the wor~ing cla3s itself.
:rhese coucLus tons and zecounnaudatiOL1S, u.esit,ned to
deal ~'lith :;:arkby' s 'ldgh propor-t Lon 01' irresponsible or
maniiestly c-nti-social residents' reflect specitic red.ctiull-
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ary assumptions rather than aocl o-eeconomdc criteria.
Despite the numerous sto.tistics of socio-economic hardship
which lIe presented, Chapple Loca bes the social pro1Jlems of
:arkby \'Ii th resicients who had done "li ttle or nothing to
improve the local image.a(94) It is within this form of
expression t:lat such ideologies based upon general themes.
of lazy and unruly working class communities are perpet-
uated. l;otions such as 'parental irresponsibility'
le6'i tii,li:.:.e ~E:actionary law enforcement policies and cbs cur e
the 'irrasponsibili ty' of maintaining Cl. social ay st emvhf eh
feeds off poverty and deprivation to l'eyroduce itself.
:i'or Chapple, by definition a 'pro"ulem falilily' \'las
necessarily anti-social. One section of his :leport dealt
\'iitll "pr ob.LemZ.:i.milies and other anti-social neighbours",
providing the rea.der wi tIl a 'who's who' of tIle und.isciplill.;j
s ect Lone of tlj_e r:irkby ccmuunfty. These included men't.aL
retard:;.:tio::."l, delinquents, single par~n t families, unusually
large families an.l alconolism. r·:aving identifieu the
'anti-social ele:-::ent3f Chapple noted vii t: .. sC;l.tisfac:ticn
thatLne social services were tacKling the pro'Jlem by
exercising .,great car e ••• in ensuring the alloca tio:i.1of
problem fa:rlilies to properties wher-e t:ley are unlikely to
be able to inte.l'lt:lrc with other .faii,ilies.:! (95)
-..
This is ei'fectively Cl policy of con'ta.Lnmen't of social
pr oo'Lemara.ther tiEn solution and re:)resent:3 but one step
in the familir.r pr ocese of class control wnich ul ti::iately
concludes \'Ii til Lncar'c er-a'tLon , Conciitions of pover-ty and
deprivatio:i.l ar e ii;aintd.ined within the ·I;or~'-ingcLass and.
\
policed in varying degl.'eesbythe state to l.'eproduce ·~~le
structured inequalities 01' capitalist pr-oduct ion and.
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d.Lst.r-Lbu'tLon of weaLtho The social isolation of families
suffering the worst excesses of economic dep~ivation
seryes to further exacerbate the adverse social conditions
of life in which they are confined. The rei.'lforcement of
alienation of sections of the worl{i:ng class community from
otl1er sections supports the fragl:lenta.tion of commun.lty
solidarity and legitimates the policies of reaction.
Law anu order ideologies based upon notions of
parental irresponsibility were regularly orchesLrated
d.uring the 1970' s 'by cilie! constables and senior police
epo't eaper aona, l3y 1979, 'law and order' had become Cl
major issue in the General Election. ,statements by chief
cOllstables Vlere given widespread publicity. Criminality
was d.efined as directly arising from parental irresponsi~i-
Ii ty. .A.sJames Ander-ton , Chief COl1stdule or Greater
r·~an~hester stZl-ted at a 'conference 011 family life' in
Octo~er 1970:
"~':emust stop making excuses for bad par errtc and
set about re-educating them. ':le must force them,
as far a::: is r0~sonably possi~le, to face up to
their personal responsibilities and pel'lalise bhern
in ::JOIneitiay if they will not.!!(96) .
On the same day, 3ir DavLd hc:ree, tnen l·:etropoli tan
?olice CODililissioner, s tz, tecl to a Sus3e.'{ a.udience:
::Criminal parents tend to bring up criminal
cn.LLdr-en, ~hat is no doubt somethin9 we canall understand and pr-obabLy expec t s " ~97)
~uch ideoloGies rest upon notions of declining
"mor-a.L values' and 'law and order'. .uid like mos t r-eac-
tion~ry ideoloeies, LncLudLng t:le fascist varieties, it
is 'based upon a Iuyt:Llica.lgolden age. :iror Llre lJolice
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corporate management it VIas an age wliere 'authority' was
absolute; i.e. it was unquestioned and respected. It was
the age before 'increasing violent crime', before 'rising
juvenile delinquency', 'riots', 'mass picketing',
'permissiveness', 'mugging', soccer ~ooliganism',
'terrorism', 'Stanley knives', 'hippies', 'skinheads',
'punks', 'immigration' and so on.
The fact that such 'Folk Devils,(98)have always
featured in reactionary ideology in one form or another
does not diminish the material impact of the lllythology in
legitimising the development of the state's coercive forces,
particularly during periods of capitalist crisis and
recession. During; the 1970' s -:;:le police corporate manage-
ment entered 'the political arena of public debate iii th
apocalyptic visions of civilisatio:i.l facing im::.hlent collapse
at the hands of the mug.:;er, t6.l.'rorist, subvei-s Lve etc.
~or the police, faoed with "••• the loosening of moral
(ca'J.isci?line, j,:estraint and corrtz-o'l." ..I..1)t:lerevias a need
to I'e-assert and Gtrengt~:e:i.lthe power 0; author-aty ,
requiring measures to discipline vlOrldng class ccmmunI ties
which they saw as a'brogati116 their res~ol1si1Jilities.
siule J;Jd.!'0uts' and juvenile offend.ers concuc ted by chief
CO~i.stu"uleslld-l begun to Lava a major impact OLL law eniorce-
merrt pulicy. The' short-sl1arp-silOclc t appr-oach as advoca teJ
policy iollovJiub the ~ory victory in the 197:; General
Blect,ioLl. .'ulderton was quite cLear 011 tIle pur'poae of such
Q.::tentim,l centres:
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:;~"lretched o!'!'enders li1\:e these (marauding gangs
of dirty youths and men) who take the fullest
advantage of eve~y meek r:::.sponse to their
abominable conduct should be arrested, convicted,
and placed in penal Vlork calJlPs wherG they should
be made to sweat as they have never sweated
before and remain until their vLoLence has 'been
vanquished by penitent humiliation and unqualified
repentance.:r(lOO)
Such sentiments as they ars have of course been
ex-pressed at var Lous periods thXoughout Dritish modern
history and in that sense express ideologies whf.ch have
served to sustain bourgeois he~emony during crisis and
rapid social change. (101) ?or our latter day chief con-
stables the forces of' disorder are manifest in the ever-
. present threat of sUJversion, terrorism, permissiveness,
pickets and the elusive shadowy spectre of coramunfem,
:Between them, 'extremists' and 'do-gooders' haV"econspired
to weaken the moral fabric of :British society. Violent
crime and 'fuolic <llsorder are deiir..ed as a ~esult of
society !'ailing to face up to its responsibilities.
'au.thori ty' is iJ6in6 undermined and tile police take it
upon ·~:.leiLlselves to re-establish it. .:..3 Chief ConebabLe
r~enneth Oxford said following the Toxteth riots of 1531:
!!If the par snta are not 60i:::16 to 'pic!~ up their
responsibili ty and apply .:l disci:tJli11e, i t means
that I have got to do i~ to protect the comraunfty
at Lar-ge ;" (102)
The !'ac-l:;orwhf.ch disti~guishes such idcolot;i8S of
recent y ear a fro::l earlier expr eccf.ons , is tl.i.~cle3X
authori ty over- their cldlQ~en to t1le one tha t the police
have got to do it .for -~llem.
"'
:::'or a::;_lthe rhetoric al.ou't tl18 virtues of family
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life and the need to 'strengthen' the fardily, it is
perhaps tha :family more +nan 8jlY other social institution
whi.cli has suffered. most from economic recession and post-
'liar capitalist goverilment policies vlilicll have, for examp l e
on r,Ierseyside, systematically. smashed the extend.ed family
ne twor-ks of inner Liverpool, fragmented the communities
Ln wrrLch they were in ter-ll1eshed and scattered. them at
random into new t owns and connurbations where tney were
expected to sit tight and wait for jobs to appear.
In policing the consequences of this process, the
parents of the 11e\'1 genel:'ations brought up under these
cond.i tions are scape-goated and the state takes it upon
itself to :yerform the socialisation roles which the parents
l~ve purportedly 'abrogated'.
As lias already been indicated, the notion of 'parental
irresponsi'oili ty' is not new; for example, in the 1930 IS
police chiefs expr eaaed similar ideas 0:i.1 the cause of
juvenile criliie, but the intention was one o:f rebuke:
r
"Tn connec tLon v;itil. the general trend to increased
crime, and especially crimes conu.d, tted uy juveniles,
it seems very plain t:J.at \'Ii tllOUt a more salutory
check, df.sas tr-oue consequences will arise, and tllis
matter appear-s to we so important t:idt I feel bound
to ava LL Illy-self of t}lis occaad on to rebu:{e tllOse
'Parents in not waLc ni.ng mor-e car~f·u.l1:y over the
conduct of t~J.eir c:!l.il':::cen - many of \'1110:,1 are d.1'ifti:::g
into a life 01 L:rirlle." (Ci.liel CO~1sta'ble, ':;t.nelens.
'1 c ...'"')' '10''':' \\ ').)0 ). \ ..J)
7urtlJ.errr.ore we also find 8i ..:i1ax ideas 1.le1'8isting dur Lng
the lS~O t s:
'{:8..:i:cellent 'I:or:'~ is c'::,rrieJ out 'by pr'oba tLon ul~l~~j ...a ,
~...'I,.,oo' +-'" .'_ '_,... end coc i .L~ "or" "I'''' '," - '-.:>,l'.L' ""J.' ,,-..,\,,;.u J,.- ~v,-I.,; •• e...(;)..... 0.) ........ c;J. '.~ .\."' ...... , UU" I;;A,t''"' ..... \,,;.;.;
dll.C\'lS, .:..n": cc.se s iJJ..'OU.:.~~lt JE:Zure tlle cour-t ::rove,
~ime c..nd.t:'f.1e i.i..:;pvin,:10.,,; bucll. 1'l1ore(!ould l) e 8,l.:llie-;ed
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ii' only parental interest would tighte,l up
J.isciuline in the home. Lack of uar entaf
in-'ce:rc3t and corrtr-o l, is a sad feature Ll many
at the cases dealt with.iI(lC4)
::2his ideology is not however peculiar to the t',;eatieth
century but can b e found right back in the debates wnf.ch
pr cceded t:le passing of the 1329 ~olice ACt wnen the
modern police force Has established. ::era \'{e find similar
ar'gumerrts wh.i.cii were used to support demands for a 'new
police' to d.eal \'lith the struggles arising froln the
industrial revolution of e~rly capitalism. ~iith large-
aca.l,e public disorders, SUCllas tl.le GorJol1 niota and
~uddit8 aiots, the capitalist class feared for their
wea'l tIl and lives and demanded the creation of a permanent
police force to assert a moral and coercive authority over
t~e working class. It was to perform this role that the
,
'new police' were esta'blisl:ed as the shock troops of
Victori(;;.n jjlor_..lity; their task vias both ideological and
coercive - the use of force ill mailltaining bourgeois pu"ulic
order and the penetration of tile dcdly lii'e of wor:~ing
class communities to establish a permanent presence of
bourgeois authority.
Problelils endemic to capi talisl~1 were ul tilllately deemed
to be caused "uy those who exp ez-Lenc al tl1elll; tiley were self-
.. inflicted; cl.'illliaali ty was passed on from parents to
child.ren - cOHuitio113 of poverty Vlere indeed otten idell-
tified, 'but seen as of aecondary i;;ji!or"(~G,nce. Iil e-vidence
to the 'Committee on the State ui t~e rulice of the
retro~olis I (1317) a ~·r. ~rav{ford - descrio:u. a::> the
I s~c.tetal.'Y tv tIle 8ocL:tj" of ·,{hich the 00 ject is to i~quire
into the eaU30S of Ju.ye::ile :i):1i...lQU61lCY' - taJ. cleJ.:'ly
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impI'G3.3aQthe committee ",:i til t!'le accoun t or -t}~e causes
of ju-.reuile crime, t~~ey reported:
"It appear-s t~.:.8n, i'::;::or.:th.;; e7id.ei.1Ce of t~:at res.~ect-
able ::.n"::' in·;:;.:.llie;Gnt pe:L'CO:i.lt!j_.:..t from et .ai.nut e
investigation 01 tIle SU0 j ect, ·tIlere are Ge-.re.i:al
thouaande of :Ways ill t1:e i·:etro:polis who ez e d.aily
engag ed in the commission of crime, tl'lat the causes
of this Lle'Olorable evil are to be traced to t11e
improper and cr-Lmi.na.l COHQUCt of parents ••• !1 (105)
Other ;aci;ors presented by i·x. Crawford, such as "warrt
of educa t.i.on r, 'deficiency of employment f, 'violation of
the Sabbath', and the 'prevailing habit of gambling in
the public stret::ts' (106) - formeu. t11e general background
to cent.ra l notions of improper and criminal par errta'l
conduct. Closely connected to the notion of parental
irresponsi1Jility a.s a central cause of criminal l>ehaviour
amongst oche worl~ing class of Yictoriai~ times was '~:tat of
:;)rink. ...;'sZiarrisoll hae noted s
~:The il;lpressive rise in the number of dr unxenneaa
pz oceed.Lnga between 1857 and 1876 is at least as
likely to stem from Incr eaemg ccnc arn at the
seriousness of the drink prob1ec in t~ose years
as from any actual increase in cOi.lsumptiun.!! (107)
The increase in Jrunkennes;:; proceedings during the
lStll Gentury had as a crucial deterii1ining factor the
pervasive iJ.lfl~ence of dcutnan t ldeo10bies vnf ch politi-
~I"' cally defined v;orking class Ul'Ll:dng habits as a fundamental
source of industrial capf, talism f s endemi,c poverty, dLJOl:u.er
and squalor. The stark cOlltrhdictiol1 ut 2. thriving
f thrifty' :nidd1e class displaying 8.11 the _t.lriyi1eG8s of
'ivealtii and. 11.L..:m'j count crpo s ad to the hJoverty UJ_lUhar-darii.p
co.pi~alist J)l'od.uctioll c.:.ndthe ineq~i i:;.:..'~ledist:,,:·i"uu.tion
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of wealth, was presented by dominant ideology as a result
of excessive alcohol consumption by the working class.
Moreover such activities were presented as a growing
threat to social order, fuelling reactionary pressure for
the strengthening of repressive legislation and law
enforcement. Such ideology, in strengthening state control
over the lives of the working class, has characterised the
development of a bourgeois form of policing. For the
ruling class, the real problem which threatened capitalist
society was public disorder engendered by the workings of
capitalist market forces. Drunkenness itself was not the
problem so much as working class drunkenness, perceived
as a threat to public order. This perception became
ideologically generalised as a root cause of criminality
requiring more stringent enforcement of drink and licensing
laws. Thus the fallacious linkage between drink and crime
figures was served up as propaganda for middle class
consumption to legitimate more direct disciplinarian forms
of policing working class communities. Disorderly beha-
viour became the focal point of law enforcement policy.
As Brian Harrison pointed out in his book - Drink and the
Victorians:
-..
"Again, changing criteria for arrest, and even a
chang~ng catchment area, deprived early Victorian
statistics for London drunkenness arrests of much
value; impressive in gross, they made no allowance
for persistent offenders; furthermore, many drun-
kards were arrested for disorderly behaviour rather
than for drunkenness. Nor could the figures indicate
changing drinking habits within a particular social
class, at a time when the police seldom arrested
respectable drunkards."(108)
\False causal links, such as that between drinking
and crime, has played a major role in the historical
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development of law enforcement policy and legitimating
the formation, development and strengthening of police
forces in Britain. Commenting on false causal connections
such as that between drink and crime, Harrison states:
"The fallacies lying behind these popular fears
did not, however, prevent them from being poli-
tically influential in the 1920's: the sentiments
which lay behind the introduction of the Metropo-
litan police in 1829 also lay behind the Beer Act
of 1830."(109) .
-..
Ideological attacks on working class leisure activ-
ities by the Victorian bo~geoisie in 19th Century Britain
have been well documented.(llO) These ideologies, enveloped
in middle class morality, particularly focussed upon
working class drinking, festivals and sports. But beneath
this veneer of public morality lay more fundamental
bourgeois fears of political and economic dimensions.
It was not so much the spectacle of blood sports and
drinking which upset the bourgeoisie, but rathe~ what
they perceived as the disorderly conduct associated with
these pastimes beyond their control. The potential threat
to property and social order and the potential translation
of social disorder into political revolution was, for the
bourgeoisie, a problem of maintaining a public order
conducive to the material interests of their class.
These associations assumed the ideological driving force
behind the formation of the new police and dominated its
law enforcement policies. But in practice, the universal-
istic appearance of bourgeois morality and bourgeois
conceptions of 'the rule of law' were contradicted in
the ~nforcement of laws which could only express the class
nature of the legal system. The drinking habits and blood
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sports of the Victorian bourgeoisie and aristocracy
remained relatively secure whilst regular attacks were
being perpetrated against similar forms of recreation
enjoyed by the working class.
As examined in Fart I, developments in policing
during the 19th Century reflected ruling class concern
with public order, whether in relation to working class
leisure activities, industrial disputes, demonstrations
or riots. For the ruling class, it was not the contra-
dictions of capitalism which lay at the root of disorder
in bourgeois society but the 'improper conduct of parents'
and working class drinking habits. In evidence to the
Committee on the State of the Police of the Metropolis
(1817), a Mr. Poynder, a clerk of Bridewell Hospital,
expressed such dominant ideological perceptions which
were to materialise in the passing of the 1829 Metropol-
itan Folice Act. Mr. Foynder was quite convinced of the
threat to social order posed by working class drinking:
"I would further observe, that the continuance
of the present system of drinking has appeared
to me calculated to encourage and perpetuate .
habits of insubordination and sedition; and I
feel strongly persuaded that the government
loses infinitely more in the alienation of
the minds of its people than it can ever gain
by ,the largest contribution to its revenue."(lll)
The demon drink became a central feature of all
disorder and threats to the social order of capitalism:
"I am fully persuaded that much poverty is absolutely
created by drinking and that all poverty is greatly
aggravated by it. It is in the public houses that
extensive combinations are formed against masters,
that common funds are collected for the support of
those workmen who hold out longest against their
employers, and that able plans are organised for
the application of those funds."(ll2)
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Thus the new police became the missionaries(113)
charged with the task of practical application of
bourgeois morality for the restraint of the "bohemian
and wayward working classes I'.(114) As Harrison further
argues:
"A fiction of superior upper-class morality waspreserved by a police force which publicised
. the intemperance of the poor, while quietly
conducting upper--class drunkards to their
homes without taking them to court."(115)
The translation of this fiction of superior upper-
class morality;into legal practice by the police in the
19th Century was not however without its contradictions.
Working class resistance in the 19th Century to these
new forms of policing was quite extensive. Although by
the late 19th Century the police had ideologically pene-
trated numerous working class communities, many still
remained entrenched against police hegemony:
"The police were powerless without a favourable.public opinion and in many slum districts (of
London) this favourable opinion did not exist."(116)
(Harrison - 1971)
Even by the early 20th Century, new police forces
were still being established around the country. In
St.Helens, Lancashire, a new police was established in
1887 with the particular function of curbing the drinking
activities of the town. As the St.Helens Standard
commented in 1904:
"••• the roughs of the Town seemed to be inclinedto the opinion that the new constables were
"provided for their amusement, and they were
maltreated time after time. However, Magistrates
administered severe punishments in every case
brought before them and the ways of the new police
became much smoother."(117)
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A major contradiction faced by the new police and
the middle class, was the fact that, on the one hand,
the task of the police was to suppress working class
drinking and thereby antagonise the Publicans whose trade
duly suffered, but on the other hand the police relied
upon publicans for information about the criminal world.
As Harrison points out:
It ••• their responsibilities for enforcing the
licensing laws and for controlling crime were
to some extent contradictory. And the police
knew that publicans and brewers were often
powerful on local watch-committees.It(118)
In St.Helens, with the introduction of the new
police in 1887, this contradiction led to the bizarre
situation where the new police was established with the
task of enforcing the drink laws under the authority of
a watch committee appointed to direct its movements,
whose dominant members were drawn from the Beecham and
Pilkington companies which, at the same time, provided
free beer to their workers. As Price comments:
"Those in authority appear to have had an ambivalent
attitude to this problem, on the one hand encouraging
the workers to drink to help with adverse working
conditions created by furnace work and the noxious
fumes which were the inevitable by-product of many
industrial processes to be found in St. Helens and
neighbouring towns, and on the other hand de~loring
the consequences of excessive drinking."(119J
Whilst working class drinking habits have by no means
been the only focal point for law enforcement policy, the
drink-crime terms of reference have been a significant
factor in determining enforcement policies of constabularies
during periods of capitalist crisis. The recent history
of the Merseyside Police Force has testified that such
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ideologies still form the basis of law enforcement
policy, particularly in relation to the development of
new forms of policing. Assessing the enforcement policy
of the Merseyside Task Force in 1975, the Sunday Times
(16/2/75) commented:
"The emphasis on combating drunkenness was based
on the theory that many people who have been
drinking go on to commit more serious crimes."
For Chief Const~ble Haughton and his successor,
Kenneth Oxford, drinking was a major cause of criminality
in the 1970's. On the pretext of combating organised
crime, the operational policies of the Chief Constable
became increasingly concerned with drink and drunkenness
in the 1970's. As a public order priority this develop-
ment played a major role in establishing and ,developing
new reactive forms of policing. For many localities around
Merseyside, reactive policing strategies directed towards
the repression of drink activities in the 1970's had
assumed distinct para-military tendencies. Raids on pubs
and clubs for late night drinking became major operations.
The Guardian (2/7/79 noted in July 1979:
"This public move was backed by much closer contact
than before with the licensing justices and the
introduction of a special police squad to raid
clubs and pubs, looking for after-hours drinking."
For the Merseyside Police Corporate Management, the
implementation of tougher enforcement policies concerned
with drinking was presented as the key to tackling the
source of crime in Liverpool. In many respects this policy
on drinking in Merseyside displayed reactionary character-
\
istics; its enforcement was inevitably coercive, but for
the Chief Constable a necessary measure to discipline the
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drink activities of the working class on Merseyside,
legitimated on the grounds of tackling the 'crime problem':
"So the new tough police policy, which has the
implicit backstairs backing of the judges at
Liverpool Crown Court, may be beginning to work.
But, as Mr. Oxford admits, one of the two main
keys to solving Merseyside's main crime problem
is the rigorous application of the Licensing laws."(120)
This policy was enthusiastically applied in 'Kt
Division. By 1979 the recession had already made a sharp
impact on social conditions in Knowsley. Mass unemploy-
ment increasingly posed the threat of public disorder.
In the context of such volatile conditions, the need on
the part of the police to assert the authority of the state
became targeted on drink activities culminating in a series
of pub raids in 1979 which led to physical confrontations
between police and public. It was four days following a
raid on the Eagle and Child public house that Jimmy Kelly
died whilst being arrested for the offence of drunk and
disorderly conduct on his way home from the Oak Tree,
another Huyton pub.
. 3) REACTIVE POLICING IN KNOWSLEY
Reactive and pre-emptive policing, as integrated into
the Command and Control system of the Merseyside police
corporate management, have gradually replaced the labour-
intensive foot patrol systems which characterised preven-
tive policing. In this respect, control of operations and
the formation and implementation of law enforcement. policy,,
has now largely become the prerogative of Chief Police
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Officers whose political powers have, through centralisa-
tion and concentration, outstripped the political perimeters
of local government. That the early experiments in
reactive and pre-emptive policing should have taken place
in mostly urban working class areas, particularly those
of high unemployment and material deprivation has testified
the political role of policing in operating to contain the
crisis conditions of the inner cities and outer urban
estates. In this respect, the use of Kirkby as a guinea-
pig in the early development of reactive policing, was
based on attempts to create a combination of foot and
vehicle patrols by a system which later took the name of
Unit Beat Policing. As the system was developed, the
emphasis increasingly became concentrated on reactive
mobility.
Unit Beat Policing and Kirkby
Prior to the development of Kirkby Newtown from 1953,
the village of Kirkby was policed by a single policeman.
However, with the creation of the Newtown, in ten years
the population rose from 8,000 in 1953 at the beginning
of the town to 60,000 in 1963(12l)with the relocation of
many families from the inner city. During this period
the strength of the local force was raised to 67 police
officers (see Table 3) and had attained sub-divisional
status. In the first 10 years of its existence, Kirkby
was policed largely by the traditional methods of foot
and cycle patrols characteristic of the period. However
given the purpose of the Newtown as an isolation unit for
\
Merseysiders suffering the worst excesses of poverty and
unemployment, and the social consequences of their re-
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location in Kirkby (i.e. the breakdown of community and
family ties and support networks), traditional methods
were seen as increasingly incompatible with the demands
of policing the contradictions of a community experiencing
the consequences of capitalism in crisis twenty years
before the emergence of nationwide recession. In this
respect, Kirkby has served as a guinea-pig for the develop-
ment of new forms of policing, and this to some extent
accounts for the rather 'ad hoc' process in which these
new forms of policing were developed in the area.
Although by 1964 the foot and cycle patrols had been
supplemented by the introduction of ~ cars with radio
communication.
tI ••• it had become clear that this then standard
type of policing was inadequate for the special
problems experienced in Kirkby - particularly
the high incidence of vandalism and hooliganism
in the town."(122)
To this end, the traditional forms of policing by foot
and cycle patrols were rapidly superseded by new forms
of policing.
Increasing mass unemployment in the town, aggravated
by successive factory closures, was effectively creating
a permanent surplus labour force, a high proportion of
which were youth. To police and contain the social conse-
quences of this process, the Newtown Police had to first
establish itself as a highly visible'and dominant force
in its relations with the Kirkby working class, particu-
larly the youth. The political role of the U.B.P. in
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Kirkby was to develop the means of containing working
class youth within the adverse conditions of capitalist
crisis.
Traditional forms of policing by means of foot and
cycle patrols were largely superceded by more mobile
reactive strategies. What was essentially new about
this strategy was the ~ in which it developed.(123)
What was later to be described as 'Unit Beat Policing'
and subsequently implemented in varying degrees in police
forces around the country, was developed in Kirkby in the
'ad hoc' fashion mentioned earlier in the attempt to
establish coercive police control of the streets. The
development of Unit Beat Policing for this purpose was
strongly influenced by technological innovations in the
Lancashire Constabulary. Of particular importance at
this time was the introduction of personal radios in 1964
for police patrols in Kirkby, enabling constant direct
communication with the sub-divisional headquarters. (124)
Thus police movements around the town were more effectively
co-ordinated and the reactive aspect of policing strength-
ened:
-..
~
"The issue of personal radios on this scale wassomething of an innovation at that time and
proved very successful in enabling foot andcycle patrols to become much more frequentlyinvolved in the type of active policing which
until then had been almost monopolised by theArea Car and Crime Car crews. Similarly, patrolconstables could feel reasonably secure in the
knowledge that if set upon by hooligans a quickradio message would bring immediate assistance."(125)
With, effective communication systems established in this
manner, the subsequent abandonment of the foot beat system
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in 1965 in favour of a new system of mobile beats laid
(126)the basis for the 'Panda System'. The strategy was
based on the division of the town into five 'mobile areas'
with Panda cars covering four residential areas and the
industrial estate, with a single foot patrol covering the
town centre shopping precinct. (127)
According to Chapple, the new system had a dramatic
effect in reducing Kirkby's crime rates by 31% - vandalism
by 53% and an improved detection rate from 29% to 3?fo.(128)
The extent however to which this statistical reduction
may have been due to the retreat from the pavement to
the road, and thereby reducing the potential for the
reporting of crime by the public, merits consideration.
As Michael Banton has argued:
"Where the adoption of Unit Beat policing has
.resulted in a decrease in reported crime, this
may be because more policemen are sitting in
cars and not putting themselves in situations
such that citizens come up and report crimes
to them. Officers are increasingly policing
on wheels instead of from wheels."(129)- -
However, whatever the short term benefits to the police
the new system may have afforded in terms of crime reduc-
tion, its effect on relations with the Kirkby people
merely served to further antagonise the existing state
of affairs. Whilst a strengthening of policing in terms
of the development of a new reactive capacity was achieved,
the development had a two-fold adverse effect on both
police/public relations and on the surveillance and
information-gathering process. As Chapple admitted:
\
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"In a community of which a large proportion is
openly hostile to the police, no opportunity
is given through informal daily contact for
police/public relations to be improved.
Another corollary of this situation is that
the policemen are so busy hurrying from one
incident, or call, to another that they never
have opportunity for systematic preventive
patrol, nor the time to 'investigate much of
the anti-social behaviour which is constantly
taking place."(130)
However, as a result of the initial reduction in the
crime statistics for the area with the introduction of
the panda car system:
"••• it was never thought necessary to introduce
Unit Beat Policing in Kirkby, or in any other
way to modify the original mobile beat system
of May, 1965."(131)
This situation held up until around the time of reorgani-
sation in 1974 when Kirkby became part of 'Kt Division of
the new Merseyside Force. During this period, aggravated
by recession, social conditions in Kirkby continued to
further deteriorate; moreover the growing economic recession
of capitalism had begun to make significant inroads into
other working class communities in the Merseyside area.
Policing in Kirkby beca.me the subject of several reports
following reorganisation:
-.. "Within a few months of taking over responsibility
for the policing of Kirkby the new Chief Constable
decided that certain features of life in Kirkby
required special police attention."(132)
The report of Norman Chapple who became Chief Superinten-
dent of 'K' Division in 1975 laid the basis for further
deveiopments in policing Kirkby. From this report,
Chapple made several recommendations which had the
- 129 -
objective of both strengthening the reactive forms of
policing Kirkby and developing the kind of public relations
and 'community liaison' schemes which are now a familiar
aspect of recent 'community policing' schemes around the
country. Chapple's recommendations may be summarised
as follows:
I. An increase in the strength of the Kirkby sub-
division.
2. The formation of a Tactical Patrol Unit.
3. The development of a 'long term prevention role'which would be It ••• geared to educating young
members of the public with a view to achievingvoluntary improvement in standards of conduct
rather than by physical police presence ••• by
a concentrated School Liaison Scheme the police
could play an important part in the social educa-tion of future generations of Kirkby parents."
4. A greater effort in police-community relations. (133)
The recommendation for an increase in police strength was
largely based on proposals by Chapple for the adoption of
Unit Beat Policing in Kirkby; the introduction of the
system subsequently brought the police strength of the
town up to the establishment target.(134)
The Unit Beat formulae, as developed at Accrington
and based on early developments in Kirkby centred on the
ideal of a 'resident' beat officer being supported by a
mobile team of panda cars, a detective and a collator.
Here we see the breakdown of the policing task previously
performed by single beat police officers; i.e. public
order and response to incidents, detection of crime, and
information gathering and surveillance; with the Unit Beat
\
system the remaining task for the foot police officer was
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specifically that of surveillance and information gather-
ing.
From these developments, new forms of policing
working class communities emerged. Both the reactive and
pre-emptive aspects of policing were, with the aid of
capital-intensive Command and Control systems, expanded
into new spheres beyond the traditional foot beat system
and structured within the new corporate organisation of
the Force. In this respect new forms of reactive and
pre-emptive policing which were originally conceived of
as a 'back up' to the officers on foot patrol, increasingly
attained positions central to police operations, with the
foot patrolman reduced to being an appendage to the police
system.
The intention was that each division would be divided
into mobile beats policed by units. The original conception
was thus:
Unit Beat Car: 5.39 men (for manning throughout24 hours)
2.00 men (not relieved for normalabsence)
.44 men (16 hour cover)
.67 men (24 hour cover)
Area Constable:
Collator:
Radio Operator:
-,. Reserve or Patrol: 2.00 men
10.5 constables per unit
(Source: N.L. Chapple (1975) p. 286 - taken fromHome Office Memorandum 2/70)
However, in practice the UBP formulae were inevitably
restructured in relation to specific local conditions.
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Moreover, as the system was developed around the country,
the mobile units eventually replaced the beat officers in
many cases, as the central dynamic in policing. As Banton
noted in the early 1970's:
n ••• UBP is not being fully implemented in the
way it was intended. When extra men are needed,the area constables are the first to be withdrawnfrom their regular duties." (135),
In many cases, beat police officers were largely directed
towards the patrolling of private commercial and industrial
property. In his study of the policing of Sheffield, Rob
Mawby notes:
"Beat policemen are confined almost exclusively
to commercial and industrial areas and the main
roads. A large number of officers were assigned
to city centre beats •••"(136)
This situation has been characteristic of Kirkby, where
the town centre has had foot patrols since the creation
of the town.(137) However in 1976 with establishment at
Kirkby brought up to full strength, additional foot beats
were introduced to cover the shopping and commercial
complexes in the town centre and the heavily populated
areas, backed up by mobile cars. (138) According to the
Chief Constable in his report to the Police Committee on
the policing of Kirkby at that time, with this development
'the system of policing Kirkby was changedl.(139)
In terms of the structure of UBP, or rather its
particular version in Kirkby, the system itself has not
particularly changed; rather, this move simply represented
"
an attempt to strengthen the existing system by the develop-
ment of extra reoruited police officers on the ground to
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back up the mobile patrols.
During the mid-seventies, there began an orchestrated
campaign, supported by dominant sections of the police,
the media and sections of the public to 'get the bobby
back on the beat'. In this context, policing policy
entered the public relations field in a professional and
systematic manner, with senior police officers pledging
to get back to either foot or cycle patrols. This however
merely resulted in larger increases in police recrUitment,
from 97,300 in 1971 to 119,500 in 1981, as shown in Table 3.
Existing UBP's were reshuffled whilst maintaining
essentially the same form. In Sussex for example, UBP
appeared to have been abandoned with the withdrawal of
panda cars and the introduction of more foot beats. But
in reality the number of beat patrols just simply increased
along with the reactive aspects of UBP. Thus in February
1974, in an amazing feat of double-think, the editorial
of 'Police' could confidently state:
"••• the retreat from mobile policing gets underway. ff (140)
and then goes on to note:
"••• the number of general purpose patrol carswill be increased and will serve as a 'back up'
service to the man on the beat."(14l)
In the parts of Northern Ireland at the time of writing
there are army patrols 'backing up' police patrols
'backing up' the odd constable on the beat. Similarly
in T~xteth, there are fortified police transit vans
'backing up' the Chief Constable's 'community police'
officers. (142)
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Task Force
With the 1974 reorganisation, the formation of 'K'
Division of the Merseyside Police saw the establishment
of a new Task Force at its Headquarters in Knowsley Hall.
The Task Force was originally created by Lancashire
Constabulary in 1969 and marked the development of a
new form of policing based on the extension of the reactive
policing strategies as discussed earlier. Set up in
January 1969 by Chief Constable Haughton, the character
of the new force was outlined by one of its early commanders:
"Crime prevention, said Detective Chief Inspector
.N. Taylor, also plays a great part in the work
of the (Task) Force. By employing the men as
'shock troops' they act as a deterrent to crime
in many cases." (St.Helens Newspaper 28/1/69)
The crucial feature of Task Force was their establish-
ment as units of about the size and structure of the
average sub-division, but with a territorial boundary of
a much greater acreage. In 1974, Merseyside Police estab-
lished three Task Forces Wirral, Central and Northern
to police the Merseyside area (see Fig. 2). The Northern
Task Force, based at Knowsley Hall, was established to
provide a 'mobile reserve' for J, K, H and L Divisions
(see Map 7) although by April 1976 a section of the
Northern Task Force was accommodated at Kirkby Police
Station. II(143)
The presence of this section of the Task Force at
Kirkby met Chapple's recommendation for a 'Tactical Patrol
Unit'\for the town, although it must be noted that the
proposed Unit, if established, would have come under the
Fig. ~.
TASK FORCE (r974)
(
':lirral Central
1 1
C.I.D. C.I.D.
1 I
I Superintendent I Inspector
2 Inspectors 2 Sergeants
4 SerGeants 6 Constables
6 Constables
IC.I.D.
I
I Superintendent
I Chief Inspector
I Inspector
6 Sergeants
7 Constables
UnifoT.'J'Tl t'hifoM
I Superintendent 3 Scrzeants
2 Inspectors 33 Constables
7 screeants
5I Constables
6 P '.r Constables....II.
T~tal: n Total: 1:.2
3()1.~r:~a: ':'~.e Ho art 0f thS' Chief C'):rstable (D~8i "'nato t;) t,"'')
DJ 11-::(> CO;1,'11it te·~ of t"'c T·f,.~.t'~C'Y,;i (1e CO)1(>"[1;;: C'j:",1[cil (Al1Pc:r:,di:<: f I (0) I)
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command structure of 'K' Division, as opposed to that
of the Northern Task Force. In Chapple's proposals, the
Unit would form part of the Kirkby sub-divisional opera-
tional structure:
"It is important that the' operation of such a
unit should be a permanent feature of the town's
policing so that any results accruing (e.g. the
breaking up of hooligan gangs) will not be short-
lived. For this reason it would not be sufficient
to call in Task Force personnel on an 'ad hoc'
basis though the concept is similar."(144)
Thus, instead of the formation of a Kirkby 'Tactical
Patrol Unit' to avoid the ad hoc deployment of the Task
Force, a section of the Task Force itself under the
operational command of the Northern Task Force was estab-
lished in the town to perform the reactive policing tasks
outlined by Chapple in his report. These were:
" I. The breaking up of gangs and generallypreventing breaches of the peace at
points where these commonly occur at
present, e.g. outside public houses,
youth clubs, in shopping precincts.
2. Visits to public houses where there is
good reason to believe that under age
drinking (a prevalent offence at present)
and other offences against the licensing
laws are taking place.
-..
3. Patrolling of vulnerable property with
particular attention to schools, vacant
dwellings and other common targets for
vandalism.
4. The setting up of late night vehicle checks.
5. Dealing with truant school children during
the day time (experiments with police truant
patrols have proved very successful in reducing
crime in at least one Scottish force area) and
the very young who are out in the streets after
dark.
6. Responding in force to any identifiable crime
.patterns which may emerge from time to tine. (145)
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As can be seen clearly, a pertinent feature of this plan
of action is that many of the items were directly con-
cerned with the policing of juveniles and youth.
In 1976, the Operational Support Division was formed
from the 'redistribution of the former Task Force'. (146)
This reshuffling was, in part at least, done to deflect
mounting criticism voiced by Merseysiders of the activities
of the Task Force. This move was initiated by Kenneth
Oxford on his gaining the post of Chief Constable, which
had been vacated by Haughton (who became an Inspector of
Constabulary) in the midst of the widespread allegations
and criticism directed against the Task Force.
The Task Force had become notorious in its particu-
larly coercive methods operationally, it performed a
similar public order role to that of the various other
Task Forces and Special Patrol Groups around the country.
In 1975 a group of Liverpool citizens under the name of
'Vigil' began a campaign to disband the Task Force. (147)
However, on Haughton's repl~ent by Oxford, the new Chief,
Constable merely swapped the Task Force para-military
style jeeps for transit vans and renamed it the Operational
Support Division to be deployed in districts with "long-
standing crime problems.,,(148) In his annual report for
1976, Oxford comments:
"Young persons continued to create many problems
varying between vandalism, hooliganism and gang
warfare. Special Patrols, including units from
the Operational Support Division, have had to
be deployed periodically to combat this behaviour
and they have had the desired effect."(149)
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The formation of the Special Patrol Groups in the
1970's and their deployment in street patrols of working
class communities, in labour struggles and on political
demonstrations highlighted the centralised autonomous
political power of the police corporate management.
Given their specific reactive capacity with mobility over
relatively wide areas, the special patrol groups signified
a further development of the form of mobile policing
originally established through Unit Beat Policing. However,
whereas UBP combined mobility and radio communications
systems for the patrolling of specific local areas, the
Special Patrol Groups, organised as separate and distinct
Divisions, enjoyed a much wider freedom of movement across
territorial Divisions with a more specific para-military
orientation.
The Operational Support Division, like its SPG counter-
parts in Metropolitan London and around the country, held
no local allegiances and operated under a direct central
command. Whereas the distinctive feature of UBP lay in
the fact that the system characterised the first step
towards the formation of mobile para-military policing,
the distinctive feature of the SPG's lay in the fact that
they represented the second step of this ~ocess. By the
r turn of the seventies, SPG's and PSU's were being regularly
deployed for public order situations outside of their
Force boundaries on the basis of 'mutual aid' agreements
between Constabularies, and in the wake of the riots of
1981, with the combined deployment of SPG's and other para-
military reserves such as the Police Support Units, a
National Riot Force had effectively been created.
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Consolidation of Reactive Policing
in 'K' Division
We have so far established that with the formation
of 'K' Division and the broad implementation of the policy
recommendations contained within the Chapple Report, the
law enforcement policy which it detailed was primarily
concerned with the deployment of reactive policing strat-
egies to coerce the working class of Kirkby into passive
acceptance of deteriorating social conditions. The guiding
hand of bourgeois morality was to be rigorously applied to
undisciplined youth, their 'irresponsible parents' and.
drink activities. Such policies were not of course
exclusive to Merseyside Police 'K' Division. Many of the
law enforcement policies outlined in Chapple's report
reflected similar processes in other divisions and in
general terms the corporate ideology of the Force. Below
are detailed a number of cases which illustrate the
material consequences of reactive policing. The first
one, involving the Central Liverpool Task Force during
its first year of establishment, was in many respects a
clear indication of things to come.
KENNETH WILLIAMS
Kenneth Williams (27) died at Walton Hospital on
August 4th 1974 from Acute Pancreatitis. (150) Three weeks
earlier on 22nd July Williams, from Southdene in Kirkby,
had been arrested by Liverpool City Police after a car
chase. The police thought that Williams was driving a
stolen car, but it emerged at Williams' inquest that the
car had belonged to one of his relatives. Williams
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claimed that he was subjected to violence immediately
after his arrest and the police claimed Williams had
injured a police officer who jumped onto the car in an
attempt to stop it. Williams was subsequently charged
with attempted murder, although the charge was later
dropped and replaced by grievous bodily harm.
During his release on bail, Williams maintained he
was beaten at the time of his arrest and punched whilst
held at the Bridewell in Cheapside. On July 30th Williams
was taken into intensive care at Walton Hospital where he
died four days later.
The post-mortem examination revealed that Williams
had died as a result of a burst pancreas consistent with
a blow to the stomach, although medical opinion at the
inquest suggested that alcohol or gallstones may also
cause this medical condition.
The inquest on Williams' death was opened on the
26th November 1974 by the Coroner, Mr. Roy Barter, follow-
ing the DPP's decision not to recommend proceedings against
the police officers involved. After two and a half days,
the nine-man jury returned a verdict of 'misadventure'
following the Coroner's summing up:
"Summing up, Mr. Barter said that any question
of the jury committing any of the police officers
for trial for murder or manslaughter could be
forgotten - there was no evidence to warrant
it.
He said that the law stated that reasonable
force could be used to arrest an offender or
suspected offender. 'If the arrest was lawful,
and you are satisfied that any injuries he
received killed him, then the verdict is
misadventure." (l51)
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Before his death, Kenneth Williams insisted that he
had been beaten up in the back of the Task Force Land
Rover and punched at the Cheapside Bridewell. The police
surgeon, Doctor Maurice Kerwin, in cross-examination stated
that he found two wounds on Williams' head when he examined
him.
During Mr. Williams' confrontation with the Task Force,
he claimed he panicked and attempted to drive off. It was
.around this time that public concern began to show itself
in connection with the activities of the Task Force, leading
eventually to its re-naming - the O.S.D. - by Kenneth
. '.
Oxford when he was appointed Chief Constable in 1976 •.
JOHN LANNON
"\'Ieare advised by our client that when he was
arrested by the police officers in connection
with this offence, he suffered injuries as a
resul t of "police brutali tyw.
We are instructed to claim damages on our
client's behalf."(152)
-..
Three months after his appointment superceding Jack
Watson as Chief Superintendent of 'K' Division in May
1975, Mr. N. Chapple received a letter from the solicitors
of John Lannon claiming that he had been severely assaulted
by officers of 'K' Division, causing a punctured lung,
broken ribs, and facial cuts and bruises. Following an
internal investigation, Lannon's complaint was dismissed
by the DPP who ruled that there was insufficient evidence
on which to prosecute any officer. Lannon died 17 months
later after the assault in January 1977. Since his arrest
Lannon had physically deteriorated and had received
repeated hospital treatment.(153)
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The case was re-opened following the numerous
complaints of assault made against the 'K' Division police
in 1979, making legal history with the disclosure of the
report of the internal investigation.(154)
The case was taken to Liverpool Crown Court by
Lannon's family as a civil action against the Chief
Constable, Kenneth Oxford, and Mrs. Gladys Conway, land-
lady of the WoodpeckeI public house in Kirkby.
In the early hours of 11th August 1975, Lannon and
a friend, both drunk following a late night party, had
entered the car park of the Woodpecker pub and poured
paint over the publican's car. In cross-examination,
Mrs. Conway's daughter had stated that Lannon had fallen
off the pub wall and was unable to get up off the ground.
Following the arrival of the police, about a dozen eye
witnesses stated that they saw Lannon dragged around the
car park of the Woodpecker pub, punched and kicked by
two police officers and beaten about the head with a
billiard cue by Mrs, Conway. Mrs. Conway denied assault-
ing Lannon, but was It ••• unable to explain, under cross-
examination, why she was carrying the billiard cue.,,(155)
~~s. Conway also denied seeing the police assault Lannon
r and that she had telephoned Lannon's mother shortly after
the incident to say that the police had caused the
injuries and not her. .
In Counsel's summing up for the family, Mr. Simon
Newton stated:
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".•• Lannon was very drunk and although
injured was not incapacitated. He had
undoubtedly struggled with police officers
and could well have kicked P.C. Alistair
Frew. But they had assaulted him first
while he was lying on the ground."(156)
Dr. Wake, who examined Lannon when taken to hospital
11 hours after his arrest, stated that it was likely that
Lannon's rib was broken by a kick. (157)
Following his arrest Lannon alleged that he was
driven to Simonswood fields where he was further assaulted.
The police officer driving the car, P.C. Norman Wilcox
(who we shall meet again in the Yates case) denied this
and stated that he drove Lannon round the neighbourhood
looking for Lannon's friend. On this wide discrepancy
in evidence, Counsel for the family drew attention to
the •••
It ••• curious fact that the names of the streets
they drove through are all listed in P.C.
Wilcox's notebook. This was very unusual
and would indicate that there was already an
internal police investigation into where they
had been. II(159)
Lannon was kept in police cells for over 11 hours,
despite his. obvious pain and injuries. No medical assis-
tance was given until he was taken to hospital in the
afternoon on the day after his arrest. On this discrep-
ancy, Counsel for the family stated:
"If they had succeeded in keeping him out of
the daylight, so his injuries could not be
clearly seen in court that day, then they
achieved their object in my view." (159)
·.Taking up this point, Judge Edward-Jones suggested
that 'it would have been in the best interests of the
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police to call a doctor since it would look worse for
them if Lannon was found to be seriously inj~ed'. In
reply, Counsel for the family stated:
"That depends on how many times they have
got aw.y with it." (160)
During cross-examination at the Crown Court Mrs. Conway
admitted that she had known P.C. Wilcox, having met him
socially two years previously, but denied that he drank
in her pub or visited her home. However, Mrs. Conway's
daughter contradicted this by stating under cross-examina-
tion that she knew Wilcox as he used to come and deal with
any trouble they had at the pub and had often had a drink
there. (161)
In the event the case was dismissed. However, without
the publicity surrounding the case, generated by the
publicity accorded to the other incidents in 'K' Division
in the 1970's, the suspicious circumstances relating to
-the injuries which eventually led to Lannon's death might
otherwise have passed unnoticed.
HUYTON PARK HOTEL
On the evening of June 15th 1979, officers of Mersey-
side Police 'K' Division raided the Huyton Park Hotel at
about 11.15 p.m. for after-hours drinking. 18 people
were arrested and subsequently subjected to beatings from
the premises of the pub to the Huyton Police cells.
Injuries sustained, most of which have been supported by
-,
medical examinations and eye witnesses, included a fractured
thumb, damaged kidney, broken noses, cigarette burns,
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broken teeth and head wounds along with cuts and bruises,
caused by punches, kicks and beatings with a wet knotted
towel.
These incidents came to national public attention
with the death of Jimmy Kelly and the investigative
journalism of Rob Rohrer.(162) The pub customers made
substantial allegations of not only indiscriminate violence
by the 'K' Division police on the premises of Huyton Park
Hotel, but systematic beatings on arrival at the police
station as the detainees were subjected to a run of the
gauntlet. Some of the customers were then taken to the
showers and ordered to wash themselves. Ned Rogers, a
54 year old labourer refused:
"I thought I was being taken down to be charged.
Half way down the detective stops and says "Here
you are, go take a shower". I said "No". The
next thing, I got hit in the stomach by a uni-
formed copper. I went down and three of them
started kicking me. I got it in the head first."
Then Rogers was taken back to his cell and told
to wash in the sink. He refused. "I was bleeding
but I wasn't having a wash. I saw them take the
roller towel down and knotting it at one end.
They soaked it in water and the detective who'd
arrested me comes straight in swinging the towel
and hitting my head from side to side. He was
a big fellow. He did it for about a minute or
two until he saw the blood coming from my ear."(163)
Most of the Huyton Park customers were charged with
being drunk and disorderly and released early the following
day. Those arrested later appeared before Huyton magis-
trates. Three of the defendants, David Howells, Terence
Roche and Patricia Rogers insisted at the hearing that
the police officers appearing against them were not the
'.
officers who had arrested and assaulted them. One was
found guilty and two were found not guilty of being drunk
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and disorderly. Moreover, as Rohrer pointed out:
"During the police evidence it emerged that a
number of plain clothes officers had gone on
the raid. P.C. Philip Atherton admitted he
had gone along in civilian clothes. But why
some constables disguised as civilians were
needed for a straightforward licensing raid
was not explained to the court." (164)
Following Rob Rohrer's articles on these and other
incidents in 'K' Division in 1979, and the subsequent
public concern, Chief Constable Ken Oxford ordered an
enquiry to be conducted by ~~. Gerty of the West Midlands
police into 14 separate complaints against the 'K' Division
police. Following Mr.' Gerty's enquiries, four police
officers were charged with perjury, attempting to pervert
the course of justice and damaging clothing.(165) All four
were later acquitted of the charges.
EAGLE AND CHILD
-,.
The following evening on the 16th June 1979, a con-
frontation again occurred between police and public outside
the Eagle and Child public house in Huyton. Two officers
had been attacked and left lying on the ground outside.
Members of the Operational Support Unit were brought in.
Five men were arrested following the incident and later
sentenced to three years imprisonment for affray and
assault occaSioning actual bodily harm.
One of those jailed, Peter Jeonney, aged 19, was
later released following Gerty's investigation by an
Appeal Court Judge who stated that the case against
Jeonney had been invented. As well as being framed,
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Jeonney had been subjected to violent assault on being
arrested:
"Richard Crockett, a 17 year old apprentice
bricklayer, claims he saw the police officer
go up to Jeonney and punch him. Jeonney fell
to the ground and several witnesses say they
clearly saw him being kicked by a group of
officers. Then he was pulled up and, he says,
"A uniformed officer hit me right on the nose.
It lifted me back onto my feet'!. His father
saw the police van later with his son inside.
"I saw one fellow punching Peter around the
face", says James Jeonney, "One raised a baton
and hit Peter with it. It was a helluva blow.
I heard Peter scream."(166)
Jeonney alleged that later at the police station he
w~s tied down by police officers and subjected to beatings
with a wet knotted towel and cigarette burns to his body.
Jeonney was later taken to hospital by the police "where
his arm was put into a sling and his facial and nasal
bones X_rayedll.(167) Jeonney's screams were heard by other
persons held in custody at the time. John Bishop, held
over from the Huyton Park incident, heard Jeonney screaming
and later:
"As he looked out of the cell hatch a passing
CIn man told him: "He thinks he's tough, that's
what he gets for beating up police officers."
There was a young kid with his mouth cut who
could hardly walk."(168)
r Jeonney's screams were also heard by Geoffrey Jones, aged
21, who had been arrested and similarly alleged he's been
subjected to violent assault. Four police officers were
later charged with perjury offences following Jeonney's
release.(169) All the officers were later acquitted of
the charges.
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JIMMY·KELLY
Following the pub raids in Huyton on the 15th and
16th of June 1979, four days later on the 20th of June
1979 Jimmy Kelly dies in police custody. The police
had originally claimed to have found him unconscious on
waste land in Huyton. However, numerous eye witnesses
testified to the fact that Kelly had been beaten by
police officers before being taken to Huyton Police
Station where, as it subsequently emerged at the inquest,
he had been accidentally dropped on his head whilst being
lifted from the police van.
Kelly was returning home from the Oak Tree pub
following celebrations concerning the return home of his
younger brother from Australia. He was drunk and singing
as he crossed waste land between two streets. Eye witnesses
stated at the inquest that Kelly had been assaulted by the
police. Eddie Kelly, Jimmy's elder brother, recounted eye
witness accounts of the incident:
"A police car came up and just knocked him down
with the wing. Then police jumped out and grabbed
hold of him and tried to put him in the car. He
resisted, as most men would. He hadn't done any-
thing. That's when they started batoning him.
Then along came a black maria - they always have
four or five men inside, we call them the 'heavy
gang'. They grabbed him and put the handcuffs
on him and pushed him inside. It's only a ten-
minute ride to the police station and by the time
he got there he was dead."(170)
.Following Jimmy Kelly's death, three post mortems
were carried out. The first, conducted by Dr. John
Bens~ead (a Home Office pathologist), reported no serious
injuries. He had been "handled with kid gloves", Benstead
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had stated, and the cause of death was given as heart
failure.
A second pathologist, Dr. John Torry, was commissioned
by the Kelly family following a visit to the mortuary by
Jimmy Kelly's brothers who notice bruised and grazes on
his body. On examining Kelly's body, Dr. Torry discovered
that Kelly had in fact sustained multiple injuries includ-
ing a double fracture of the jaw, and concluded that these
were consistent with a severe beating. These serious
injuries were confirmed by Professor Alan Usher of Sheffield
University, the third pathologist commissioned by the Chief
Constable, Kenneth Oxford.
It was arising from the revelation of Kelly's serious
injuries that the Jimmy Kelly Action Committee was formed
by members and friends of the Kelly family. And it was
their efforts which ultimately succeeded in making the
death of Jimmy Kelly an issue of national" and even inter-
national concern. And moreover, behind the Kelly Action
Committee stood not the subversive phantoms of the bourgeois
press but the working class community of Huyton, alarmed
by the increasing use of violence and harassment by the
'K' Division police. The Jimmy Kelly Action Committee
r subsequently took a leading role in campaigning against
the malignant repressive policing experienced in Huyton.
Support from other communities in 'K' Division was soon
to follow.
The inquest into Jimmy Kelly's death, held at Whiston
Council Chambers, lasted sixteen days (as opposed to a few
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hours for most cases of deaths in custody where many
relatives have not even had the privilege of a solicitor
to represent them. From start to finish it was essen-
tially a police operation. As Rob Rohrer noted:
"The family's Counsel also recommended strong
complaints about the police presence during
the inquest; not only were the Coroner's
officers from 'K' Division, the same division
as the arresting officers, but car-parkatten-
dants, door-keepers, ushers, jury bailiffs and
jury escorts were all police officers. Senior
police officers sat within feet of witnesses
as they gave evidence (on the first day Mersey-
side's Chief Constable in full uniform was so
close he could have tapped witnesses on the
shoulder). It (171) ,
By the time the inquest had begun, on the 25th March
1980, it was clear that the Merseyside Police, along with
the D.P.P., Home Office and Coroner's Court, had decided
to suppress key evidence concerning Kelly's death in an
effort to whitewash the whole affair. The D.P.P. had
decided against criminal proceedings on the grounds that
there was insufficient evidence against any of the officers
involved - thereby legitimating the suppression of key
evidence on the grounds of privilege. As Tommy Banks,
chairman of the Kelly Action Committee commented at the
time:
"How much evidence do they need? There are five
witnesses willing to swear in court that they
saw two police officers knock Mr. Kelly to the
ground using their police car, attack him with
their fists and feet and an unidentified object
from the boot of the car, while throughout the
attack Mr. Kelly did not retaliate. The eye
witness statements correspond with (the inde-
pendent pathologist) Dr. Torry's report, when
he says a heavy blunt instrument, a bar, was
. used on Mr. Kelly. Gerty (the West Midlands
officer in charge of the police inquiry into
the Kelly case) did build our hopes up -
he told us we had nothing at all to worry about,
everything was going in our favour. But we should
not have been taken in." (172)
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Given that the investigation was being conducted
by the police themselves, the Kelly family had in effect
little choice in the matter. Indeed, as Tommy Banks
pointed out, they have been forewarned by one sympathetic
person of what to expect from such investigations:
"We had Mrs. Towers' letter, the mother of
Liddle Towers, who wrote that the police
told her they would 'leave no stone unturned'
to bring those responsible to justice - and
the verdict was 'justifiable homicide'.(173)
On the death of Jimmy Kelly, the coroner's jury of
eleven men, carefully selected by the coroner's officer -
a 'K' Division police officer - returned a verdict of
'misadventure'; a verdict suffiCiently ambiguous to allow
the Home Secretary William Whitelaw to announce that
there were no grounds for a.public inQuiry.(174) All
the officers involved had effectively been exonerated.
YATES FAMILY
Six weeks after the death of Jimmy Kelly, the fourth
major incident occurred in the series of police-public
confrontations in 'K' Division during 1979. Police
officers had responded to a call arising from a dispute
between two families on the Kingsway estate in Prescot.
Police interventions in such situations have proved a
regular aspect of policing working class communities.
In terms of ~ the police intervene into domestic disputes
or conflict between neighbours may be dependent on a
multitude of factors specific to the incident. Enforcement
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policy at such times may prove a decisive factor in
determining the outcome.
\Yriting in 1969, at a time when most police forces
had only just begun to develop new forms of reactive
policing such as Task Forces and the Panda car systems,
John Lambert, in an article entitled 'The police can
choose' presented the ideal-type mode of police interven-
tion in such disputes:
"Custom and tradition suggest a number of techniques.
A very common one is a plain denial of competence -
"This is not a police matter" - followed by a plea
for calm and reason, sometimes supported by a
w~rning about breaching the peace. The police
task is to get the disputants to behave reasonably.
The presence of an authoritarian stranger, a few
words of advice, a warning, some reassurance, are
all the sanctions possible." (175)
Following a call the previous evening arising from
the dispute on the Kingsway estate, the police were called
again the next evening, receiving a complaint over the
noise from a new resident's party. The Yates family,
who were the original complainants, were arrested and
subjected to indiscriminate assault. Steven Yates, aged
24, stated that he was handcuffed and beaten as he was
taken to the police car. One witness stated:
"They had him by his hair and they were kicking
. and punching him. I was sickened by it. It(176)
Another witness from a neighbouring house also saw his
arrest:
ItThe lad had handcuffs on and one policeman brought
\ his knee up between his legs. He just doubled up.
It looked like they came looking for trouble.It(177)
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The next to be arrested was Stephen Yates' father, Harry
Yates. This was witnessed by another neighbour:
"I saw them kicking Harry Yates. Harry wasn't
moving at all on the ground. They were kicking
him pretty hard. I went over to a policewoman
and asked, "Can't you stop them?" She said -
"It's not me kicking him." She had a smirk on
her face, and walked away. I was absolutely
shocked." (178)
The third member of the family to be arrested was Mrs.
Betty Yates who subsequently spent four days in hospital
following police assault. Mrs. Yates described to Rob
Rohrer how she sustained extensive bruising across her
right groin, back, arms and wrist:
"I'd seen my husband being dragged away and they
were kicking Stephen. Then they were banging
the car door against him. As I ran towards the
policeman he gave me a hell of a kick. It sent
me flying. I thought my hysterectomy scar had
opened up."(179)
The only member of the family present not arrested was
the Yates' 12 year old daughter who was left behind with
neighbours. The three were charged with assault, criminal
damage and destruction. The Chief Constable, Kenneth
Oxford, in a special report to the Police Committee on
the 'K' Division incidents, outlined the legal outcome
of the affair:
-,.
"Complaints were received from the Yates family
that they had been subjected to unnecessary
violence and abuse at the hands of the arresting
officers. Following reference of the papers to
the Director of Public Prosecutions, criminal
proceedings against members of the Yates family
arising from the incident in Wilson Road were
not pursued. The Director did not consider the
evidence sufficient to justify criminal proceed-
'\ ings against any police officer. The papers were
then forwarded to the Police Complaints Board who
accepted the Chief Constable's conclusion that
disciplinary proceedings not be instituted in this
case."(l80)
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MICHAEL CAVANAGH
On the 25th August 1979 Michael Cavanagh (19) was
arrested by police officers of the Kirkby Sub-Division
for gambling in the street. In the course of his arrest
Cavanagh suffered severe injuries including several frac-
tured ribs and subsequent removal of his spleen and a
kidney during a five-hour operation. Cavanagh stated
that, prior to his hospitalisation, he had suffered three
hours of agony in Kirkby police station before being
released. (181)
When police raided the dice game outside a betting
shop in Kirkby, Cavanagh made a run for it but tripped
and fell.(182) Cavanagh then claimed one of the officers
fell heavily on top of him. He was placed under arrest,
but while the two officers were holding him, he alleged,
a uniformed officer approached and kicked him twice. (183)
Unfortunately for Cavanagh, there were no indepen-
dent witnesses to the assaults and he was later fined
£10 for gambling.(184) A consultant who examined Cavanagh's
injuries had stated that they were not caused by the fall.
(185)
Michael's father, Joseph Cavanagh, made an official
complaint against the police, whereupon it became the
fifth separate incident in a seven-week period involving
allegations of brutality by the Knowsley police. However,
the D.P.P. ruled that there was insufficient evidence on
which to prosecute the police officers involved.
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Three weeks after Cavanagh's release from hospital
he was drinking at the Woodpecker pub in Kirkby when
'a riot' took place and police officers were called to
clear late drinkers. Cavanagh is alleged by the police
to have urged a stone-throwing mob to attack police,
telling the crowd - "Those bastards have my kidney -
get them.,,(186) Cavanagh (still recovering from his injuries)
it was claimed, had assaulted police during the confronta-
tion. He was taken to court, found guilty and sentenced
to three months in a detention centre. Passing sentence,
the magistrates' chairperson said:
"The bench is determined that violence against
the police will be dealt with with a custodial
sentence." (187)
THE GERTY REPORT
Following widespread public concern over the repeated
allegations of brutality by the 'K' Division police during
the summer months of 1979, the Chief Constable, "having
reviewed the broad nature of the allegations", decided to
bring in police officers from the West Midlands Constabu-
lary to conduct an external investigation of the complaints:
"Accordingly, with the approval and support of the
Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police, Mr.
David Gerty, an Assistant Chief Constable of that
Force was approached with instructions to investi-
gate the circumstances leading to the death of
James Kelly; the complaint of assault made by
lJIichaelCavanagh and the allegations contained
in "The New Statesman" article of the 24th August
1979." (188)
"
Having announced the appointment of an external police
investigator to deal with the complaints, the Chief
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Constable was then able to sit tight and ride the\storm
of mounting criticism concerning the policing of 'K'
Division and fend off attempts by the Police Committee
to make the Chief Constable accountable for the actions
of his Force:
"The Chief Constable now considers it his duty
and responsibility to await the outcome of this
investigation until all the facts are available;
further, as far as possible to ignore the one-
sided trial of the Merseyside Police, which is
contrary to natural justice currently being
conducted by certain sections of the media with
the connivance of others of dubious political
intent."(189)
By September 1980 David Gerty of the West Midlands
police had completed his investigations into complaints
against 'Kt Division police officers and handed his report
to the Chief Constable. Upon the completion of the Gerty
Report, further confrontation arose between the Chief
Constable and the Police Committee over disclosure of the
report. The refusal of the Chief Constable to submit the
report further reaffirmed the Police Committee's inability
to make the Chief Constable accountable for his actions
and fuelled widespread allegations of a cover-up.
-..
In each case, Gerty's report was forwarded to the
Director of Public Prosecutions. Criminal proceedings
were rejected in the cases of Jimmy Kelly, Michael Cavanagh
and Mrs. Elizabeth Yates and police officers charged over
the incidents at the Huyton Park Hotel and Eagle and Child
public house were later acquitted. As the Gerty Report
has never been disclosed, we have only to accept the Chief
\
Constable's word that the investigation was thorough and
efficient. As Mr. Oxford stated:
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"From all the foregoing facts it will be seen
that a most searching investigation by a team
of experienced police officers under the command
of an Assistant Chief Constable has been carried
out in each case. The reports have been subjected
to the scrutiny of two independent bodies (D.P.P.
and Police Complaints Board) and additionally in
the Kelly case to a public inquiry namely a
Coroner's Inquest, of a magnitude never previously
encountered on f.lerseyside. As reported earlier •••
the whole inquiry has been the subject of oversight
(SIC) by the Chief Constable."(190)
We may draw three salient points from the Chief
Constable's statement: Firstly, concerning the independent
scrutiny of the report - it is not the function of the
D.P.P. to assess the quality, accuracy or thoroughness
of police reports dealing with complaints, but to decide
on the basis of the evidence presented the percentage
chance as to whether a jury would return a guilty verdict
if a prosecution was proceeded with. A similar position
applies to the Complaints Board who, on the grounds of
'double jeopardy', will not take disciplinary proceedings
against police officers if criminal proceedings have
already been considered and no new evidence has come to
light. Secondly to state that in the Kelly case, the
Gerty Report was subjected to the scrutiny of the Coroner's
Inquest is extremely misleading. Throughout the entire
course of the Kelly Inquest, the Chief Constable refused
r to disclose the Gerty Report, police and civilian witness
statements, and a large chunk of the Report of the third
pathologist commissioned by the Chief Constable. What
this meant in practice was that it was entirely at the
discretion of the Chief Constable as to what evidence he
was prepared to offer the Inquest from the police investi-
gation. Thus the Gerty Report was not disclosed to the
Court; Counsel for the Chief Constable had sole access
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to the report and the other documents. Thirdly, an
Inquest is not a 'public inquiry' within the meaning of
the 1964 Police Act. (191)
Doubts concerning the efficiency of Gerty's Report
and investigation continued after the Kelly Inquest had
finished. Moreover, it later emerged that one of the
officers suspended over the Huyton Park Hotel incident
had been 'responsible for interviewing vital witnesses
in the Jimmy Kelly case,.(192) The implications of this
fact were pursued by Rob Rohrer:
... -.. .~-...
"West Midlands Assistant Chief Constable David
Gerty was appointed to investigate the 'New
Statesman' reports last year. It emerged,
however, that his inquiries into the Kelly
case - reported to the D.P.P. - depended
heavily on the Merseyside Police's own inves-
tigations. Some eye witnesses interviewed by
the officer who has now been suspended were
·7"-~not':'seenby Gerty's team: instead their later
statements to Merseyside Police officers were
re-typed onto West Midlands statement forms.
At the Kelly Inquest Gerty asserted that one
woman witness, whose account was as unshaken
by rigorous cross-examination, was either a
liar or 'grossly mistaken': Gerty's man had
not only failed to interview the woman and
her husband, but had also not bothered to
check their line of vision."(193)
The witness in question, Mrs. Pauline Gilbert, had given
evidence in which she stated she saw Jimmy Kelly kicked
r at the side of his body, whereas medical evidence found
injuries to his back rather than his side. On t~is
basis Gerty decided against interviewing ~~s. Gilbert •.
Counsel for the family, Mr. Gilbert Gray QC, took up
the point during cross-examination of Gerty at the
inquest:
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Q. ••• Let me ask you this. Did you ever go
to the Gilbert's house?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you ever go up into either of those
back rooms to look out?
A. No, sir.
Q. If you are dealing with a criminal and he
has made a statement or two statements that
may leave ambiguities, or loose ends, would
you go back to clear them up?
A. There were no ambiguities in what they were
saying. They were very definite and specific
and I did not believe them.
Q. Even though you had never seen them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is this the attitude, do you think, Mr. Gerty,
of a responsible senior officer to get a
statement and say, "I will not go to their
house. I will not see them. I will pronounce
them as unreliable? Is that the information,
the quality, that is fed to the D.P.P. by you?
A. I made no such observation. The evidence was
clear on its own, sir, and it was done for the
reasons I have said it was done and that was a
conscious decision at the time, taken after a
great deal of thought. (194)
Counsel for the family then turned to the question
of re-typing of the statements and their submission to
.the D.P.P.
Q. If the Director comes to get statements from
the Gilberts on West Midlands paper?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. He may get the impression that those statements
have been taken by investigation officers in the
West Midlands' Force?
A. Unless I make reference to it in my report, sir.
Q. Just let's look, for example, at one that comes
\ to hand. Pauline Gilbert, nee Jones. How, you
did not take that statement, did you?
A. No, sir.
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Q. What is it headed? Which Police Force?
A. Where, sir?
Q. At the top of the sheet?
A. West Midlands Police sir.
Q. Thank you. Well, why is it headed 'West Midlands
Police'?
A. Because I am from the West Midlands, sir.
Q. But you did not take the statement?
A. Well, that does not matter, sir.
Q. There was the statement as plain as life on the
Merseyside form, wasn't it?
A. Yes, sir, I can't see what you are driving at, sir.
Q. I am wondering why it was not sent off on the
Merseyside form and was copied onto West Midlands
Police forms?
A. Very likely because I didn't like the typing and
the way it had been done so for the sake of neatness
and tidiness it was re-typed.
Q. SO, without having visited the Gilberts, without
having spoken to either of them, without having
done any check as to their personality, background
or character, you decided that certainly Mrs.
Gilbert was dishonest, right?
A. What she was going to say in evidence, sir, was
not backed up - either medically or by other
witnesses and was totally wrong. She had appeared
before the Court and I still say she is wrong.
_Q. Yes, but you see?
A. And that was the reason why I came to that decision
at that time. (195)
In giving evidence to the Inquest, Gerty also claimed
privilege on the contents of the report and thus no means
was provided for testing its reliability and efficiency.
However, during his enquiries Gerty had promised to
disclose his report on completion to the Kelly family
and to their solicitors.(196) A letter to the D.P.P.
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from the solicitors of the Kelly family referred to this
point:
"\'/e refer to the above matter and your decision
in this case not to recommend the prosecution
of any police officers. As you are no doubt
aware we gave assistance to Mr. Gerty, Assistant
Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police, the
investigating officer in this case. During the
course of those investigations Mr. Gerty indica-
ted to us he would be recommending to you that
his report on these inquiries should be disclosed
to ourselves, as Solicitors for the family of
James Kelly. Could you please indicate to us
whether you are prepared to disclose a copy of
that report to us, and if not, your reasons
for not doing so."(197)
The D.P.P.'s reply (7/1/80) merely re-affirmed his
decision not to pursue criminal proceedings against any
police officer.
Gerty's report was, in effect, a report on the
policing of 'K' Division, six years after the creation
of the Division through reorganisation in 1974. Unlike
the Chapple Report of 1975, it has never been publicly
disclosed and reference can.only be made to its terms
of reference and impact on the operation of the police
complaints procedure in 'K' Division. Whereas the Chapple
Report set out to assess the development of policing in
one sub-division and was compiled by a police officer who
r became Chief Superintendent of 'K' Division, the Gerty
Report was compiled by a senior police officer brought
in from outside Merseyside with specific terms of reference
to investigate complaints against Knowsley police officers.
In this respect, the Chapple Report marked a consolidation
of new forms of reactive policing pioneered in the Kirkby
sub-division and the formation of law enforcement policies
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for policing the Knowsley communities, whereas the Gerty
Report was commissioned to investigate complaints from
members of the community, four years, later, arising from
the impact of such forms of policing and law enforcement
policy. 1979 marked a watershed in the policing of 'K'
Division; it represented the culmination of developments
in forms of policing which operated outside any system
of popular or democratic scrutiny and control, and which
carried a reactionary ideological underpinning in policies
designed to discipline and repress working class commun-
ities in Knowsley.
Although it may be said that the Gerty Report had
highlighted police misconduct in some of the confrontations
of 1979, it must be understood that the fact that these
cases achieved widespread publicity was due more to
community campaigning and the investigative journalism of
Rob Rohrer than any real effective workability of the
police complaints system. The non-disclosure of the Gerty
Report along with other instances of the exercise of
autonomous power by the Chief Constable underlined the
-,
extent to which any lingering elements or avenues of
political and legal accountability were made redundant in
the wake of the establishment cover-up of police brutality
in the Kelly case and others. The Home Office, D.P.P.,
Chief Constable and Coroner all played their respective
parts in ensuring the suppression of key evidence to the
surrogate public inquiry - a shot-gun marriage of the
complaints system and coroner's inquest into the death of
Jimmy Kelly.
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Although the pattern of major incidents subsided
following adverse publicity on policing in 'K' Division
and the commissioning of an 'external' investigation,
the kind of day-ta-day cases of minor harassment, partic-
ularly of youth, continued - .regardless of the structural
dismantling of 'K' Division through further reorganisa-
tion. We can only assume that the contents of the Gerty
Report were directed towards specific cases of complaint
rather than any examination of the underlying causes of
such incidents which lay in the character of the policing
strategies employed and the law enforcement policies they
reflected. Either way, the Gerty Report did little to
effect any change in the character of policing in 'Kt
Division, as the following cases illustrate.
THE ARREST OF BRYAN TRAYNOR
Five weeks after the Inquest into the death of Jimmy
Kelly, Bryan Traynor (21) was arrested on the evening of
23rd/24th May 1980 in Huyton, charged with actual bodily
harm against two police officers. Earlier that day
Traynor had attended the wedding of his brother Kevin
and later attended a party at a flat in York Road, Huyton,
held in honour of the newlyweds. Whilst Traynor was in
the kitchen of the flat getting a drink, an argument had
broken out in the living room. Those involved moved from
the living room into the hall and out into the street
where a scuffle began. Traynor joined a crowd of people
who successfully ejected the trouble-makers from the party
and returned to the flat. During the eviction of the gate-
crashers Traynor had lost some money from the pockets of
- 162 -
his trousers and returned to the street to pick up his
money.
As Traynor was picking up his money two police cars
and a black maria arrived on the scene in response to a
radio message reporting a complaint of a disturbance.
Traynor's description to the court of the subsequent
events which took place was as follows:
"I returned to the street and as I was picking up
the money two police cars and a black police van
pulled up to the kerb. One of the officers steppedout of the police car. I do not know which car as
1 was looking down. He told me to "fuck off". 1told the officer I was just picking my money up.
My two sisters were assisting me at the time.
I was told again to "beat it". I said I am only
in the flat and he said "That's it" and he grabbed
hold of me and threw me into the van. "(198)
Traynor's arrest was observed by several witnesses,
including his sister Karen:
"By the time I had left the flat to see what was·
.happening my brother Bryan had already been arrestedand was put in the back of a police van. But·then
I saw that a constable had hold of my sister Noreenover by the police van, so I went over to Noreen,who was very upset because she had watched them
arrest Bryan and saw them put him into the policevan. Then another constable got hold of me and
was going to put me in the back of the police van,but someone said to him that I had only just been
married and to leave me alone, which then he let
go of me and told us to get back into the flat."(199)
As Traynor was taken to·the police van a struggle
took place:
"At this time the police officer had hold of me,
my hand was forced behind my back and he pulledme into the van. All my back was scraped along
the floor of the van and I sustained several
cuts and abrasions.\1 had been in the van for a few seconds when a
second officer climbed in. I was man-handledand abused and forced to wear handcuffs. I was
then taken to the police station."(200)
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At Huyton police station, Traynor alleged he was
pushed to the floor of the charge room, roughly frisked
and then taken to a cell where he was left handcuffed for
three hours. Traynor was released the following morning
and made his way to Whiston Hospital to have his injuries
seen to.
The police version of the events took a rather
different line. Sergeant Parkinson stated to the court
that on arrival at the scene he saw Traynor shouting and
staggering about in the middle of the road. Parkinson
stated, he approached Traynor and told him to be quiet
and move along, to which Traynor was alleged to have
replied: "I'll go where I fucking like." Parkinson
claimed he then told him to be qUiet; Traynor was 'waving
his arms about' and trying to 'avoid the female who was
attempting to restrain him'. He was then alleged to have
shouted: "You can't fucking tell me what to do."
Parkinson decided Traynor was drunk:
"I saw that Traynor was unsteady on his feet, his
eyes were glazed, his breath smelled strongly of
alcohol and his speech had been noticably slurred;he was, in fact, drunk."(201) .
Parkinson then 'took hold of Traynor's arm' and arrested
him. Parkinson was 'assisted' by P.C.s Brougham, Caton
and Lawson in the struggle that ensued to get Traynor
into the van. In the course of the struggle, Sergeant
Parkinson claimed that Traynor kicked him twice in the
chest, but later decided he did not feel sufficiently
unwell to consult a doctor. P.C. Brougham stated that
Traynor had punched him in the mouth. Later examination
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by a police surgeon showed 'that he had a slight swelling
of the upper lip and the upper gum margin had been bleeding.
No treatment was required'. (202) Medical examination of
Bryan Traynor showed fa haematoma to the scalp sited over
the occipital region', 'minor haemorrhagic patches' on
the neck, 'two separate areas of abrasions' to the left
elbow, a swollen wrist requiring a supportive bandage and
'a large area consisting of separate abrasions to the
sacrum' which were cleaned and dressed. Traynor was
advised to return the following week for dressings to his
abrasions, after which 'he was then discharged back to
his own G.P. for further dressings and follow-up'. (203)
Traynor was found not guilty of the charges on
November 18th 1980 at Liverpool Crown Court.
The manner and character of the police intervention
and the arrest of Traynor illustrated the continuation
of abrasive reactive policing policy in 'K' Division only
weeks after national publicity over the Kelly Inquest in
Knowsley. However, the pattern of events in 'K' Division
between 1914 and 1980, and particularly in 1919, whilst
reflecting other confrontations between police and public
in other areas of the country at that time, highlighted
issued of wider public concern, most particularly in this
respect the steady rise in the number of persons dying in
police custody •. The death of Blair Peach during police
repr ession of an anti-fascist demonstration in Southall
and the death of Jimmy Kelly in police custody at Huyton
police station in 1919 illustrated the extent to which
the police force in Britain had consolidated a greater
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capacity to exercise power with a wider political
autonomy from any forum to which they could be brought
to public account. On Merseyside, the Police Committee
began to grasp the implications of the fact that they had
no control or influence whatsoever over operational matters,
the definition of which rested with the Chief Constable.
The Coroner who presided over the Kelly Inquest, Mr. Ronald
Lloyd, announced his determination that his court was not
going to be transformed into a circus and promptly issued
tickets to the press and public. Home Secretary William
Whitelaw, who found himself under political pressure to
instigate public inquiries into the Southall and 'Kt
Division incidents, under the procedures of the 1964
I
Police Act, transformed the humble coroner's court into
~ surrogate public inquiry by stating that he would await
the outcome of the inquest before considering the demand
for a public inquiry. As Phil Scraton pointed out:
"This decision, probably more than any other
single factor, elevated the inquest to an
inappropriate level. The Coroner's Court,
whose function it is only to decide on the
cause of death and not to rule on criminal
or civil liability, thus became the forum
in which the complaint against the police
was to be tested."(204)
THE GUY FAMILY' (205)
On the morning of Thursday, 12th January 1984,
Huyton Na.gistrates heard charges of assault on police
officers and criminal damage to a watch made against
members of the Guy family of Glendevon Road, Huyton.
\
At around midnight on Thursday 18th August 1983,
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Richard Guy (20) left his house in Glendevon Road,
Huyton, to escort his girlfriend home. On his returning
home, Richard started to jog through a local park leading
to the bottom of his road. As he approached the edge of
the park a policewoman stepped out from behind a bush and
Richard stopped running. The policewoman asked him what
he was running from. Richard replied 'nothing'. She then
asked him why he had stopped running and he replied that
he was 'out of breath'. She then asked 'what did you
throwaway?', to which Richard replied 'nothing', and
she then asked him what was in his pocket e, to which
Richard replied 'money'. The policewoman then asked
Richard to empty his pockets and he declined. Richard
was then asked if he was refusing to be searched, to which
he replied: "No, I only live: up the road, if you want to
search me come to my house."
Like many youth living in the Huyton area Richard
was wary of being searched by the police, particularly
as only a few weeks earlier he had been stopped by police
and asked to empty his pockets, whereupon he alleged a
police officer had knocked the money held in his out-
stretched hands to the ground.
In court, the policewoman, P.C.Murray, claimed that
she saw Richard running through the park and asked him to
stop. P.C. Hurray stated that she then took hold of
Richard's arm whereupon the defendant struggled, hit her
in the mouth and ran off. The policewoman admitted that
she ~id not say Richard was under arrest, but claimed she
did not intend to search him, although she had not said
so. She denied that Richard had offered to be searched
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at home.
Richard continued to walk to his house a few doors
down the road arguing with the policewoman. As they
approached the house the argument was heard by Richard's
parents and younger brother who were in bed. The father,
George Guy (41) and youngest son James (14) left their
beds and went downstairs to the front door. Richard
asked 'do I live here?', to which the father replied 'yes'
and asked what was going on. Richard then emptied his
pockets and showed the money in his hand.
Mrs. Guy (41) and the older brother Norman (23) had
by then joined the group outside the front door. The
mother asked what was going on and the policewoman replied
that Richard was under arrest. Mrs. Guy asked why and
received no reply. The policewoman was repeatedly asked
by Richard's father and mother what he'd done - pointing
out that he had been at home all evening with his girl-
friend. P.C. Janice Hurray then stepped into the road
and radioed for assistance. She was approached by Mr. and
Mrs. Guy who invited the constable into the house for a
cup of tea and to straighten things out.
This was all ignored by the constable and about two
~ minutes later following the radio call a police car arrived
at the scene, followed moments later by more police cars
and police vans. When the first car arrived, a policeman
jumped out and ran towards the group. The policewoman
pointed to Richard and said "I want him". The policeman
then'ran straight up to Richard and punched him on the
side of the head causing him to fall to the ground.
- 168 -
At this point Richard's parents and brothers stated they
became bewildered and frightened by the whole incident
and repeatedly asked what was going on.
Richard's father was then referred to by another
constable arriving at the scene as 'another clever bastard'
and subsequently grabbed around the neck and legs by two
police officers and fell to the ground. Richard's eldest
brother Norman was also grabbed by police officers and
pulled by his hair into the garden over the rose bushes.
He was punched in the face and hit with a truncheon by a
senior police officer.
At around this point ~~s. Guy and her youngest son,
both in a state of distress, went from one constable to
another, pleading with them to stop. Mrs. Guy stated she
was simply thrown aside and told to "fuck off". She was
called "a whore" and a "fucking slag".
James (14), the youngest of the family, was then
grabbed by a police officer who twisted his arm up his
back causing the small boy extreme pain. He was then
taken towards a police van, but a policewoman intervened
and said that he was too young. With this the policeman
gave James' arm one last heave and let go. James fell to
~..
the floor crying out in pain. James was later taken to
hospital with a suspected fractured wrist. The injury
was dressed and a later X-ray examination showed that the
wrist was not broken but had suffered severe internal
bleeding from burst blook vessels, requiring a splint and
plaster.
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In the police version of the events of that evening,
Constables Murray, Baker, Rouse and Sergeant Curtin
claimed that they had been assaulted by Richard's father
and brother in their attempt to arrest him. P.C. Rouse
stated that he saw P.C. Murray with the family in the
front garden and went to assist her in the arrest of
Richard. Rouse claims he was then assaulted by the father
who had taken hold of him by a head-lock. With the help
of other police officers the Guys were 'restrained' and
taken to the police van. However the Guy family claimed
that on the arrival of P.C. Rouse, the policewoman was
nowhere near them in the front garden but was standing
on the path outside where she had remained since radioing
for assistanc e.
The police officers were later seen by a police
surgeon and treated for superficial scratches. All were
declared fit to continue their duties. George, Richard
and Norman were held for six hours at Huyton police station.
They were charged with assaulting the police. At around
3.00 a.m. in the morning they were treated for numerous
scratches and bruises by the police surgeon with the
recommendation that the injuries be further examined at
hospital. They were released later at around 7.05 a.m.
All three were found guilty by the magistrates after
a four-hour trial and fined £75 each for assault. In
addition Richard was ordered to pay £18 costs for the
damage to P.C. Rouse's watch.
"As the Guy case illustrated, the disbandment of 'K'
Division in the early 1980's through reorganisation and
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further centralisation did little to noticeably change
the policing strategies employed in the area. Harassment
of youth for example, as Richard Guy's experience illus-
trated, remained a regular feature of policing in the
)
Knowsley area.
Conclusion
A critical examination of the formation of 'K' Division
in the mid-seventies reveals several processes which have
been crucial in determining the character and forms of
policing in the area. Of central importance to this has
been the identification of wider developments in the
corporate organisation of Nerseyside Police. These wider
developments, such as the expansion in the power and
political autonomy of the Chief Constable, the context
of the amalgamations and reorganisations of the late
sixties and seventies, the expansion of administration
and bureaucracy and capital-intensive investment programmes,
formed the context of police organisation in 'K' Division.
These movements effectively facilitated the centralisa-
tion of police organisation under corporate managerial
control. The process led to greater centralised control
over operations diminishing the traditional character of
policing as a local service. In this respect, corporate
organisation, combined with modern communications systems,
facilitated the development of Unit Beat Policing in 'Kt
Division with emphasis on mobility and reactive response
to in'cidents.
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The formation of task forces, better known as
SFGs, under the centralised control of the corporate
management also formed a significant contribution to
the development of new forms of reactive policing in
'K' Division. Based at 'K' Division Headquarters at
Knowsley Hall, but under the central command of the
corporate management, the Northern Task Force, operated
as a mobile division outside of the organisational
structures of the four territorial divisions which
comprised its patrol area. Again, this new form of
reactive policing, which increasingly assumed para-
military characteristics, also significantly contributed
to the redundancy of policing as a local service in the
1970's.
Centralisation and corporate organisation during
the 1970's not only formed the basis of developments
in new forms of policing but also in the development of
a corporate ideology as expressed in the formation and
implementation of law enforcement policy at the sub-
divisional, divisional and corporate management levels
of the Merseyside Police Force. For the corporate manage-
ment, and Police Authority, 'K' Division (and in particular
the Kirkby Sub-Division) was, from the time of its forma-
tion, given detailed attention in forms of its social
conditions and its policing requirements, as was revealed
in numerous reports compiled on policing in the area.
As the cases of Cavanagh, Traynor and Guy have
indi~ated, policing in 'K' Division during the late 70's
and early 80's had assumed an abrasive and reactive form,
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emphasising law enforcement policies which induced a
more conspicuous and coercive approach to the policing
of youth on the streets.
Similarly, the development of more stringent law
enforcement policies to deal with working class drinking
encouraged a more systematic and coercive policing of
pub licensing hours and patrons. As the Eagle and Child,
Huyton Park and Jimmy Kelly incidents suggest, these cases
were not unrelated, but reflected a pattern of inter-
connected instances of confrontation arising from the
implementation of specific coercive policies on drinking.
Corporate management of policing has given greater
political autonomy to senior police chiefs in the formula-
tion and implementation of law enforcement policy for
police forces. This political control of law enforcement
policy and policing strategies by chief constables and
their senior commanders has also through the erosion of
local democracy and corporate centralisation, resulted
in the expansion of the power of the police into other
law enforcement processes within the legal system.
Part 3 will begin by examining specific legal and
political aspects of the investigation and inquest into
the death of Jimmy Kelly in Huyton Police Station which
illustrated the power of the police in manipulating the
Coroner's Court in order to place restrictions on presenta-
tion of evidence and obstruct the inquiry into the cause
and circumstances of his death.
PART 3
THE POLITICS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
IN THE 1980's
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1) THE JIMMY KELLY CASE
I. Cornnlaints procedure and the Jimmy Kelly Case
The series of confrontations between the 'K' Division
police and working class communities in Knowsley made a
significant impact on rates of.substantiated complaints
against the police. Statistics on complaints given to
the Police Committee by the Merseyside police tend however
to be rather ambiguous. General figu~es are given for
recorded 'cases', with each case representing 'a single
investigation carried out,by an investigating officer
into one incident or group of incidents complained of
by one or more persons' along with figures based on
recorded separate items of complaint in a given case.
Thus, in 1979 there were 808 recorded cases involving
1,672 items of complaint against Merseyside Police Officers.
In 1980 there were 777 recorded cases including 1,638
separate iternsof complaint.1
No breakdown is provided of these figures per division
r and thus weare unable to assess rates of recorded
complaints in separate divisions, nor also the types of
complaints made. However, what we are provided with are
rates of substantiated complaints against the police per
division which are itemised into types of complaint.
During the first seven months of 1980, from January to
July, there appeared a sharp rise in the number of
substantiated complaints against 'K' Division police
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officers. For 1979, if we compare 'K' Division with
the other divisional areas2we find that 'K' Division's
total of 9 substantiated complaints approximates an·
overall divisional average of 9.3. However, if we examine
the figures for 1980 as a whole we find that 'K' Division's
total of 11 substantiated complaints greatly exceeds an
average of 6.8 for all divisional areas in that year.
,
Much of this increase occurred in the first seven months
of the year, where total substantiated complaints reached
a figure of 10 as compared with an average of 2.4 for all
divisional areas including 'K' Division.
The reasons for these sharp movements in the nUmbers
of substantiated complaints during 1980 are not clear.
Most of the allegations o~ brutality in 1979 were recorded
as complaints in that year and moreover none were con-
sidered substantiated by the police. Also, as clearly
illustrated with the Traynor case in the last chapter,
complaints against police misconduct are not always made.
However, given that the Kelly case was receiving wide-
spread publicity during the first few months of 1980,
including the inquest held during March and April, it is
possible that this factor may have encouraged a greater
willingness amongst the public of Knowsley to forward
complaints of police misconduct. A breakdown of the
figure reveals: 4 items of complaint concerned with
'neglect'; 5 of 'irregularity'; 1 of 'property'; and
1 complaint classified under the heading 'others' (see
Table I). In terms of a critical analysis of the question
I
of police accountability and the complaints system, such
statistics as are compiled by the police (taking into
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account factors such as biased police investigation,
discretion over presentation of reports, D.P.P. reluc-
tance to prosecute police officers) give little indication
of the degree of thoroughness and accuracy of police
investigations of complaints ,against tpemselves. Each
stage of the procedure weighs against prospective
complainants and thereby re-affirms the autonomous political
power exercised ~y the police in the absence of any effec-
tive institution of democratic control with counter-posed
powers of law enforcement. This position was clearly
illustrated with the death in custody of Jimmy Kelly -
in relation to the mechanics of the complaints procedure,
the police manipulation of the Coroner's inquest through
the engineering of a legalistic smokescreen, and through
the total inability of the POlice Committee to bring,the
Chief Constable to account for policing policy in 'K'
Division.
The present complaints procedure is outlined in a
leaflet published by the Home Office and available on
request at local police statiqns. Entitled 'Police and
Public: Complaints against the police', the leaflet is
based on the 1964 and 1976 police Acts. It provides a
useful framework of the system from which we can draw a
~T"
critique of its most salient features as applied to the
complaints procedure in general and the Kelly case in
particular.
Following the filing and recording of the Kelly
family's complaint against the police officers involved
in Jimmy Kelly's arrest and subsequent death, the Mersey-
side Chief Constable, Kenneth Oxford, ordered an
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investigation into the allegations concerned. Section 49
of the police Act 1964 requires that the investigation
of complaints be conducted by an officer of minimum rank
of superintendent; the responsibility for action following
the result of each investigation rests-with the deputy
chief constable (or a senior officer in the Metropolitan
or City of London police). Chief Superintendent Turner
subsequently conducted the internal investigation into
the Kelly family's complaint.
Complaints are made either in writing to the Chief
Constable (if the complaint·.is.against. the Chief Constable
it is sent to the police authority), or.the complainant
calls at the local police station to make the complaint.
This aspect of the proced~e can obviously be intimidating
to the complainant as there is no other way in which a
complaint may be made and investigated.
Following their registration of a formal complaint
against' the police, the family of Jimmy Kelly applied for
legal aid to take proceedings for damages for assault
arising out of his death against the Chief Constable!
When the Law Society refused to grant legal aid for the
family to be legally represented at the Inquest, the
~ Jimmy Kelly Campaign was set up to raise the necessary
funds and publicise the suspicious circumstances surrounding
Kelly's death.
Given the fact that all complaints against the
police are dealt with by either the Chief Constable or
Deputy Chief Constable and with the knowledge that "only
the police have the authority to investigate complaints
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against police officers"~ th~ solicitors (Canter and
Levin) acting for the Kelly family employed the services
of a private detective to collect witness statements and
assemble other pertinent evidence. It was made known to
the Kelly family that the private dete.ctive# Mr. Jack
Watson, was an ex-senior police officer. What they didn't
know at the time was that Jack watson was the first Chief
ISuperintendent of 'K' Division, between 1974 and 1975,
before being transferred to st. Helens Division and
replaced by Norman Chapple.5 Watson headed the Force's
first Task Force~ and had been commended by the Chief
Constable when he was Chief Superintendent for st. Helens
for 'the manner in which his men carried out their duties'
at the time of the Pilkington's strike.7 Such duties
included attempts by Special Branch officers to infiltrate
The Rank and File Strike Committee~
Watson's tasks included the collection of witness
statements, the taking of photographs of Kelly's body
during the second post-mortem, fingerprinting the deceased,
examining hospital records, arranging -forensic ~xamination. -
of fingerprints and the .w~isky 'bottle alleged'to have been
found in Kelly's possession, and attending the inquest.
Evidence accumulated by the private detective was
handed over to the police by the family's solicitor Alan
Berg, who stated:
"I wish it to be put on record that every facility
and cooperation has been afforded by myself and
the family to the Investigating Officers including
,copies of statements taken from witnesses, the
sight of photographs, the use of interviewing
rooms and the availability of manpower."9
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Such courtesies to the Investigating Officer were
not of course reciprocated. Statements made by the police
officers connected with Kelly's death were not even,
disclosed to the Inquest, let alone the Kelly family's
solicitors. Indeed, statements made tq the police by
civilian witnesses were withheld from them during cross-
examination at the Inquest. Such 'privileges' will be
examined in more detail later.
As it stands, there is no Lndependeneeys tem of
investigating complaints against the police, nor is there
any effective independent system for monitoring police
investigations into complaints. Endemic to the system,
therefore, is the potential for abuse. Moreover evidence
exists to support this contention. Frequently a client,
on making a complaint at a police station, or subsequent
statement to the Investigating Officer, may be guided by
the police themselves. The records may emphasise criminal
allegations pertaining to a specific incident(s) during
the complainant's encounter with the police, and these
stand little chance of substantiating ~pros~cution and
thus the officer's general conduct a disciplinary
matter may be neglected. This contention is supported
by a Home Office Research Unit unpublished report leaked
... to The Times (8/4/81). Following a study of Metropolitan
Folice files of complaints of assault:
......The report says it is clear in one case
that the police realised the use of criminal
charges in nullyfying or weakening a compLadrre;"
\Thus the police can formulate the charge for the
client. AS is often the case, the D.F.F. may decide
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against bringing a case to court and subsequently any
disciplinary aspects of the case are in practice dropped.
Once the D.P.P. decides there are insufficient grounds to
prosecute a police officer, disciplinary proceedings
cannot be pursued if the evidence required to substantiate
the disciplinary charge is the same as that used to support
the criminal charge which is usually the case. This
is justified on the grounds of avoiding 'double-jeopardy',
that is, being accused twice of the same offence. For
example, a police officer's conduct may be seen by the
complainant as offensive, which is a disciplinary matter.
However, during the encounter, the police officer may have
seized the complainant by the arm, which could be emphasised
in the report as a technical assault a criminal charge
which becomes the focal pOint of the complaint. The
disciplinary aspect, of which the complainant may have
felt most concern and which may have stood a better chance
of redress would be neglected. According to Margaret Simey,
it is this loophole in the machinery which can work against
the complainant .10
Complaints are investigated by a senior officer who may
come from a different division or force. The discretion
exercised by the Deputy Chief constable or the Chief
Constable in making this decision was highlighted in a
-,.
report-of a Merseyside police Authority working group.
They argued that:
"•••• the view that the decision to bring in an
outside force to investigate involved a value-
judgment on the part of the Chief Constable or
the Deputy Chief Constable based on the facts
of each case. One or two members expressed
reservations about the possible false inference
which could be drawn from the fact that the
force under investigation selects the investi-
gator, whether internal or external."n
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Following the internal police investigation into
the Kelly case by Chief Superintendent Turner and further
complaints and allegations of police brutality in 'K'
Division, the Chief Constable under the powers of the
1964 Police Act, requested the appoin~ent of Assistant
Chief Constable David Gerty of the west Midlands Police
to investigate ......the circumstances leading to the
death of James Kelly and other allega~ions contained in
the (New Statesman) press article ...12 We have already
discussed the Gerty Report in some detail in the last
chapter, so at this point it remains to note that with
the completion of the Gerty Report, the Chief Constable's
refusal to release its contents and the D.P.P. 's decision
against prosecuting the officers involved in the Kelly
incident, the Coroner's Inquest into Kelly's death was
resumed. The Inquest, at this point, became the forum
for testing the complaint against the police via legal
processes outside the terms of reference of the Police
Acts 1964 and 1976. Such a position was attained by a
political sleight-of-hand performed by the Home Secretary,
William Whitelaw. Under pressure from other politicians,
the Kelly Action Committee and sections of the media for
a full public inquiry under the terms of the 1964 Police
Act which would have proved more difficult because
of the withholding of police evidence such as the Gerty
Report and police statements whitelaw stated that he
would await the outcome of the Inquest before considering
a public inquiry under the police Act 1964P Whitelaw, in
reply to a letter from Harold Wilson, argued that any
inquiry under Section 32 of the 1964 Police Act "is likely
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to depend for its effectiveness on promises to potential
14witnesses of immunity from prosecution." .However, for
the Chief Constable, the inquest was, as far as he was
1 i . ,15 d·concerned, a 'pub ic nqu~ry; an g~ven the widespread
media and public attention th~ inquest.assumed the
character of a trial, but without an official prosecution
and defence. In effect, the coroner's court, which is an
inquisitional process and thus not constituted to rule on
civil or criminal liability!6 assumed an 'ao hoc' adversarial
character with Counsel for the police and family assuming
respective roles of defence and prosecution.
The D.P.P. 's decision not to·recommend criminal pro-
ceedings on the basis of Gerty IS report was predictable.
The Director will only forward a case for prosecution if
he considers th~t there is a 51% chance of a jury returning
a guilty verdict. The criteria or standard for assessing
-..
this percentage chance of conviction is the D.P.P.·s own
private subjective evaluation. Moreover, in cases involving
criminal allegations against a police officer, the percentage,
as the D.P.P. has admitted, may be substantially higher.
According to the D.P.P. this higher percentage is arrived
at with the assumption that juries are reluctant to find
a case against a police officer unless the evidence is
overwhelming. Chief constables are required to send reports
of criminal investigations to the D.P.P. in all cases
"except those where the Chief Constable~is satisfied that
17no criminal offence has been committed."
l.thas often been stated that 'police officers, like
everyone else, are subject to the law of the land'18 B~t
given the specific role of the police in the law enforcement
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process, particularly in relation to police discretion
in prosecution, a dichotomy can emerge in the administra-
tion of criminal procedure between police and public.
For example, with the death in police custody of Jimmy
Kelly:
"In normal circumstances, where death in suspicious
circumstances occurs and the slightest suspicion
therefore fall upon a member of the public, the
Police bring that person before a Court, with all
due expedition and without initial reference to
the Director of public prosecutions, without a
Pre-Trial investigation and provided "there is
prima facie evidence upon'which they can rely,
a charge is preferred and the due process of law
takes its course. Neither the police nor the
D.P.P. puts themselves in the position of Judge
and Jury. One would have thought after some
4!~months (•••of investigation by the police
into the circumstances of Kelly's death) the
Chief Officer of Police would have been in a
position to indicate that there was evidence
in this case for a charge to be preferred or
alternatively, that there was no evidence for
that course to be pursued and thus end the
speculation. II 19
In practice, the decision against prosecution of
officers involved in Kelly's death reached beyond legal
terms of reference into wider political considerations.
In this respect, the D.P.P.'s decision, on the 'advice
20of leading and junior counsel', and as a senior civil
service bureaucrat appointed by the Home Secretary, may
constitute more than simply legal judgment, but intra-
state political struggle between police and government.
Counsel for Kelly's family seemed genuinely mystified
by the D.P.P.'s decision:
liltis a mystery how he has managed to disregard
the independent eye-witness evidence which,
.~oupled with the post-mortem findings, raises
a prima facie case at the very least of inflic-
ting grievous bodily harm, and the recommenda-
tion believed to have been made by the indepen-
dent police inquiry for prosecution on thisbasis. II 21
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Reluctance on the part of the D.P.P. to decide in
favour of prosecution of police officers is reflected
in the relatively small number of charges arising from
complaints. Between January 1st 1978 and March 31st
1980 the D.P.P. received 6,415 complaints from which
" .
charges were brought in just 33, a ratio of one charge
for every 200 complaints, or 0.5%.22
IComplaints of a disciplinary nature are also inves-
tigated by the police themselves. The Chief Constable is
the disciplinary authority for his ForceJ3 The Police
Complaints Board has no power to investigate complaints
as all the evidence they receive is from the police
investigation, and"neither can it impose disciplinary
action by itself. Although the Board can request further
information on particular cases, and offer counter-
-,..
recommendations to thos~ proposed by the police, this
rarely happens in practice. In 1979, of the 7,365 cases
before the Board, disciplinary proceedings were brought
in only 127 cases:4or less than 2%. In only 18 cases
did the Board dispute police conclusions and in these
cases agreement was subsequently reached. Such figures
have continually justified widespread criticisms of the
Board as a toothless watch-dog given to rubber-stamping
police decisions. However we must not neglect the guiding
hand of the Home Office in such matters. AS the Board's
Secretary assured the solicitors acting for the Kelly
family:
~~The (Police Act 1976) requires the Board, in
discharging their functions, to have regard
to guidance given them by the Secretary of
State particularly as to the principles to
be applied in cases that involve any question
of criminal proceedings. It 25
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This 'independent element'(SIC) in the complaints
procedure is therefore not only a toothless watch-dog,
but a miserable creature chained by its police and Home
Office masters to the pillar of 'double jeopardy', as
illustrated in their acceptance of th~ Chief Constable's
decision against disciplinary proceedings in the Kelly
case:
"The Board have considered Mr. Gerty's report
and are satisfied that the Chief Constable has
taken the only view consistent with the Secretary
of State's guidance which is to the effect that
where an allegation against a police officer has
first been the subject of criminal investigation
and it has been decided, after reference to the
Director, that.criminal proceedings should not be
taken, there should normally be no disciplinary
proceedings if the evidence required to substan-
tiate a disciplinary charge is the same as that
required to substantiate the criminal charge.
The Board have accordingly accepted the ChiefConstable's decisiori."26 .f'
Apart from the slender possibility of criminal or
disciplinary proceedings arising from police investiga-
tion of a complaint, the complainant may take a case to
the civil courts. Although this avenue may prove satis-
factory for redress in some cases, it can only decide on
matters of compensation and not the searching investiga-
tion of a case~7 In addition, an action for assault, wrong-
-.. ful arrest, false imprisonment or negligence such as would
apply in the case of Jimmy Kelly would, as the family's
Counsel advised, result in no more than nominal damages
'in view of Mr. Kelly's parlous state of health and short
expectation of natural life.'~
In the previous chapter, the development of reactive
policing policy was analysed in terms of its impact on
the working class communities of Knowsley. we have
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examined the formation of law enforcement policies for
the policing of Knowsley and the material and ideological'
determinants upon which they were based. These develop-
ments have been located in wider mediations which have
. .served to expand and extend police powers which have
given rise, in the post-war period, to greater political
autonomy for the police. In this respect, the development
of reactive forms of policing has reflected an expanding
political autonomy for the police from the remnants of
traditional elements of accountability such as police
committees and the complaints system. Such processes are
clearly illustrated in the death of Jimmy Kelly, the
character of the police investigation and the manipulation
of the legal procedure of the Coroner's Inquest to nullify
demands for a public inquiry into Kelly's death raised by
the Knowsley community, sections of the media and prominent
politicians. The effective white-wash of the serious
discrepancies and circumstances of Kelly's death and the
subsequent police investigation, along with the suppression
of key evidence pertaining to the case was achieved through
the manipulation of legal procedures idiosyncratic to
coroners' courts by the police (particularly the Chief
Constable) and the discretionary exercise of the powers
enjoyed by the Coroner.
The next section will attempt to unravel the nature
of the legal wrangle used to manipulate the law enforce-
ment processes of the Coroner's Inquest, and identify. .
the character and power of vested interests which
underlay such manoeuvring.
- 186 -
2. Law Enforcement and State privilege29
When the law enforcers are subjected to the processes
of the law enforcement system that they have served to
uphold there emerges a clear contradiction between their
legal status as law enforcement officers and their legal
status as private citizens. Whilst both categories may
be subjected to the same legal processes of the state,
in practice law enforcement officials occupy a privileged
position in exercising state power where law enforcement
may instance law-breaking. When the state appears to
contradict its own laws, the legitimacy of state power
is undermined and so consequently, legal transgressions
by law enforcement officers are, as far as is practicable,
'covered up' .30
As the power of the state rests ultimately on the
use of coercive force, the exercise of that power has
to be continually legitimated within the framework of the
state's legal system. In this respect the state is faced
with the daily task of maintaining legitimacy as a 'public'
body in order to straddle the class struggle and police
its contradictions. Its law enforcement officials must
be seen to act, as far as possible, on behalf of the wh~le
of society, on behalf of a 'public'. Thus the state
ideologically rests on a conception of a 'general public'
devoid of class antagonisms and interests and thereby
attempts to defend its repressive actions in terms of
the 'public' it purports to 'serve'. The state, therefore,
claims to represent 'public interest' but in reality it
is the state itself which defines 'the public' and
its 'interests'.
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With the legal system, conceptions of public
interest are enshrined in case-law and statute. The
ambiguous and contradictory conceptions underlying
legal rulings and practice in the assertion of 'public
interest' allow for manipulation of legal and political
processes to absolve the coercive practice of the state.
This position may be critical when death or serious injury
arises from the exercise of the coercive forces of the
state.
With cases arising of death implicated in the actions
of law enforcement officials, the state, faced with popular
disquiet, takes the defence of the actions of its officials
as a defence of itself, i.e. its powers; and must show that
the exercise of those powers in circumstances leading to
death were 'reasonable' and not excessive. Moreover,
this diffusion of any popular concern over deaths arising
from state violence has to be achieved within the state's
own legal framework in accordance with the 'public interest'.
In exceptional cases the state may initiate a 'public
inquiry' where the existing machinery may prove inadequate
in meeting this task.
Given that coroners' courts are effectively pollce
r courts, legal processes peculiar to the inquisitional
procedures of inquests are manipulated to absolve the
state system from responsibility for deaths arising from
law enforcement actions where individual officials are
implicated; the political privileges ~f the state are
mystified into legal privileges afforded to their officials.
This position, moreover, applies to the implicated enforce-
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ment officials and to the enforcement officials who
instigate and conduct the investigation into the causes
and circumstances of deaths in police custody, prisons
etc. With inquests into deaths in custody the police,
who appear as 'servants' in a coroner'~ court, become
effectively the controllers •. From the investigation of
the circumstances of the death and preparation of the
evidence through to the control of the proceedings, the
police maintain a substantial command of the coroner's
court.
From this privileged position the police can have
total control over submission of evidence during an
inquest into a death in custody. Implicated police
officers may refuse to re.lease statements to the court
which they have made during internal police inquiries
by claiming 'privilege' for their statements. Senior
investigating police officers may claim 'privilege' for
their reports; they are defined as confidential documents
and their retention, with all the necessary legal under-
pinnings, is explained on the grounds that disclosure
would not be in the public interest. AS the friends of
Blair Peach have argued:
-,. "In every case, the argument advanced against
publication has been the 'confidentiality' of
the reports concerned; it is suggested that if
it had been known that these reports would be
made public, then they would have been prepared
differently. This is, of course, a familiar
argument in a country with one of the most
secretive and therefore arbitrary bureaucracies
in the world. It is, as it has always been , a
-,completely specious argument. We are in effect
being told that the dedicated democrats of our
public services might in some way behave dis-
honestly if they thought the public might get
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to know the truth the very same public
servants in whom we are also expected to have
absolute faith and unquestioning confidence .1131
Similarly in the case of Jimmy Kelly, Counsel for
the Chief Constable, Andrew Rankin, a.c., offered a
similar argument to justify non-disclosure of police
statements from the investigating officer's report:
II •••• if there was ever to be an unhappy situation
similar to this, it may inhibit witnesses from
making statements to police officers ,who were
conducting a very proper, necessary investiga-
tion ...32
The 'witnesses' to whom Rankin is referring are of
course police officers. The contradiction is that in
one instance police officers are members of the public
like any other citizen who comes before the Coroner's
Court, but in another instance they are law enforcement
officials who can exercise rights of privilege which are
,not normally employed by civilian witnesses. The only
real privilege that extends in practice to civilian
witnesses is that they could refuse to make a statement.
This option is theoretically also open to police officers,
but considering that police officers spend a good deal of
time taking statements, to refuse to make a statement
would not auger well for their case or indeed the force
-.. itself. Therefore they have the privilege of making
statements which are held in confidence and not revealed
outside the state system. Thus, in the name of public
interest, evidence from investigations is censored by
the police before being fed into the legal machinery and
of c~urse ultimately into the media. Only th~ 'relevant
facts'·are made known to the court; as Counsel for the
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Chief Constable explained during the Kelly inquest:
•••••• it is in accordance with the instructions
I have received from the Chief Constable to
place before you sir, every fact which is
conceived by those advising the Chief Constable
to be relevant to this inquiry."33
Even though at times the strings may get a little
entangled, they all pull in the same direction.
(i) Legal Contradictions in the Blair Peach Ruling
Before we begin a more detailed examination of the
legal processes in the Jimmy Kelly case, it is first
necessary to examine the High Court ruling on the Blair'
Peach case as this case was used as a legal precedence
for the refusal to disclose documents and statements in
the Kelly case.
On Friday October 12th 1979 the Hammersmith Coroner,
Dr. Burton, reopened the inquest on the death of Blair
Peach. Stephen Sedley, Counsel for the peach family,
asked for a copy of the poli~e inquiry,report (the Cass
. "
report) to be submitted in the evidence to the inquest,
as the report was relevant in that it was the results of
a "murder inquiry in which the subject was a Metropolitan
police officer".34 On the evidence available
there was a 'primae facia' case that Blair Peach was
killed by a blow to the head in violent circumstances.
In other words, there was (and is) a case to answer, based
on eye witness accounts that Blair Peach was struck on the
head by a blow which was to cause his death as was later
confirmed that ill-fated day by hospital X-rays which
"
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revealed a fractured skull. If Blair Peach had been
struck whilst surrounded by civilians then this would
have been a case for the police homicide squad. However,
at the time the blow was struck Blair peach was surrounded
by police officers of the S.P.G. wielding batons and riot
, .
shields. In such cases, the Chief Constable (Metropolitan
Commissioner as he is called in London) is faced with the
decision as to whether or not the officer(s) implicated
should stand trial. Important considerat~ons are made
with regard to weighing up the'circumstances, such as media
coverage, adverse publicity, political implications and
cost. In short, the 'master' must decide whether or
not to abet and assist his 'servant' with the following
consideration in mind:
liThe chief officer of police for any police 'area'
shall be liable in respect of torts committed by
constables under his direction and control in
the performance or purported performance of their
functions in like manner as a master is liable in
respect of torts committed by his servants in the
course of their employment, and accordingly shall
in respect of any such tort be treated for all
purposes as a joint tortfeasor."35
In the event, the Commissioner ordered an internal
police inquiry and stated that the report of the inquiry
would be passed to the Director of public prosecutions
r for his consideration. Following the D.P.P. 's decision
not to bring proceedings against the police officers
concerned, the inquest on the death of Blair Peach was
resumed. With the rejection by the Coroner of the family's
Counsel's request for the Cass Report to be submitted to
the Court in evidence, the issue was then taken by the
family to the Divisional Court to appeal against the
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decision of the Coroner. The Appeal was rejected on the
following grounds:
"First of all, as I say, the method of preparation
of the statements to which I have already referred
indicates that those statements s~arted as police
property and, in my judgment, continued as police
property, and at the present time are police prop-
erty. I see no wayin which anyone other than the
police authorities can obtain any sort of legal
title to these documents, and therefore, prima
facie they are not available to be handed over
to the Applicant. Prima facie the present custo-
dian of the documents, the Coroner, should nit
without breach of confidence or trust show them
to the Applicant."36
If we consider the basic premises of the ruling,
there in fact emerges some quite pertinent legal contra-
dictions which illustrate the fact that the ruling was
based more upon politicaL considerations than strictly
legal ones. This position was made apparent when the
Blair peach Campaign received a letter from the Police
Complaints Board in October 1983. In this letter, the
Complaints Board established the following facts:
(i) No formal complaint had been made against
the police under Section 49 of the 1964
Police Act by the family of Blair Peach.
(ii) Investigation of the Southall disturbances
was conducted on the initiative of the
Commissioner and not specifically in
response to complaints.
(iii) From this investigation it was decided
that 14 persons were to be regarded as
complainants and this did not include
members of the peach familY:-
-;With these facts in mind, consider the following
quot~tion taken from the Peach Ruling:
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"In preparation for the hearing before the
learned Coroner consideration has been given
to whether the Applicant, who is an interested
person in the inquest, should be entitled to
see and profit from some 60 odd statements
which have been taken in resoect of this case
••••• 11 37 (My emphasis)
According to the Complaints Board, the investigation
(including the taking of 60 odd statements) was ~ in
respect of this (i.e. peach) case or in fact of any of
the complaints that were made, but was on "the initia~
of the Commissioner. under Section 32 of the 1964 Police
Act a Chief Constable has power to II •••• cause a local
inquiry to be held by a person appointed by him into any
matter connected with the policing of any area. ,,38 This
is a different process and category from that provided
for in section 49 (1) of the 1964 Police Act which is
soecifically concerned with the investigation of complaints.
However our Worships on the Divisional Court appear
to have got their wigs in a twist when in the course of
their Ruling they seemed to be under the assumption that
they were dealing with Section 49 (1):
-,..
"The method of obtaining these statements, as we
have been told in the course of argument is this:
The police, first of all, when a serious complaint
is made against one of their number, "must take
evidence in order to deal with the disciplinary
inquiry which is bound to follow. Apart from any
other obligation or desire the police might have
had to take statements in this case, they were
bound to take elaborate statements to satisfy
their duty under the relevant Police Acts. 1139
+he basic premise then, of the High Court Judge's
Ruling is therefore erroneous. No complaint had been
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made by the Peach family (as they were originally told
there was to be a murder inquiry). MOreover the 'discip-'
linary inquiry which was bound to follow' did not follow
given that there was no specific investigation of a
complaint. As the Cass Report arose not from formal
complaints against the police but from the Commissioner's
~nitiative to cause a local inquiry', it would further
seem that the D.P.P. based his decision not to prosecute
officers in connection with Blair Peach's 'death on a
generalised report on the Southall disturbances and not
a specific investigation into the death of Blair peach.
Therefore we can only come to the conclusion that the
premise of the peach Ruling was incorrect. Given the
contradiction of the legal basis of the Ruling, the asser-
tion that: ......the method of preparation of the state-
ments •••• indicates that those statements started as police
property ......40is invalid.
-,.
Furthermore, the notion of 'police property' is also
contradictory. In bourgeois law, the poli,ce are cons'ti-
tuted as 'public servants' - they are established in the
'public interest'. AS a state body the materials and
equipment used by the police are 'public property' and
not the private 'property of the police. Therefore reports
compiled by a public body must effectively be public
property. In ruling that the Cass Report was essentially
the property of the police and that there is 'no way in
which anyone other than the police authorities (i.e. police
command) can obtain any sort of legal title to these
documents'~ a distinction emerges between 'public property'
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and 'police property'. It is a distinction which rests
in the political autonomy of the police. In the Kelly
inquest this distinction was referred to as 'privilege'.
(ii) Contradictions of Privilege in the
Jimmy Kelly Inquest.
DRAMATIS PERSONAE
Professor Alan Usher
Kelly family's Barrister.
pathologist who conducted
third post-mortem for
Chie f Cons table.
Gilbert Gray, Q.C.
Andrew Rankin, a.C.
Police Federation
Barrister representing
4 police officers who
arrested Jimmy Kelly.
Barrister for Chief
Constable.
George Carman, Q.C.
Dr. John Torry Pathologist employed by
Kelly family.
David Gerty ASsistant Chief Constable
(West Midlands) •
Appointed by Chief Const-
able to conduct 'external'
investigation.
R. Lloyd Coroner.
Francis Keegan Eye witness to Kelly's
arrest.
-,. P.c. Brophy Constable involved inevents at Huyton Police
Station.
Chief Superintendent
Turner Conducted 'internal'
investigation.
Chief Constable.Kenneth Oxford
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Legal argument over disclosure of documents and
statements began with Gilbert Gray's request for a full
copy of pathologist Professor Alan Usher's report and
statements that were made by the four police officers
42during the police investigation. (2.3J In reply to
Gray's request for the police statements, Carman claimed
privilege for the statements on behalf of his clients on
the grounds that he had not received copies of civilian
witness statements from Gilbert Gray and to release the
police statements would give the Kelly family's a.C. an
advantage which was denied to him. (2.3)
Similarly, in respect of the Usher report, Andrew
Rankin a.C. refused to disclose the full report on the
grounds that it was a 'private privileged document' •.(2.4)
At this point it was not clear as to whether the privilege
claim was on behalf of Usher or the Chief Constable.
Rankin was only prepared to release a 'filleted' version
of the report which excluded "•••• observations of Prof-
essor Alan Usher which are not directed directly to the
medical evidence of the various considerations which the
jury will have to determine." (2.4) These 'observations'
by Usher were based on his assessment of his post-mortem
r in relation to the police evidence shown to him from the
investigation, a procedure which is common practice in
post-mortem reports. At a later stage in the inquest
proceedings this refusal to disclose the full report of
Alan Usher gave the police interests an unfair advantage
during cross examination of the pathologists, as a full
copy of Dr. Torry's report (the second post-mortem
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conducted on behalf of the family) was submitted ~n
evidence, including his observations, and were exploited·
in cross examination by both police counsel to discredit
Torry's evidence. The privilege claim for the Usher
report was in fact later made explicitly on behalf of
the Chief Constable. However Gilbert Gray had stated
during argument over this issue that he had in fact
received a letter from Usher expressing his hopes that
the full report would be disclosed to the'"inquest. (2.5)
In reply to Carman's assertion that he was refusing
to release the police statements on the grounds that he
had not received copies of civilian witness statements,
Gray offered to provide him with copies of all statements
in his possession. Gray also pointed out that all their
statements had been handed over to Mr. Gerty, the inves-
tigating officers
"•••• we handed over every single document and
it is the evidence we possess and we have not
had the corresponding facility from the Chief
Constable or indeed from my learned friend,
Mr. Rankin." (2.5)
In reply to Gilbert Gray, Rankin argued that Gray
would not be entitled to copies of the statements of
witnesses seen by the police in a murder inquiry, there
being "no difference between this situation and that
situation." (2.6) This however is a side-step of the
issue by Rankin. In the first place, no murder inquiry
was ever commissioned into the death of Jimmy Kelly and
the statements taken in the course of the Gerty investi-
gation were for the purpose of investigating a complaint
against the police. At no pOint in these events have
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the police ever acted on the basis of a prima facie
case of murder and therefore Rankin's assertion that
the inquest was the same situation to committal proceed-
ings arising from a murder inquiry was spurious. Commit-
tal proceedings are based upon adversarial procedures
with defence and prosecution. Inquest proceedings are
inquisitional in form; there is no defence and prosecu-
tion; no one is on trial.
In not wishing to appear obstructive to the proceed-
ings, Rankin stated that his position was in accordance
with his instructions from the Chief Constable and that
on the basis of the Chief Constable's instructions; would
place before the Coroner "every fact which is conceived
by those advising the Chief Constable to be relevant to
this inquiry." (2.6)
On the face of these ambiguous assertions, which the
Coroner allowed to pass without challenge, Rankin extended
his claim for confidentiality of statements made during
the investigation to include .civili.~n wi~~ess s-t:atements.
This emerged during his cross-examination or 'a civilian
witness, Mr. Keegan, who was questioned by Rankin on the
basis of a statement he had made to the police some months
-,.
earlier, without being shown the statement:
"Mr. Rankin: Let me remind you what you said to
the police "Meanwhile another
policeman had got out of the car."
They not one, ever took hold of the
man, was not in any way'rough or
nasty and manoeuvred him towards
their car. Now that is quite differ-
ent from the account you gave today,
isn't it?
Mr. Gray:
The Coroner:
Mr. Gray:
The Coroner:
Mr. Rankin:
Mr. Gray:
Mr. Rankin:
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Do I take it that a statement is being
referred to that this witness made to
the police?
I beg your pardon?
I am just wondering if my learned friend
is referring to a statement in writing
this witness made to the police. One
would have thought the proper way to
deal with that is to show the statement
to him so that he can look at it.
well now, is this a statement which the
witness made to the police, Mr. Rankin?
It is, but it is a perfectly proper way
to cross examine. I have not put the
statement to him. I have no intention
of giving him the statement. I am
perfectly entitled to ask him did he
say that to the police •
.'
He is perfectlyentitl.ed to show him the
statement or·part of it, and I would
entirely understand and it will be fullypresented. .
I am becoming a little anxious about .
Mr. Gray's course. I know perfectly
well what he is at and he is not gOing
to succeed. I am not endeavouring to
cover anything. I am acting consistent
with what I said this morning. I' (2.70)
(My emphasis)
Let us examine this last sentence of Rankin's a
little more closely, as this was uncriticslly accepted
by the Coroner and the cross-examination was resumed as
before. Rankin was referring to his previous analogy
r (discussed earlier) of witness statements and a murder
inquiry which we have already shown to be spurious.
Moreover the earlier position with regard to statements
was concerned with police statements and the Usher report.
The legal premise of Rankin's refusal to disclose police
statements and the full Usher report was privilege. At
this stage Rankin had now extended this position to include
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civilian witness statements. In other words, statements
made to the police investigation by civilians had become,.
following Rankin's legal argument, the private privileged
property of the Chief Constable. This position would
therefore apply to both police and civilian witness state-
ments. However, the Chief Constable had chosen to release
copies of police statements back to the officers concerned,
but not to civilian witnesses. A puzzling dichotomy.
Moreover, at this stage it must be pointed out that no
claim of privilege had been made by the police officers
for their statements through Carman. Carman had refused
to release copies of statements at this stage not on the
grounds of privilege but on the grounds that he had not
received copies of witness statements from either Gray or
Rankin.
It was during the early stages of the inquest when
it became clear that control over the release of statements
and documents resided with Counsel for the Chief Constable,
the Coroner simply saw fit to accept whichever position
Rankin assumed in defend~ng non-disclosure of documents
.. .'
and statements. The premises of Rankin's argument, as the
proceedings progressed, ultimately relied upon the Blair
Peach Ruling, which became a convenient safety-net to cushion
the fall of police counsel's discredited arguments. On the
third day of the inquest during cross-examination of Keegan
who alleged he saw Kelly struck by a 'bar-like' object,
Rankin revealed that forensic examination had shown no
traces of blood or anything of 'apparent significance'
on any of the items submitted. At this point Gray inter-
vened to protest at not receiving any documents or state-
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ments concerned with the forensic examination:
Gray: "••• my learned friend has repeatedly saidnothing is going to be covered up, all is
to be revealed and all is not being revealed."(3.6)
In reply, Rankin makes his first refer~nce to the Peach
Ruling as justification for.non-disclosure:
Rankin: "All is being revealed to Mr. Gray. The
witnesses will give evidence and we will
still conduct ourselves in accordance with
the rigorous requirements of our profession,
we are not departing from it. May I point
out I have given Mr. Gray a copy of the
application, a judgment on which was given
in the Blair peach Inquiry. I have it here,
the Lord Chief Justice presiding, and one
of four such applications·was made by the
relatives of Peach for copies of all the
police statements, they were refused by
the police Authority and that authority
was upheld by the Divisional Courts •••"
(3.6)
In reply, Gray points out:
Gray: "••• it is perfectly right for my learnedfriend to say that there is authority for
him keeping all his statements; if he wants
to keep all his statements, well and good,
but that should not be compounded by con-
stantly saying we want to reveal all.
It is inconsistent." (3.6)
~o which Rankin merely re-asserted his position with a
solemn promise to disclose to the Coroner·anything which
he considered ought to be disclosed:
Rankin: "I am under no obligation and I have no
intention of providing Mr. Gray with
statements taken by police officers.
If there is any matter, sir, which
does not come out because you have not
called a particular witness I will invite
your attention to the existance of that
evidence and leave it to you to decide
whether to call the evidence." (3.7)
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This advantage afforded to Rankin in having possession
of both civilian and police witness statements was used
to full effect in his cross-examination of civilian
witnesses. Moreover, Rankin was able to contrast civilian
evidence given at the inquest under crpss-examination with
both statements made to the private investigator (which
the family's counsel had made available to the court) and
statements made to the police investigation. As the
witnesses were not shown their police statements, Rankin
was able to select odd phrases and sentences from the
hidden statement and contrast with the witnesses' oral
evidence. This resulted in civilian witnesses becoming
confused as to what had been said in the different state-
ments, which Rankin capitalised upon in attempting to
portray Keegan as motivated by malice and bias against
the police.
Gray objected to this by arguing that witnesses had
a right to ask for and see their statements under the
guidelines of a Home Office Circular dated 9th April.1969,
which stated that ••• (Para. 2.)
II ••• the Chief Officer should normally provide a
person on request with a copy of his statement
to the police.1I (3.20)
The only circumstances, the Circular suggests, when
disclosure by a Chief Officer may be refused, is where
there is reason to suppose that 'the statement is sought
for some sinister or improper purpose.1I (3.20)
Moreover, as Gray pointed out, the Circular made
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specific reference to Coroners'inquests: (Para. 3)
"In the interests of consistency it seems appropriate
to apply a similar practice in cases where an inquest
is pending; the Secretary of State accordingly recom-
mends that a copy of a witness' statement taken by
the police for police purposes in the course of an
inqury involving a death should be supplied, notwith-
standing that an inquest is pending, on the same
basis as advised in the previous paragraph." (3.20)
Gray further argued that the Peach Ruling did not
apply to this case as the Peach applicati~~ asked for the
release of all statements 'en masse'. Gray was not sub-
mitting for the entire Gerty report to be released, but
for disclosure of specific statements •••
"••• where a witness has had his attention drawn
to a statement he made to the police, has been
questioned upon it and later he says in terms
when told that something is missing from another
statement, "Well, it may be missing from that but
it is in the other statement."" (3.20)
Thus, in order to justify withholding statements
from the witnesses who made them, the Chief Constable
would have to show that sinister or improper purposes, lay
behind the request. As there was no evidence to support
such a contention, Rankin was forced to fall back on the
Blair Peach Ruling again that "statements are treated as
police property." (3.22) However, although the Coroner
chose to reject Gray's submission in favour of Rankin's,
the qualitative difference in premises is quite clear.
Gray's, based on the Home Office circular, is a general
guideline to be utilised as a practical policy; whereas
the P~ach Ruling refers to a specific case. It is a
specific ruling on a specific application. Therefore,
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when Rankin quotes from the ruling:
"I see no way in which anyone other than the
police authority can obtain any sight or title
to these documents and therefore prima facie
they are not available to be handed over to
the applicants." (3.22)
- the Lord Chief Justice is specifically referring to
the applicants, i.e. ROY Peach, who was the brother of
the deceased and not a material witness to the injury:
"It is most elementary that if the charge is being
made against a person he must be given a fair
chance of meeting it; that often means he must
be given documents for the purpose. But there
is no charge here made against Mr. Peach, the
applicant, to my mind." (3.22)
By 'charge' the Lord Chief Justice appears to include
'criticism' in a broader definition:
"(it is not intended) to widen the Coroner's Inquest
into adversarial fields of conflict. That being so,
because this applicant is in no risk of himself
. being criticised." (3.22)
In the Kelly proceedings such implied criticism was
made against the police officers concerned who had
access to their statements and against certain key
civilian witnesses who were denied access to their
police statements. However in a coroner's inquest nobody
is on charge; the proceedings are inquisitional and not
adversarial. The privilege afforded to the officers in
having access to their statements was not afforded to
civilians. The legality of this outcome was based on
the C'oroner's acceptance of the false premise of the
Peach Ruling in Rankin's submission. To summarise, the
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Peach Ruling was concerned with the release of documents
len masse I to a person who was not a witness to the
inquiry. It was a specific ruling on a specific case.
In Gray's submission, under the guidelines of the Horne
Office circular pertaining to the position of witness
statements in any given case, a particular witness has
a right of access to his statement unless sinister or
improper purpose can be shown.
At this stage it becomes clear that the legal grounds
of Rankin IS refusal to release the statements were ambig-
uous and contradictory. The decision against disclosure
was essentially political rather than legal; i.e. it had
been decided that the statements would not be released
and subsequent justifications by police Counsel, uncriti-
cally accepted by the Coroner, rested on the clutching of
legal straws. In the event the Coroner justified his
ruling against disclosure by simply stating:
II ••• As I understand the position, these statements
were not prepared for the purpose of this coronerls
inquest. tt (3.25)
If, indeed, this was the case, then the Coronerls con-
clusion begs the question, why in that case were they
used to test witnesses (blind) in the inquest and why
were the police officers allowed access to their state-
ments, and moreover later allowed to claim 'privilege'
for them?
By this stage it was clear that civilian witnesses
would not be allowed access to their statements on the
grounds that these were the property of the Chief Con-
stable and therefore exclusively at his disposal.
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Although the Chief Constable saw fit not to release
civilian witness statements to their authors, statements·
made by police officers had in fact been released to
Counsel representing the 4 officers, George Carman QC.
Thus the 4 police officers had had the privilege of
access to their statements prior to proceedings; a privi-
lege not afforded to civilian witnesses.
During cross-examination of P.C. Brophy, the police
officer who dropped Kelly on his head at Huyton Police
Station (not one of the 4 officers), Gilbert Gray asked
the officer if he would like to see his statement, to
which Brophy replied that he would, upon which Gray
requested that the statement be made available to the
officer. (7.56) This situation raised something of a
predicament, as Brophy, not being one of the 4 officers
directly represented by carman, had, in agreeing to see
his statement, opened the door to the possibility of
disclosure of police statements, which may have forced
the Chief constable's Counsel into the very awkward posi-
tion of refusing to release a statement requested by one
of his officers if it was to be revealed. On the other
hand,statements made by the 4 officers had already been
released to the 4 officers and to refuse Brophy his state-
ment would add further weight to allegations of a cover-up.
In the event, it was Counsel for the 4 officers who saved
the day by seeking a new ruling from the Coroner.
Carman argued that in addition to representing the
4 poiice officers he also represented the National police
Federation and as Brophy was a member of the Federation
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Carman claimed he could therefore represent Brophy.
The main pOints 'of Carman's argument were as follows:
I•••• all the statements taken for the purpose of
a complaint and for potential disciplinary pro-
ceedings are, in effect; still subjudice, and
the problem is, in my submission, that every
police officer who makes a statement in the
course of a disciplinary Inquiry is making
a statement which is privileged and confined
to that Inquiry." (7.61)
..'
As far as Brophy's position was concerned, the
premise to Carman's argument here is spurious in that
neither potential criminal nor disciplinary proceedings
were at any stage facing Brophy, and when Carman submits
the argument that •••
"That officer should be advised, in my respectful
submission, that the document is privileged to
him, and only if he waives that privilege and
elects to reveal the contents of the statement
need it be introduced." (7.62)
- he is really effectively attempting to close a loop-hole
through which statements made by the 4 police officers may
be revealed:
"What Mr. Gray is about to begin, I anticipate,
with the various police witnesses and ultimately
ending up with the officers, is a voluntary
prompting to give evidence; which is not only
to ask them questions in cross-examination
which he is perfectly entitled to do, but
pursue or seek to obtain any document which
may well be privileged."
Here again we find that in preventing the submission
of vital evidence to the proceedings, Counsel for the
police are reduced to the clutching of legal straws to
legitimate what was essentially a political decision not
- 208 -
to release police statements and documents. Following
Carman's submission, in his haste to affirm Carman's
argument, the Coroner neglected to allow Gray to reply
to the application. The Coroner concluded:
"These statements to which reference has been
made have not been prepared for the purposes
of this Inquest, and I would consider they
are, in fact, privileged documents and not
available to the Court." (7.63)
-rHowever the legal error in the Coroner's conclusion
was not left unchallenged by Gray. Brophy was not facing
•
disciplinary proceedings and neither, at this point, had
he made any claim of privilege:
(Gray) "This officer so far as we know is not subject
to any disciplin~ry proceedings. There has
been so far as we know no complaint about him.
Therefore, any statement made by him following
this accident (1) is a police statement, not
a privileged document, and is a public docu-
ment." (7.64)
The Coroner, faced with the legal ambiguities of his
ruling, could only reassert his previous ruling, which had
now become hybridized with the notion of 'privilege':
"What we are concerned with here is a special
investigation under a particular Act, in other
words, under the Police Act 1964, and I would
have thought that any papers or statements or
anything else prepared for the purposes of a
special investigation of that kind was, in ".fact,
a confidential or privileged document. I so
rule in this case." (7.66)
Thus, the Coroner, no doubt a little lost in all the
legal·rhetoric, made his ruling which was based more
upon political considerations than legal ones. He had
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totally failed to understand Carman's legal submission
and could only grasp its political implications. His
phrase "••• confidential or privileged document" illus-
trates this fact, in that what was at stake were legal
notions of'confidential documents' an~ 'privileged state-
ments'. Carman was submitting for a ruling on claims for
privilege for police statements by the police officers,
not police documents held by the Chief Constable and on
which the Coroner had already previously ruled. The
Coroner seemed to be under the impression that all he
needed to do was reiterate his previous ruling. The notion
of 'privileged document' (7.63 and 7.66) merely illustrates
the Coroner's half grasp of the legal arguments and the
political basis of his ruling. The confidentiality o·f
documents as based on the'Peach Ruling, i.e. that they
are the property of the Chief Constable, has nothing to
do with the notion of 'privilege'. There is no mention
of'privilege' in the Blair peach ruling. However, the
Coroner in his inability to grasp the finer legal distinc-
tions in these matters felt obliged to use any legal 'notion
peddled by police Counsel to legitimate his political ruling.
This inability became even more apparent on the following
day (day 8) when Counsel made submissions on the question
r as to exactly from what date the privilege ruling applied
to police statements in relation to the commencement of
potential disciplinary proceedings.
The pOint at issue concerned the date from which the
Coroner's ruling on privilege for the police officer's
statements was to apply. The formal complaint against
the officers was sent by the solicitors for the Kelly
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family on the 25th June 1979, which Rankin argued was
the earliest date from which the privilege ruling applied,
and therefore he could release to Gray the documents and
statements made prior to that date. Gray challenged this
argument by pointing out that the solicitors' letter of
the 25th June made no complaint of disciplinary matters;
it was a complaint of assault which amounted to a criminal
offence and therefore all statements that were taken until
formal notification of disciplinary proceedings were
available and unprivileged. Gray argued that it was there-
fore not open to Carman to claim privilege for what was
essentially a police inquiry, not going into disciplinary
matters but into criminal allegations. (8.20)
Carman's defence of privilege his "watershed of
privilege" rested on commencement at the date on which'
Chief Superintendent Turner was formally appointed to
investigate. (8.19) Carman argued that investigation,
under Section 49 of the police Act 1964, could embrace
two situations of either potential criminal proceedings
or potential disciplinary proceedings, or also, as Carman
contested, both at the same time. For carman they are not
'mutually exclusive'. (8.20) On this premise, Carman's
-,. submission rested and as this was a false premise in
relation to actual statutory law, his subsequent pleas
of double jeopardy, as defined in statutory law (police
Act 1976), were contradictory:
"The complaint on investigation mayor may not
amount to a situation where criminal proceedings
are appropriate." (8.21)
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Complaints are not investigated to ascertain
criminal or disciplinary proceedings ad hoc. The primary
consideration is the possibility of criminal proceedings
and this is the basis of the investigation as laid down
in complaints procedure:
"When a deputy chief constable received the
report of an investigation into a complaint
he must first send it to the Director of
Public Prosecutions unless he is satisfied
that no criminal offence has been cormnitted."43
So when Carman asserted that an investigation "may amount
to a situation where both are appropriate" (8.21) his
argument has no legal basis in statute. The primary
consideration in the investigation of the complaint by
Jimmy Kelly's family was .the possibility of criminal
proceedings. Moreover, the double jeopardy rule makes
this procedure quite clear. It is only after criminal
proceedings have been considered that disciplinary pro-
ceedings are considered:
"The Deputy Chief Constable will therefore
consider (after any reference has been made
to the Director of Public prosecutions)
whether as a result of the investigation
of a complaint the evidence is such as to
justify bringing a disciplinary charge."44
-r
With the double jeopardy ruling, an officer cannot be
charged for the same offence:
"Where a member of the police force has been
acquitted or convicted of a criminal offence
he shall not be liable to be charged with any
·offence against discipline which is in substance
the same as the offence of which he has been
acquitted or convicted. "45
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Therefore, as the Complaints Board later affirmed in a
letter to the Kelly family shortly after the inquest,
disciplinary proceedings do not arise from criminal
proceedings unless fresh evidence emerges:
"The Board have considered Mr. Gerty's report
and are satisfied that the Chief Constable has
taken the only view consistent with the secretary
of state's guidance, which is to the effect that
where an allegation against a police officer has
first been the subject of criminal investigation
and it has been decided after reference to the
Director, that criminal proceedings should not
be taken, there should normally be no disciplinary
proceedings if the evidence required to substan-
tiate a disciplinary charge is the same as that
required to substantiate the criminal charge.
The Board have accordi2?ly accepted the Chief
constable's decision.1I
Therefore, there were no disciplinary proceedings under-
taken. The investigation, was into allegations of criminal
conduct and considered as such by the Chief Constable and
D.P.P. The statements were made for the purpose of
investigation of possible criminality on the part of
police officers in the death of Jimmy Kelly. Carman's
assertion that the release of the statements to the Court
IIwouldundermine the whole disciplinary complaints pro-
cedure" (8.21) is fallacious, as disciplinary proceedings
were considered inappropriate by both the Chief Constable
and the Police Complaints Board: a position moreover
which was held at the time of the inquest and ever since.
The Coroner, either unwilling or unable to discern
the finer but crucial elements of the pOlice Complaints
Procedure, did his best to help Carman pull his act
\
together. However, in bringing in the notion of 'double
jeopardy' in support of Carman's argument this merely
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served to further expose the contradictions of Carman's
position; as the following dialogue illustrates, neither
of them knew what they were talking about:
Mr. Carman:
The Coroner:
Mr. Carman:
The Coroner:
Mr. Carman:
The Coroner:
Mr. Carman:
"I can't add anything sir, you have
already ruled and I re~lly don't
think Mr. Gray quite understood
the position because a complaints
procedure embraces both criminal
inquiry and disciplinary inquiry
potentially at the same time."
"Essentially what you are saying in
effect, Mr. Carman, is that your
clients are to some extent placed
in double jeopardy?"
(by the complaints procedure ??)
"Certainly."
"And that they face possible criminal
proceedings as well as disciplinary
proceedings?"
"They mayor may not.,.
"Two quite separate distinct matters?"
"Absolutely correct sir, and of course
it must not be thought by this jury .
that anybody as it were, is taking a
view that.they could' face:those
proceedirigs." (8.22).
But then as Carman later confesses:
"••• if anything fresh emerges it could be, I don't
know, there might be disciplinary proceedings
against my clients." (8.22)
Fresh evidence? The undisclosed statements perhaps?
At this point Carman becomes submerged in legalistic
gobbledegook:
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"(the officers) are not going to waive privilege
of statements which were made for quite different
purposes unconnected with these proceedings and
for the purposes as yet unresolved finally." (8.22)
For Gray, the issue was simple: prior to any formal
notification of disciplinary proceedings, all statements
made by the police officers were unprivileged:
.....the officers have to be told in writing that
that is the decision, sir, if it were otherwise,
one could never get a police officer 'to face a
statement that he has made at an inquest because
he would say there may be disciplinary proceedings.
(8.22)
And here Gray requested the date on which any disciplinary
proceedings were notified to the police officers. Carman
claimed his copies of the statements were undated as they
were copies. Rankin, who was in possession of the orig-
inal documents, gave the date as 14th November 1979.
However, although Carman stated that the documents were
served on that date, he later goes on to quote from them:
•••••if you make such a statement it may be used in any
subseguent disciplinary proceedings. " ,(8.23), This then
was one crucial matter for the Coroner to decide upon in
the legal submissions of day 8. From which date would the
privilege ruling apply? Two other important matters were
also raised by Rankin for the Coroner to decide on:
.....here is the dichotomy, we know Mr. Waddell
had nothing to do with the events on the waste
land, Constable Brophy had nothing to do with
the events on the waste land, they have made
statements, are their statements to be privileged
because they are police officers, 'although not
police officers against whom complaints are made?
(8.24)
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The other matter concerned cautioning of the police
officers by the investigating officer:
"If the officers are cautioned and say nothing,
that is their right because the words of the
caution say so. If on the other hand, they
are cautioned and say something, .does that
by saying something, so to speak, waive any
privilege?" (8.24)
However, the Coroner in his conclusions on these sub-
missions could only evade the issues by dogmatically..'
reiterating his previous ambiguous ruling:
"Having listened very patiently to everything
that has been said it does appear to me that
all that the jury and myself are concerned
with is the evidence which is actually given
by the witnesses in this court and the
witnesses are giving their evidence, they
are then being questioned by all three leading
counsel, and I would have thought that that
was all that we were concerned with in this
case involving an Inquest. There is a gentle-
man there who persistently waves his head from
side to side. You don't suffer from any
physical disability, do you sir?" (8.26)
If the Coroner thought the matter of confidentiality
was going to rest there, he was mistaken. His ambigUous
ruling created more questions than answers. On the
following day the three Counsel decided to put legal
submissions to the Coroner in the absence of the jury
Or to clarify the scope of the Coroner IS ruling. In these
submissions, Carman gave the underlying premise of the
privilege claim:
"You will recall, sir, that when police Constable
Brophy was giving his evidence, Mr. Gray sought
to obtain a copy of a statement made by him
··.datedthe 27th June, 1979. I then made an
application to you in open court and the purport
and content of that submission was that all
statements that came into existence after that
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date were privileged. The ground of the
privilege being public interest and the
ground of the public interest being that
the statements came into existence for
two purposes potentially: (1) criminal
proceedings, and (2) disciplinary proceed-
ings." (9.2)
This was, in fact, the first mention by Carman of
the notion of 'public interest'. Contrary to the claim
in his submission above, there was no mention of 'public
interest' in any of his previous applications; neither
was the court informed as to what exactly constituted
'public interest'. In further support of the claim for
privilege Carman referred to the Home Secretary's state-.
ment given at the House of Commons in which.he stated
that fresh consideration may be given to the question
of criminal proceedings i~ fresh evidence emerged. (9.2)
There is, however, a difference between fresh considera-
tion in the light of fresh evidence appearing and actual
criminal proceedings ~ progress which may have
supported carman's case on the grounds of sub judice.
However at the time (and to this date) there had never
been criminal proceedings taken against the four police
officers.
Following quotations from the Peach Ruling in support
r of his submission, Carman summarised his case as follows:
I) All documents from the 25th June are in law
privileged.
2) "That the privilege in respect of which you
ruled was the privilege of the four officers
whom I represent, because I could not sensibly
have made that submission on behalf of anybody
other than my own client." (9.7)
(This is incorrect as Carman had in fact
'advised' P.c. Brophy to claim privilege!)
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3) That any disclosure by Rankin of any information
in the privileged documents was a breach of the
Coroner's ruling. (9.7)
After Carman's submission for the Police Federation,
Rankin gave submissions on behalf of the Chief Constable.
These may be summarised as follows:
1) What were the consequences of the Coroner's Ruling
with regard to privilege?
.,'
2} Would the Coroner reconsider that ruling in the
light of these submissions?
3) There was no mention of 'privilege' in the Peach
Ruling and therefore it had nothing to do with
the question of privilege. .
4} That a contradiction existed·between·the Coroner's
privilege ruling and Rankin's 'duty as a member of
the Bar' to submit any evidence from statements
which materially contradicts oral evidence:
"Suppose, sir, the officer gives sworn testimony,
whereas in a previous document it is not outside
the privilege ruling you have given, so that we
know that that officer has sworn on oath let us
say the opposite of what he has said in a state-
ment on a matter which is material and relevant
to how Mr. Kelly came to meet his death and do
nothing merely because Mr. Carman has persuaded·
you to rule privilege in his favour?" (9. 10/11)
For Rankin, the Coroner needed to clarify "the nature
and content of the claim for privilege". (9.12)
-,..
With Gray, the Counsel for the Kelly family, the
question of disciplinary proceedings related to the family's
complaint against the police. The formal letter of
complaint from the Kelly family's solicitors indicated
a complaint of criminal assault and therefore there was
no evidence to suggest disciplinary proceedings started on
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the 25th JUne. The officers concerned had only received
a formal letter informing them of a disciplinary investi-.
gation on November 14th 1979.
In giving his ruling on these submissions, the
Coroner once again fell back upon the ambiguities of
his previous ruling and the peach ruling:
"I would think that the judgment of the Lord
Chief Justice fortifies the opinion I'have
already expressed in this ,case, that so far
as any documents are concerned they are, in
fact, the property of the police and they
are not within my disposition as such. What
use the Chief Constable makes of those docu-
ments, they are at his disposal." (9.45)
From here the Coroner then proceeded to quote from
the Coroner's Rules 28 (1) which state that documentary
evidence shall not be admissable at an inquest unless
the Coroner is satisfied that there is good and sufficient
reason that the maker of the document should not attend
the inquest. (9.46) However he then went on almost
immediately to affirm Rankin's proposal to hand over to
Gray a bundle of documents 'on wbi~h we have been referring'.
Rankin then interjected:
"I understand you to say, sir, that you adhered
to your earlier ruling which made the date the
25th June."
Coroner: "That is right." (9.46)
A trick question, because in his earlier ruling,
which we have already examined, the Coroner gave no mention
of dates but simply reiterated, dogmatically, his general-
ised ruling (8.26); so Rankin could then state:
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"Mr. Carman's claim for privilege is restricted ~
to the 25th June." (9.46)
Rankin could perhaps just as easily have said
'14th November'.
Carman was obviously piqued at this, particularly
given the Coroner's pains to quote R'ule 28 (1) and then
proceeding to allow Rankin to give Gray documents made
prior to June 25th. In questioning the Coroner on this,
Carman is obviously dealing with a deference to the
authority of the long arm of the Chief Constable:
Carman: "Sir, I thought you ruied -I may be quite
wrong - that under your rules it was not
necessary to introduce documents it a
witness is giving evidence •••"
Coroner: "I thought I made it perfectly clear,
Mr, Carman."
Carman: "Yes."
Coroner: "They are the property of the police and
what use of them Mr. Rankin on behalf of
the Chief Constable makes is entirely a
matter for Mr. Rankin." (9.47)
Which all begs the question why did the Chief Constable
see the need to withhold the other 9~1o of the documentary
evidence?
To recapitulate a little, we have seen that first,
in the early days of the Inquest, the Counsel for the
Chief Constable, Mr, Rankin, refused to disclose the
contents of the police report on the death of James Kelly.
All the documents were defined as confidential and the
property of the Chief Constable to dispose of as he pleases.
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This position was affirmed by the Coroner, following
submissions by Counsel, and the basic premise of his
ruling rested in case-law on the Blair Peach Ruling
which we have already shown to be itself based on a
legal contradiction. Moreover, the foUr police officers,
represented by George Carman, claimed privilege for their
statements and this was affirmed by the Coroner. The
premise for the privilege ruling rested on the notion of
'public interest'. It was argued that as 'the four officers
could face criminal or disciplinary proceedings if fresh
evidence emerged during the Inquest then the withholding
of their statements was their privilege in not risking
incrimination of themselves. However, the premise of this
argument was contradicted on two grounds. Firstly, in
that at a Coroner's inquest nobody is on trial, there is
,no defence or prosecution and all witnesses are equal:
but with the privilege ruling some became more equal than
others in that, whilst the four policemen were protected
from cross-examination on their statements, civilian
witnesses faced rigorous and detailed cross-examination,
often blind, on both statements they made to a private
investigator and statements made to the police. Secondly,
in contradiction to a later speech, when Carman claimed
that he represented only the four police officers, during
cross-exami~on of P.C. Brophy, who was not one of the
four officers involved in the waste land incident, Carman
'advised' him to claim privilege for his statements.
However at no time had Brophy been accused of any criminal
or disciplinary action, and therefore the extension of the
Coroner's ruling to P.C. Brophy contradicted the premises
of the Coroner's privilege ruling. Essentially it became
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clear that the ruling was based more on political rather
than legal considerations as we have also shown with
the confidentiality ruling on the documents of the police
report on Kelly's death and the High Court Ruling on the
Blair Peach case upon which it was based •.
'During cross-examination of Assistant Chief Constable
Gerty of the West Midlands police who conducted the
'external' investigation and produced the report on
Kelly's death which was deemed confidential, the political
basis of the privilege ruling became apparent.47
During cross-examination of Gerty by Gray, Gerty
refused to answer Gray's questions concerning a number
of police photographs ~econstructing Kelly's position
in the van. According to,the officers who arrested Kelly
he was placed face down on the floor of the van. The
photographs taken as part of Gerty's investigation showed
Kelly sitting up. In evading explanation for this contra-
diction, Gerty took refuge in the privilege ruling:
Gray: "well now,in'all those police documents'that I have referred to it records Mr. Kelly
as having been put in on the floor of the
van?"
Gerty: "Yes, sir."
Gerty:
"Face down. You must think that it was a
curious thing to be taking those photographs
with someone sitting on the seat face up."
"Not at all, sir. I have followed quite a
few lines of enquiry. I am afraid they are
all part of my report and I am not allowed
to disclose that report." (15.57)
-,. Gray:
And this was Gerty's position on just about every question
asked of him under cross-examination by Gray concerning
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his investigation. However Gerty was not being asked to
disclose confidential documents which were defined as
the property of the Chief Constable, but refused to
answer guestions on the grounds of privilege:
.....I am not allowed to refer to anything
.that is a matter of privilege.l• (15.56)
As the photographs had already been disclosed, they could
not be classed as confidential, even though they formed
part of Gerty's report. This then was not an issue of
confidentiality but a claim of privilege by a police
officer who was in no way involved at any stage in the
actual death of Jimmy Kelly. So why should Gerty cLadrn
privilege to protect himself from incrimination: AS the
statements of the four police officers did not enter. into
this argument, the privilege in which Gerty sought refuge
was therefore not of the officers but for himself. But
Gerty did not face any criminal or disciplinary proceed-
ings as he had no connection with Kelly's death. Indeed
Carman proved quite helpful in illuminating the answer
to this puzzle:
-..
"Mr. Gerty, quite rightly, in my submission,
is claiming privilege, that privilege has
nothing to do with the privilege on which
you have already ruled. It is a privilege
of the Chief Constable; a privilege presum-
ably of the Director of Public prosecutions
and a privilege of this police officer
appointed under the police Act. I say it
would be unprecedented, unfair and highly
dangerous to the administration of justice
if such reports were to be disclosed."
(15.58/59)
\
Carman is quite correct in that Gerty's privilege
had nothing to do with the privilege on which the Coroner
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had already ruled: however, there are four errors in
this speech of Carmans: Firstly, privilege has nothing
to do with the Chief Constable. The report is defined
as confidential and the property of the Chief Constable.
There is no mention anywhere of 'privilege' in the Blair. .
Peach Ruling. Secondly, the D.P.P. was not called as a
witness to the Inquest and therefore whatever the ambig-
uous meaning attaches to the privilege ruling, it has
nothing to do with the D.P.P. Thirdly, the appointment
of Gerty under the Police Act 1964 does not afford him
the privilege of refusing to answer questions on documents
which have already been disclosed. And finally Carman's
assertion about disclosure of police reports being unfair
and highly dangerous is completely spurious, as Gray's
submission in this instance was not at all concerned with
disclosing confidential reports but with Gerty answering
questions on documents (i.e. the photographs) already
disclosed and submitted by the Chief Constable in evidence
to the Inquest.
Furthermore, Rankin's support of carman's submission
could only be described as cognitive disson~nce in relation
to his past submissions when he says:
"Mr. Gerty is quite right by me. He has claimed
privilege. It is his privilege. What he is
speaking of is his report to the Director if
Public Prosecutions. Those are my submissions.
You really have no alternative but to allow
that be privileged." (15.59)
Gray's reply was to the'point:
"I am not seeking to refer to the report that
Mr. Gerty made to the Director of Public Prose-
cutions. All I am saying is that these photo-graphs have been in this Inquest forming part
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of the evidence for days now. If Mr. Gerty now
seeks to claim privilege for these one respect-
fully says he must have been nodding off during
the previous days of this Inquest. But the
logical corollary in saying these were privileged
is that we should now fold them all up and hand
them back and say "sorry for seeing something
that we should never have been allowed to look
upon s " That is the situation that has arisen.1I
(15.59)
For the Coroner, the issue required some exercise in
double-think:
Coroner:
Gray:
Coroner:
Gray:
Coroner:
IIIwould say, Mr. Gray, in the circumstances,
that obviously those photographs having been
put in and circulated and been seen by every-
one in.the Court including the Jury, that
obviously they form an exhibit and they are
avad Lab l.e s "
"Yes.1I
IIButso far as answering any questions arising
out of these photographs, that is a matter
where the witness is entitled to claim
privilege.·'
IIButwith respect, sir, if photographs or
a document or an exhibit is to be produced,
placed into my hands and then I am to be
told, "You cannot ask any questions about itll,
this makes me just a mere observer at this
Inquest, no mcre ,"
IIwell,questions have been asked of previous
witnesses in connection with these documents,
but they, of course, were not in a position
to say that they were in a privileged position
in any way.·' (15.60)
Exactly. And here we have it·all in a nutshell. 'privilege'
is essentially for law enforcement officials. It is a
privilege pertaining to police officers called as witnesses.
In other words, the police can claim privileges which do
not apply to civilians through their status as law enforce-
ment officials. This political power lacks a credible
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legal basis; it is not a 'Public Interest' privilege,
but a privilege of the state; state privilege. The
Coroner's ruling on privilege had therefore nothing to
do with potential this or that proceedings but simply a
political privilege dressed in legal rhetoric for law
enforcement officials to cover up contradictions and
shortcomings in the exercise of law enforcement processes.
,
Question: When is an inquiry not an inquiry: Answer:
When it's an inquest'
Gerty: "I am not claiming privilege in respect of
that document of itself and neither do I
claim privilege myself for my report.
That report is the Chief Constable's
property and I am not allowed to disclose
it, on his directions."
Gray:
Gerty:
"I am not asking you to Mr. Gerty."
"I am perfectly prepared to answer all the
questions I can, if it is the case that
it is a matter that is covered in my report
then I shall have to answer that I cannot
answer the question." (15.61)
3. The Jimmy Kelly Action Committee
There is little doubt that the 16 day inquest into
the death of Jimmy Kelly would not have achieved the
publicity it did without the series of controversial
articles by New Statesman journalist Rob Rohner and the
activities of the JirmnyKelly Action Comrnittee. For the
people of Knowsley, the Kelly Action Committee became
the voice of dissent expressed over methods of policing
in 'K' Division. The formation of the Comrnittee soon
-,
after Kelly's death marked the beginning of a long
campaign for a public inquiry and highlighted other cases
,:: '" ' JIMM~ KEE.L~ ACnON: COMM1'tTEE··
Chief Constable Oxford: You said
you would 'confound your critics'.
Confound us by giving your
answers to these very simple ques-
tions.
The police said Jimmy Kelly was found unconscious. If this
is true:
• WHY put a man in handcuffs if he is unconscious?
• WHY did they take him to the police station and not the
hospital?
• WHY did they not render first aid in which they are
trained?
• WHY throughout have the family not been told why Jimmy
Kelly was arrested and what he died of?
• WHY didn't the police pathologist find the injuries the
independent pathologist found?
• WHY was it not treated as a murder inquiry if he was
found unconscious and had died as a result of injuries
usually associated with homicide?
These and a lot more questions have got to be
answered by the police before the public on
Merseyside will be satisfied.
Published by the Jimmy Kelly Acnon Commmee. 31 Pencombe Road. Huylon
Printed by Astmoor Lrtho Lid .. 21 ·22 Arkw"ght Road. Runcorn. Cheshire
The unanswered guestions
There will be a
ARC
from the IEagie and Child'
Liverpool Road .
SUNDAY 30th SEPT. 10.30am···
JIMMY KELLY: died whilst inpolice custody at
Huyton police station
WITNESSES: saw Jimmy Kelly being beaten at a .
place known as the hollow, an area
of waste ground in Barkbeth Road
.~\..~ ...
I
Come along and sUpl!!!_rt us for
• A PUBLIC INQUIRY
• AN END TO. POLICE BRUTALITY
Published by IIle Jimmy Kelly Action CommillM. 47 PMRtie4d~. HI$In
Pnnted by AItmoot Litho Lid.. 21-22 ~ RoIId, Auncom CI'IeInn.
Mobilising the Huyton community
"_ .
Demonstrat.ion in Kirkby against police brutality 1979.
Lernonat ra t i on by Jimmy Kelly Act i cn Corruni t Lee
,'.l1'J local corn.nun.i ty 1979.
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of police brutality, as discussed in the last chapter.
Fund raising and street activities characterised the
campaign, as the people of Knowsley rallied in support,
and a local popular movement emerged to take up a struggle
long since abandoned by their elected representatives.
. .Thousands of pounds were raised to cover court costs,
including donations from individuals and organisations
around the country. Trade Union Branches sent dozens of
letters of support with donations. Resolutions condemning
,,'the police actions and inadequate inquiry into Kelly·s
death were passed at branch level and forwarded to Union
executives. A typical resolution was that passed by the
Liverpool District Nurses Branch of NUPE:
"This Branch wholly condemns the decision of the
Director of public Prosecutions not to institute
any legal proceedings against any officer(s) of'
Merseyside police in connection with the death
in custody of Jimmy Kelly. We consider his actions
to be purely political and above the considerations
of natural justice. We demand that all the evidence
relating to his enquiries be made available for
scrutiny including the ·Gerty Report· on the
activities of the Knowsley Division of Merseyside
police.
To this end we urge the Executive Council to support
the Justice for Jimmy Kelly Action·Cq~ittee in '
calling for an immediate public inqury into the
events surrounding his tragic death."48
Such acts of solidarity were repeated in numerous
union Branches around the country. Demands for a public
inquiry grew as the campaign gained momentum. Knowsley
District Council gave support to the demand, along with
Liverpool, Sefton and Knowsley Trades Councils. By
October 1979, four months after Kelly·s death, the Kelly
Actibn Committee had collected over 15,000 signatures
by Merseysiders in a petition to William Whitelaw, the
; "
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then Home Secretary, to set up a Public Inquiry.
Members of the Committee were invited to address
numerous organisations and groups around the country
and letters of sympathy arrived daily at the home of
the Kelly family. Leaflets were produced in reply to
Oxford's comments on the case, in particular his state-
ment that he would 'confound his critics'. Anger
continued to mount in the Knowsley area at police and
government intransigence over Kelly's death. Marches
were organised and led by the Kelly Action Committee
through the Huyton area deman~ing a public inquiry into
Jimmy Kelly's death. Rumours abounded tha~.Huyton police
had acquired riot shields and CR gas.to deal with poten-
tial disturbances. The accuracy of these rumours, which
apparently originated from an officer in Huyton Police
Station itself, who had become alarmed at the turn of
events, could not be proven; however it is interesting
to note that it was CR gas - not the more commonly known
CS gas - which was alleged to have been stockpiled.
As the protest at the death of Jimmy Kelly continued
to grow, other instances of police brutality, such as the
Cavanagh incident, became focal points of protest as well.
In Kirkby, local residents formed the Michael Cavanagh
Action Committee, which became the focal point of local
protest and marches against police harassment of youth.
In response to the mounting public protest against
police brutality, the Liverpool Trades Council set up
the Joint Trade Union Inquiry into Allegations of police
Violence in December 1979. The inquiry became a sorting
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house for complaints against the police. An Interim
Report contained the following cases as typical of those
received:
"We have in our possession one particular
statement from a man who alleges he had
gone to register his protest to the police
at the treatment of another man. However,
"he was then arrested himself and placed in
a cell for ~ hours with a bruised and
painful arm; on his release he went to the
Liverpool Royal Hospital where the arm was
found to be fractured. He was later found
guilty of resisting arrest, the police saying
he fell backward after a policeman put his
arm round him. The Committee felt they should
also report that this man alleged that the
police obtained information about his workfrom the Department of Employment."
ItIna statement from the girlfriend of a young
man who was charged with assault on the police
and loitering with intent, she declares that
the police beat him from the time of his
arrest until they reached the police station.He then collapsed, she says, and - "he was
given no treatment from the police, and it
was not till he came horne at 12.30 a.m. with
black eyes and blood allover him that I
insisted he went to the hospital.1t He was
later visted by a Detective Chief Inspector
whom he informed of his intent to take out a
summons against the police. His girlfriendwrites: ItHeheard no more about the matter
until he had been found guilty by the Magis-
trates, and he was asked to sign a statement"
saying he would drop the charges against the
police for a lesser sentence (he) signed the
statement and was given three months on each:charge .tt 49
-,.. In the vast majority of cases of police brutality
and harassment, the individuals concerned have not had
the support of a campaign to publicise their case and
with the lack of interest of the police Committee,
most cases are never highlighted and the unfortunate
victim becomes vulnerable to trumped up charges endorsed
by magistrates courts. For the relatives and friends
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of Jimmy Kelly, the success of the Campaign was no easy
achievement. It was only through the combination of
their past experiences in fund raising for charity, hard
work and the solidarity of the local working class commun-
ity that the Campaign was sustained. ~d indeed, it was
in recognition of those less able to struggle for justice
over the death of a friend or relative in police custody
that the Jimmy Kelly Action Committee gave their full
support and backing to the establishment of the pressure
group 'INQUEST' in 1980.
However, give~ the persistent failure of the police
committee to take a stand on cases of deaths in custody
and police brutality, the organisations of the working
class have themselves, ov~rall, been slow to respond,
even following the riots of 1981. Indeed, as the Trades
Council Report of 1980 prophetically concluded, the growth
of police violence was ultimately a threat to working
class organisations themselves:
-,.
"we consider that it is youth who are stopped and
harassed most, again in densely populated working
class areas. we believe that special attention
should be focused on the Liverpool 8 area, where
black youth suffer an additional attack of racial
insult. To conclude therefore, we feel that the
concern oftiverpool Trades Council expressed inseptember, last year, was fully justified. We
feel that in the light of developments in the
Kelly and cavanagh cases, and in the light of
other statements we have, the Liverpool Trades
Council should call immediately a conference of
working class organisations to discuss the ever
growing problem of police brutality. One of the
purposes of this conference will be to get a
great deal more support for the work of this
Committee. .
We feel that this is all the more urgent as most
Trade Unionists are worried at the role of the
police in dealing with future resistance to theTory Government attacks." 50
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Eighteen months l~ter the police waded into
battle with batons, shields and CS gas against black
and white youths in Toxteth. Three-and-a-half years
later, the NGA Print Union had been battered at
Warrington with similar tactics and months later,
in 1984, full-scale para-military policing strategies,
including repeated baton charges, snatch squads and
cavalry charges, as well as the usual array of riot
equipment, were regularly deployed against striking
miners in the coalfields •
.~
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2) THE POLITICAL AUTONOHY OF THE CHIEF CONSTABLE
UThis relationship of power between the police,
public and government lacks precise definition
because it relies, in what could be called a
typically British way, on being interpreted
in a fair and reasonable way. 'Sometimes it
is best for systems not to be too delineated;
it gives you some flexibility', says Ken Oxford,
Chief Constable of Merseyside."
Martin Leighton (Sunday Times Magazine 26/9/82)
"Mr. Oxford simply runs the force his way and
we provide the money. There has never been
any damaging interference."
Margaret Simey (Guardian 31/12/83)
-..
At the time of the widely publicised confrontations
between the police and local communities in the Knowsley
area in 1979. the Police Committee of Merseyside County
Council was controlled by a Conservative majority and,
as might be expected, its official response to the events
was somewhat restrained. However, pressure from the
Labour opposition, led by Margaret Simey, did succeed
in getting the issue debated and culminated in requests
for Oxford to account for the actions of his officers
and to disclose to them the substance of the inquiry
into Kelly's death. In reply, the Chief Constable merely
reiterated his powers under the Police Act 1964 and
accused members of the Police Committee and County
Council of making "vituperative misinformed comment",(5l)
after having earlier told them to "keep out of my force's
businessll.(52) These confrontations between Labour members
of the Police Committee and the Chief Constable were
giveh widespread media coverage and fuelled the debates
over police accountability.
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Given the Chief Constable's refusal to disclose
information on the Kelly investigation on the grounds
of sub judice and the reluctance of the Tory controlled
Police Committee to directly confront the Chief Constable,
the Labour members voiced their dissatisfaction with the
state of affairs:
"Mr. Oxford does not seem to think the Police
Committee is worth proper consideration and
the Tory majority do not seem to think that
there is anything wrong in that." (53)
In recognising the ambiguities surrounding the powers
of the Police Authority, the Committee decided on the
23rd October 1979 to convene a special sub-committee to
report on the role and responsibilities of a police
authority. The report was completed three months later
and in substance added a little to what had already been
laid down in the 1964 Police Act. The conclusion of the
Report was predictable:
"We concluded (Councillor Mrs. Simey dissenting)
that, in general the Police Committee acting as
Police Authority for the Merseyside Force, is
capable of fulfilling its duties and obligations
as laid down by Parliament."(54)
In general terms, the police force of every region
is said to be accountable to a police authority for the
r area (except in the case of the London Force where the
Home Secretary is defined as the Police Authority).
Following the implementation of the 1964 Police Act,
local watch committees were amalgamated into one police
authority for each constabulary force. Comprised of one
third magistrates and two thirds councillors, the newly
combined police authority was legislated to serve the
following functions:
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I. To secure the maintenance of an adequate and
efficient police force for the area.
2. To appoint the Chief Constable and determine
the number of officers in each rank. (\'lith
Home Office approval)
3. To provide buildings, premises and alterations.
(With Home Office approval)
4. To provide and maintain vehicles, apparatus,
clothing, buildings and other equipment. (55)
In relation to the police authority the Chief
Constable is compelled to submit an annual report on
policing for that area. However, in practice the sub-
stance of these reports is largely at the discretion of
the Chief Constable, so to this extent matters of law
enforcement policy pursued by the constabulary force
are usually given scant consideration.
Chief Constables are also compelled to submit reports
on matters specified by the police authority concerned
with the policing of any area for which he is responsible.
Again, in practice, these reports tend to give little
indication ~ law enforcement policy, and police committees
have little say on what the substance of these reports
should consist of. In the wake of the 'K' Division
confrontations and the subsequent investigation into the
r allegations of brutality, Merseyside Police Committee
requested such an occasional report on 'Kt Division.
This report was submitted to the Police Committee on
9th September 1980 and in content provided minimum details
of the investigation and no account of policing policy
for the area. For instance, the Chief Constable could
confidently assert that ••••••• "••• the New Statesman
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made further allegations, many of which were later found
to be figments of imagination, incapable of foundation,
not pursued, or withdrawn.,,(56) 'Many' - but not 'all'.
No indication was given of which allegations were figments
of imagination, nor information to substantiate this
position. Instead, the Police Committee were basically
provided with chronologically descriptive information,
most of which was already known, on the procedure for
setting up an external investigation (Gerty Report) and
the legal outcome of the investigation into each complaint.
And on this basis, the Chief Constable reached the
following conclusion:'
"There is little doubt that the more obdurate
critics will continue to denigrate the police,
as is their wont, and will attempt to transform
individual transgressions by police officers
into a universal condemnation of the police
system." (57)
The Chief Constable ignored the fact, however, that
the 'obdurate' criticism of his force, in this instance,
began with the widespread feelings of anger and fear by
the'working class communities of Knowsley at what they
felt was a deliberate policy of repression against them
by their local police. The pattern of events in 'K'
-,.
.
Division was recognised as more than just isolated cases
of 'individual transgressions' by particular police
officers. The fact that such events reflected the develop-
ment of particular law enforcement policies for the
Knowsley area, as discussed earlier, is neglected by the
Chief Constable in this report, but then the Chief
'.Constable also has the legal right (with Home Office
approval) to withhold information which he considers
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is not in the 'public interest,;(58) and in this respect
it is the Chief Constable who has the power to decide the
public's interest and not the elected members of the
police authority.
The police authorities were set up following the
recommendations of the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police.
The Commission's report gave clear recognition to the growth
of the discretionary powers of chief constables. It was
with this development in mind that "the Commission wrote
that •• ••••• "••• the problem of controlling the police
can therefore be restated as a problem of controlling
chief constablesn.(59) Given that the Police Act 1964,
which arose from the recommendations of the Royal Commission,
was supposedly enacted in part to overcome this problem,
may be asked as to how it has come about that chie~ con-
stables now have even more political power than they had
prior to the Act. The answer to this dichotomy involved
~ive major factors.
-,...
Firstly, there was the 1964 Police Act itsel~. The
functions of the police authority as outlined in the Act
are concerned primarily with administration and financial
provision. Policy formation is in the hands of the chief
constable, and apart from attempting to sack him the
police authority have little control over the chief
constable's policy decisions:
"Whilst the Act imposes a clear duty upon the
Police Authority with regard to an adequate
and efficient police force, the Authority has
..to operate within strict limits, because consider-
able powers are also conferred direct upon the
Chief Constable with regard to the direction and
control of the force."(60)
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To this extent, the statutory position of the Police
Authority as constituted in the 1964 Police Act is largely
an administrative one, and in comparison with the old
watch committees, the sphere of influence and power of
elected representatives in matters of policing were further
reduced with the introduction of the Act. The foundations
had effectively been laid by the Royal Commission for the
development of a highly autocratic corporate managerial
control of policing:
"Moreover, the authority's role cannot, under the
arrangements which we propose, extend beyond the
giving of advice; and it will not be entitled to
give orders or instructions to a chief constable
on matters concerned with policing."(61)
So despite the rhetoric about controlling chief
constables, the Royal Commission made it clear where the
effective political power must lie. In practical terms,
if a chief constable has any accountability to the police
authority for his policy it can be no more than a
'gentlemen's agreement,.(62) There is nothing in the Act
to suggest otherwise and as r~s. Simey has pointed out,
the Chief Constable formulates his policy and only reports
to the Police Authority what he has already done. (63)
This situation contrasts with the previous position
of the old watch committees. And whilst the extent of
their power 'in relation to chief constables has been
exaggerated, the general view was that 'the police were
under the general control of the Watch Committee'. (64)
For example, during the latter days of the miners' strike
in 1926, the Chief Constable of Wigan had to request
Watch Committee approval for extra police constables
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to be drafted in from outside to deal with mass picketing
at local pitheads. The Town Clerk, in advising the
Watch Committee of their status under the law, made the
following observations which were quoted in the local
newspaper:
"If the Chief Constable considered that additional
police should be engaged, the Town Clerk said he
thought it was the duty of the Watch Committee to
give him the necessary authority. He said that
most of the Police Authorities in the country
(including Wigan) had entered into a mutual
agreement to lend Police Officers to any Force
needing augmentation. He advised the Committee,
under the provision of this Agreement, to give
the Chief Constable authority to obtain the extra
men required. He pointed out, however, that if
the Committee did not do this the Home Secretary
had the power, under the Emergency Regulations,
to act in the place of the Police Authority in
this respect."(65)
In respect of decision-making on matters of policing
policy, the old watch committees possessed some degree of
sanctioning of a chief constable's proposals before imple-
mentation. As Simey indicated in the quotation above,
chief constables today act on their own authority and
report what they have already done. This position was
clearly illustrated with the Merseyside Chief Constable's
purchase, without Police Committee consultation, of CS gas,
plastic bullets and riot equipment. When the Chief
Constable revealed these steps at a police committee
meeting, he was 'advised' to get rid of the equipment
and no more cash would be provided for more equipment:
"After the meeting, Mrs.Simey said that she was
delighted. The committee had not ordered
Mr.Oxford to get rid of his stocks but had
,advised him of their wishes •
-,
'Obviously he is going to keep them but
he has pled~ed not to buy more', she
said." (66)
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The second factor in increasing the political power
of chief constables has been the centralisation of regional
forces. In Part 2 the centralisation process was examined
in some detail in its relation to the establishment of
the Merseyside Police Force. Overall, the centralisation
trend has continued, both within regional forces and in
England and Wales as a whole. Since the introduction of
the 1964 Police Act, the number of regional forces in
England and \vales has been reduced from 125 to 43 and many
chief constables, such as Lougharne when he was Chief
Constable of Lancashire, have argued for a "fully national
--police force", or the creation of 10 "superforces" as
Anderton has suggested. (67) The creation of larger forces
with enormous regions has ensured that chief constables
have attained increased autonomy from the amalgamated
localities which, as Simey has argued, has resulted in
the loss of old ties of local control.(6Q)
-,..
1860
1883
1939
1949
1964
1980
Number of constabularies
(England and Wales)
226
231
183
129
125
43
In connection with the centralisation of regional
forces has been the third factor of the effect of re-
organisation on the police authorities. These too have
become remote from local ties and in the early years
follo~ing the reorganisation legislated by the 1964
Police Act, the elected representatives drawn from the
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more numerous and smaller watch committees had become
confused as to their new positions. This essentially
gave ground to chief constables in consolidating their
position.
The fourth factor in determining the strengthening
of the autonomous political power of chief constables
has been their ability to display all the hallmarks of
a professional politician, following the precedent set
by Sir Robert Mark in using the media as a convenient
vehicle for orchestrating reactionary ideology on issues
of 'law and order' to legislate and consolidate widening
police powers. The reasons as to why such changes have
occurred are complex. There is no evidence to suggest
that the personalities of chief constables suddenly changed
with the rise of Mark, although many have come through the
London Metropolitan stable. Certainly they are more out-
spoken, appear more authoritarian and can be callous to
police authorities 'meddling in their affairs', but there
is no real evidence to suggest that this actually consti-
tutes a 'new breed' of chief constables. And even if this
did in some way account for the new-look chief constable,
there is no indication as to why this new approach should
only emerge in the last 20 years or so, given over 150
years of history in modern policing.
The fifth factor which has formed the basis of the
expansion of the political power and autonomy of chief
constables has been the context of the steady deteriora-
tion of social conditions caused by the decline of the
capitalist economy, and its restructuring by the state
under conditions of crisis. Since the early 1970's, the
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state has expanded its coercive forces, moving from
liberal to reactionary' forms of containment of the class
contradictions of late capitalism. At the forefront of
this transformation have stood the chief constables and
their forces:
II ••• the police institution is situated at the
crux of the contradictions of the advanced
capitalist state, confronting the particular
effects of the fiscal crisis of the inner cities.
It cannot act independently of those determinants
but can only re~ct to them."(69)
It has been this reaction to the phenomenal effects
of the crisis that has formed the ideological basis for
reactive policing in working class communities and strength-
ened the autonomy of chief constables, who have sought to
justify coercive law enforcement policies by highlighting
criminality on the streets of the inner cities and other
estates to solicit the support of the middle class and
affluent working class. As Brogden argues:
"The pursuits of the street offenders, where there
are identifiable victims arouses universal, inter-
class condemnation. It connects with both dominant
and subordinate value systems. It provides a
common denominator, in the reaction to it, which
strengthens consent to policing."(70)
It was the confrontations of 'K' Division in 1979
~ which provided the arena for confrontation between Police
Authority and Chief Constable of the Merseyside Force on
matters of policing policy. The Chief Constable, secure
and confident of his political autonomy, entrenched his
position within the terms of reference of the 1964 Police
Act.\ As Scraton has pointed out:
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nIt is clear from the 1964 Police Act, however,
that while it is the police authority's respons-
ibility to ensure the maintenance of an adequate
and efficient police force, it has no powers,
nor possibility of intervention, at an operational
level. So when Oxford referred the police author-
ity to his press statements, after its members
requested further information on Knowsley, he was
uSing, not misusing his discretionary powers."(7l)
For the Police Committee, their position in this
power struggle was severely handicapped by their seeming
lack of legal and political power which led to their even-
tual retreat into working parties and sub-committees
convened to examine in detail every nut and bolt of the
Chief Constable's armour plating. However, given the
limitations of the Police Committee's role under the 1964
Police Ac.t, there were in fact two possible courses of
action open to them, both of which were evaded in the
course of their deliberations.
-,.
The first possible course related to the communities
which the elected members represented. Since the reorgan-
isations of 1974 and the establishment of the Herseyside
force, the Police Authority had also become distanced from
connections with the local communities. And whilst indivi-
dual members gave invaluable support and sympathy to
campaigns such as the Jimmy Kelly Action Committee, the
relationship was distant. Whilst it must be accepted that
the controlling group on the Police Committee were Conser-
vative, there did exist some considerable scope for the
Labour group to take the struggle back to the grass roots
and mount an effective community campaign in the Knowsley
area, drawing on the organisation and resources of the
Labour movement. In this way, the widespread discontent
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in the Knowsley area (and indeed other areas) could have
been organised into effective popular pressure for radical
change in policing strategies and law enforcement policies.
This political strategy, coupled with the second possible
course of action - the demand for the Chief Constable's
resignation - might well have provided a concerted
challenge to the increasingly repressive methods of
policing employed in the Merseyside area as a whole.
The retreat into sub-committees was however perhaps
inevitable. In a relatively short space of time, the
mood of political challenge to the political autonomy of
the Chief Constable had given way to the conciliatory
approach and the kind of window-dressing which has largely
been the dominant feature of Police Committee strategies
since the aftermath of the 'Kt Division confrontations
and indeed the Liverpool 8 riots which followed two years
later.
On the 14th January 1980, the 'Knowsley Police
Liaison Committee' was established between members of
Knowsley Council, senior police officers of 'K' Division
and the Deputy and Assistant Chief Constables of Mersey-
side Police. It is clear from an examination of the
minutes of these meetings that their main concern was to
establish closer communication between the local police
and senior council bureaucrats. For example:
Item 7 (Minutes 29/10/80) reads:
"It was agreed that the Borough Housing Officer
'.liaise with the Chief Superintendent of 'K'
'Division with a view to improving communications
between the appropriate officers in the Housing
District Offices and the local police stations."
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and Item 8 (Minutes 29/10/80) reads:
"The Borough Secretary referred to difficulties
being experienced in obtaining information from
the police on employees involved in alleged
criminal proceedings ••••• "(72)
Other items of business dealt with included parking
on footways and grass verges, school visits by police
officers, enforcement of the Litter Act 1958, street
collections by charities and the Chief Constable's "Into
the Eighties with Pride" Anti-Crime and Vandalism Campaign."
One item of interest which did find its way onto the agenda
was subsequently retracted:
Item 6 (Minutes 29/10/80)
"Merseyside Police - K Division - Manning Levels/
Complaints.
It was agreed that it would not be appropriate to
discuss the above items at the Liaison Committee
and with the consent of the Chairman the item was
withdrawn. "(73)
The real issues of policing in Knowsley concerning
allegations of brutality and law enforcement policy were
never touched upon by this Committee and indeed nor have
they been subsequently taken up with the 'community liaison
forums' set up after the 1981 riots. With most of the
developments in policing on Merseyside in recent years,
the Police Committee has largely played the role of
spectator.
This has particularly been the position with regard
to the reorganisation of divisional boundaries, the plans
for which were drawn up in 1977 and came into operation
in 1981. As a further step in centralisation this resulted,
in the early 1980's, in the reduction of Herseyside police
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Division from 11 to 7. Speculation arose when it was
announced in January 1980 that the changes were to be
brought forward to April of that year. The police denied
that the speeding up of reorganisation, which included
the disbandment of 'K' Division, had anything to do with
the death of Jimmy Kelly in Huyton Police Station and the
numerous complaints of harassment and brutality. A police
spokesman was quoted in The Guardian as saying:
"Somebody has been suggesting that this is all
because of the troubles in 'K' Division but I
can't see that at all. I think it is bigger
than that."(74)
A Liberal member of Liverpool City Council stated:
"This move makes it look as if the police are
doing something. But it will not solve the
problems, only sweep them under the carpet.
Worse than that it will spread the weaknesses
of K Division to the areas they join."(15)
Even assuming the Police Authority have powers of
intervention on matters connected with the maintenance
of adequate and efficient policing of the area, it is
clear that the Committee had little, if any, involvement
in the reorganisations within Merseyside Police in the
early 1980's. Elected councillors seemed to have main-
tained their reputation for simply rubber-stamping the
r Chief Constable's policies, given the lack of debate in
Police Committee minutes on this issue. The fact that
these further movements in centralisation would only
serve to further strengthen the political power of the
Chief Constable of the Merseyside force, has been one of
many "'vital issues the Police Committee have failed to
adequately address.
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With the latest divisional boundary changes 'K'
Division was disbanded and the area divided up with
Kirkby joining the new 'C' Division (Northern), Huyton
going to 'D' Division (Central) and Prescot and Knowsley
added to 'E' Division (St.Helens). (See Map 8)
Such moves, as examined in Part 2, have tended to
correspond with developments in new reactive and pre-
emptive forms of policing. Each reorganisation phase
has served to further consolidate these forms of policing
and facilitated the police greater political autonomy of
enforcement policy from local government.
"I suggest, therefore, that all current trends
within and without the police service are moving
against the direction pointed by Margaret Simey.
Ever increasing rule from the centre and theacceptance by the police themselves of the ideaof a unified police service rather than wholly
autonomous police forces means that the influence
of local government must continue to decline."(76)
This was the reply of Tony Judge (editor of the
Police Journal) in 1976 to a previous article written
by ~~garet Simey, in which she argued that the new police
committees were "reduced to being not very effective cogs
in the administrative system of a public service."(77)
Eight years later, despite the rhetoric of Labour
Councillors, the Labour controlled Police Committee failed
to provide an effective challange to these developments.
In fact it could be argued that the capitulation of the
current controlling Labour group to the political power
of tte Chief Constable has at times made the Merseyside
Police Committee just another cog in the public relations
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machinery of the Merseyside Police.
Up until the County Council Elections of May 1981,
the minority Labour members of the Police Committee main-
tained a persistent challenge to the autonomous power of
the Chief Constable. And even if much of this, as we can
judge with hindSight, was largely rhetoric, the arguments
did play a part in forcing the issue of 'who controls the
police' into a major arena of public debate. The Mersey-
side Chief Constable, and indeed many of the other Chief
Constables in England and Wales, through similar political
pressures, resorted to defending their policing policies
through national and local media. Indeed the regular
dismissal of critics as subversives,and 'ratbags' by
senior police spokesmen did little to enhance their credi-
bility, given that many of the critical voices raised were
respectable Establishment figures.
Prior to the elections, Labour members of the Police
Committee made many public criticism of the limited terms
of reference of the 1964 Police Act, the inadequacies of
the police complaints system and the lack of accountability
of chief constables. With the assumption of a radical
posture by the Labour members, it seemed at the time that
if Labour gained control of the Folice Committee, the
Chief Constable would be faced with a direct political
challenge to his political autonomy. In the midst of the
public row over 'K' Division, Margaret Simey, on the
Weekend World television programme in late March 1980,
stated:
- 247 -
"I realise now there is no hope of running a big
modern police force on rules that are really no
more than a gentlemen's agreement."(78)
With the election of a Labour majority on the County
Council just over a year later in May 1981, control of
the Police Committee effectively passed into the hands of
Labour; and with an absolute majority that could outvote
the total combination of Liberals, Tories and Magistrates
in opposition, the stage seemed set for a concerted challenge
to the autonomous political power of the Chief Constable.
The issue was forced however much sooner than might
have been expected. Only several weeks after the Labour
Party had gained an absolute majority on the Police
Committee, widespread rioting against police harassment
and brutality broke out in most major cities in the country,
the most intense of which took place in Brixton, Moss Side
(Manchester) and Liverpool 8 (Toxteth area).
The catalyst for the uprising was persistent police
racism.(79) Following the first uprising in Bristol in
1980 and the second in Brixton in April 1981, the third
uprising several weeks later marked a more widespread and
simultaneous expression of solidarity by black youth
against the harassment, brutality and racism of the police
r force. In directly challenging the police by collective
resistance, the black youth were joined in solidarity by
many white youth, both in the inner city areas and in a
wide scattering of suburban areas. On Merseyside the
years of mounted anger and frustration felt by both black
and white youths exploded over the weekend 3rd-5th July,
simultaneously with uprisings in Southall, \'lestLondon,
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with further clashes in the following ten days spreading
to many other areas around the country.
The clashes were perhaps the most intense in the
Liverpool 8 area, where on the Sunday night 800 police
officers confronted hundreds of black and white youths
and the Chief Constable resorted to the use of CS gas -
the first time it had been used in mainland Britain.
59 cannisters of the gas were fired causing serious injury
to two people. (81) It was later revealed by the New
Statesman that the type used were designed for piercing
doors and windows and not for firing directly at peop1e.(81)
Just under three weeks later, a second wave of rioting
broke out in Liverpool cOinciding with the visit of Michael
Hese1tine on a 'fact-finding' mission. For three nights
police and youth again battled for control of the streets,
only this time the police were out for revenge following
their previous resounding defeat. The Chief Constable
announced his intention to introduce 'positive policing'
and gave orders for the driving of police vehicles at high
speed at the crowds. The result of this policing strategy
led to the death of a disabled man, David Moore, a broken
back suffered by another and a woman having her legs and
shoulders broken. In defending this policing policy, the
Chief Constable declared:
"They can see the vehicle coming and they know
what will happen if they get in the way."(82)
The new Labour-controlled Police Committee, faced
with the sudden outbreak of widespread and prolonged rioting,
was forced to make some quick political decisions. The
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choice was quite simple in reality. The Committee could
have either attempted to sack the Chief Constable on the
grounds of inefficiency or, as with the 'K' Division
confrontations, retreat from confrontation into sub-
committees in the misconceived hope that the widespread
popular feeling against the Chief Constable might strengthen
their 'gentlemen's agreement'. As we shall see later, this
was not to be the case.
For some on Merseyside, the Toxteth riots over-
shadowed the events in Knowsley of 1979, but for many
working class people in the Knowsley area, particularly
the youth, the inner city challenge to oppressive policing
illuminated their own experiences of police harassment
and brutality. On the barricades of Toxteth groups of
young people from Huyton chanted 'Jimmy Kelly' and days
later a crowd of youths confronted Divisional officers who
'came under a heavy attack of missiles and petrol bombs'
at Halewood.(83) The Divisional officers were reinforced
by the Police Support Unit who had been in action the day
before battling with between 200 and 300 youths using
petrol bombs. The police station in Speke was besieged
on the same day. Elsewhere in the Knowsley Borough shop
windows were smashed (in Prescot) and incidents occurred
at Netherley. Disturbances also occurred in other parts
of Merseyside including Tuebrook, Wallasey, Thornton and
BootIe. However, it was Kirkby in the Knowsley Borough
that came second to Toxteth in terms of large scale distur-
bance. As Oxford commented in his Report to the Police
Committee on the riots:
"In areas outside Toxteth, only Kirkby suffered
large scale disorder."(84)
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The significance and extent of the rioting in areas
outside the inner cities was played down considerably by
the media. They were contemptuously dismissed as 'copy-
cat' rioting and treated as an enigma; a kind of meaning-
less aberration to what was forcefully defined, particu-
larly in the popular press, as a 'race riot'.
On the evening of Tuesday, July 7th, two days follow-
ing the major battles of the weekend in Liverpool 8, a
burning barricade was erected across Quarryside Drive
near the Northwood district of Kirkby. According to the
Chief Constable, petrol bombs were being manufactured in
a home near the Peacock Public House:
"On investigation two police officers were confron-
ted by a crowd of approximately 100 persons who
formed themselves into a human barricade across
Bigda1e Drive. Bricks and other missiles were
thrown at the police vehicle and a petrol bomb
exploded in front of the vehicle. The police
drove off through the crowd and only the police
vehicle was damaged."(8S)
That evening five officers were injured and two
vehicles damaged. The following evening 150 youths again
built a barricade across Bigdale Drive, the police were
petrol bombed and retreated:
"Divisional police officers attended but despite
attempts to dislodge the youths, they were forced
to retreat out of range of thrown missiles. A
third attempt was mounted by the police using a
police vehicle as cover with foot patrols using
shields on either side. This was successful and
the youths were dispersed."(86)
The youths then regrouped about 200 yards further
down.,the road near the Woodpecker Pub. Here they were
joined by "sightseers" and "patrons" of the pub, resulting
in about 700 to 800 persons blocking Bigdale Drive.
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The crowd was attacked by the police again using shields
under 'a barrage of missiles' and eventually succeeded
in splitting up the crowd and completely dispersing it.
Later, a large group of youths were dispersed while
attempting to force entry into shops in Roughwood Drive.
That evening, 25 officers were injured, 6 police vehicles
damaged and 14 people arrested.
Again, the following evening, with earlier incidents
of storming of police vehicles:
IIFrom 2315 hours 150 youths were gathered on waste
land in Brookhey Drive/Gilscroft Avenue, armed
with missiles. Whilst assistance was called, the
youths were kept under police observation. At
2350 hours when the police strength was considered
sufficient, the youths had re-grouped on the car
park of the Woodpecker Public House. A frontal
approach was made by police who came under heavy
attack from missiles thrown by youths. They dispersed
and 5 persons were arrested for public order offences.
Whilst this action was taking place a group of about
25 youths, using building debris, made a barricade
across Park Brow Drive/Thirsby Crescent. The police
attended and although stoned, causing damage to
police vehicles, four youths were arrested and the
group dispersed."(87)
Whilst the battles in the Knowsley area were quite
a way from the extensive battles of Liverpool 8, they
nevertheless placed a significant strain on the Divisional
police and in the case of Huyton and Halewood, PSU's were
drafted in to make up the stretched manpower. Indeed it
was 'the minor skirmishes' such as these which took place
in many areas of the country which stretched the manpower
and resources of the police to such an extent that breaking
point was almost reached in Toxteth where Oxford felt the
need to resort to CS gas to 'defend the c~ty centre'.
\
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It was clear from the intensity and extent of the
riots on Merseyside that in many areas there existed
strongly felt resentment at policing methods in working
class communities. This feeling became politically
organised into an 'Oxford out' march called by the
Liverpool 8 Defence Committee and the Liverpool Trades
Council. Hundreds of trade unionists and unemployed
black and white youth marched from Sefton Park, through
Toxteth and into the city centre. Along the route police
officers were given verbal abuse and minor skirmishes
occurred. Indeed it was only effective stewarding by
members of the Liverpool 8 Defence Committee which in
several instances saved isolated police officers from
some very dangerous predicaments.
The demand for the sacking of the Chief Constable
was not, however, to be pursued by the Police Committee.
An attempt to dismiss Oxford from his mismanagement in
the handling of the riots would perhaps have tested their
notion of police accountability. Instead they chose to
'censure' the Chief Constable. The power of dismissal is
framed within the 1964 Police Act:
n ••• the police authority, acting with the approval
of the Secretary of State, may call upon the chief
constable to retire in the interests of efficiency."
(88)
Oxford had clearly shown a complete lack of knowledge,
or interest in relations between his police force and the
Merseyside communities they police. Two months prior to
the full scale anti-police riots on Merseyside, Oxford
had this to say in his annual report:
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."My policy on relationships with the community
has been endorsed and strengthened throughout
the year with all members of the force being
mindful of their obligations in this direction.
I am confident that these relationships, with
all sections of the community, are in a healthy
position and I do not foresee any serious diffi-
culties developing in the future."(89)
Several weeks later, Oxford's men were engaged in
full scale battles. In defending the racist and coercive
nature of his policing policies, Oxford fell back on the
authoritarian and reactionary ideology which underlined
his law enforcement policies.
Even if the Police Committee had decided to 'give up
the blame game,(90)the Chief Constable made it quite clear
who he thought were responsible for the riots. For the
Chief Constable the blame lay with 'irresponsible parents'
who 'allowed' their children to go on an 'uncivilised
rampage'. (91)
The failure of the Police Committee to mount an
effective political struggle against repressive policing
absolved the Chief Constable from any effective constraint
via popular democratic action.
The retreat into sub-committees came swiftly once
the dust of Liverpool 8 had settled. By the end of the
month a working party was already underway ·"to examine
means whereby relationships between the police and the
public can be improved and to make recommendations thereon
to the Police Committee.u(92) Although it must be acknow-
ledged that the Report published by this working party
was u'seful in terms of outlining the general criticisms
which had been levelled against Merseyside police over
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the years, most of this was already known to the Police
Committee; the indiscriminate and extensive use of 'stop
and search'; verbal abuse and physical violence on the
part of the police; subsequent arrests on the sole charge
of assaulting a police officer; ,over-reaction to street
incidents, particularly those involving mobile patrols;
the failure of the complaints system. These have been
regular features of policing in many parts of Merseyside.
However these features represent more than a problem of
wrong 'police attitudes'. In discussing 'general police
attitudes' the working party noted: tr ••• tendencies to
regard large areas of the population as potential criminals
and second-class citizens.,,(93) This however is more than
simply a 'police attitude' but represents a clear policing
policy upon which new forms of policing over recent years
have been developed and tested on such communities. More-
over this position also applied to the working party's
note of 'a lack of understanding of and sympathy for the
way of life of ethnic minority groups,.(94) This again is
more than a general police attitude, but deliberate and
The racist statements of the Chief
formulated by the
throughout the force.(95)
(~b)Constable and the racist
sustained racist policing policies
corporate management and permeated
r abuse frequently shouted at black people from vehicle
patrols(97)testify to this position.
With the riots following shortly after Labour gaining
control of the Police Committee and the decision not to
directly challenge the Chief Constable by demanding his
resignation, the alternative course of conciliation
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required some political gymnastics on the part of the
Labour members. In an earlier manifesto on policing
policy for Merseyside, the direction of political strategy
was expounded:
"vlhile we are committed, therefore, to the provision
of a strong and effective police force, we are
em hatic that it must be one which is firml under
democratic contro and igh y sensitive to t e
feelings of the local community which it existsto serve."(98) (my emphasis)
and also:
"There is no doubt that the really energetic exercise
of such powers as the Authority already possess
could do much to restore the balance of power between
police and elected members."(99)
However, following the riots the emphasis changed; it
appears that the Labour members had lost their balance:
"To focus on arguments about control is simply not
realistic. A continuous balancing act is what is
called for: the achievement of this balance is of
course the essence of the job of the politician."(IOO)
The Police Committee subsequently embarked upon a public
relations programme by setting up 'Community Liaison Forums'
in areas around Merseyside. The struggle for democratic
control of the police had been abandoned:
-,.
"••• the authority has abandoned the pursuit of
the delusion of "control"-and has concentrated
instead on the regeneration of the political
dimension of policing as a public service."(IOI)
In place of the struggle for democratic control, the
Police Committee capitulated to the political autonomy of
the Chief Constable and set about erecting public relations
00 ,facades to foster the belief that 'local community groups
could in some way influence the policing of their areas.
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The problem became defined in terms of police-public
relations which needed to be improved and the solution
was seen to lie in 'Community Policing' type schemes.
They argued there was a 'lack of feed-back' after meetings
between police and local com~unity groups,(102)and set
about attempting to incorporate local 'community leaders'
into liaison schemes to create the illusion that they
could have some influence in policing matters whilst in
reality, in terms of day-to-day policing practice, the
policies continued to get more coercive and reactionary
and the liaisons served as a useful tool for information
gathering:
"We support the call from the Probation Service
and the Churches for regular meetings between
police officers and other professional colleagues
in day-to-day contact with the public, i.e. social
workers, probation officers, church leaders,
community workers, trade unions and employers'
associations. II (103)
The Role of the Police Liaison Forums
"Merseyside Police Authority had consequently failed
to fulfil its responsibilities as a vital cog in
the machinery for governing policing as a public
service. "(104)
Policing is "governed" by the police corporate manage-
ment at the head of which stands the Chief Constable.
-,.
Police authorities, as constituted under the Police Act
1964, do not exist as 'a cog' in the 'governance' of
policing; their role is administrative, as defined under
the 1964 Police Act; they have no responsibilities for
the political or CgovernmentaY direction of policing.
With the abandonment of the struggle for democratic control
of policing by Merseyside Police Authority, the establish-
ment of Police Liaison Forums became a kind of surrogate
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POLICE LIAISON FORUMS
TERMS OF REFERENCE
1. 'l'he object of each Forum will be to provide a lIIeans for lIIembers
of local communities to lIIe_t with and discus. matters rela~i~q
ee the i'0!!;!:'.q ~, U.eu arlla,· :Lncludinq crime and related issues,
with local police officers and lIIembersof the Police Authority
and District Councils.
2. Each Forum will consist of three representativ.s appointed by
the County Council (one of whomwill be a lIIemberof the Pollce
Authority), thre.lllemb_rs appointed by the local Di.trict Council,
one lIIemberappointed by any Parish Council withi.n the area .erved
by the Forum, toqethar with representative. of voluntary orqanisa-
tions and resident.' and cOllllllUllityqroups within the area. Each
meetinq will include a •••• ion open to the public.
J. SUbstitute representative. will be allowecS and, wherever poesible,
advanc. notification of the nama of '" substitute lIIemb_rshould be
notifiecS to the Clerk of the Forum. The Pol.l.ce will be represented
at each Forum by the SUb-Divisional SuperintancSent, toqether with
such other officers as the Superintendant and/or the Chiei Constabl.
Cc::.::!~::r3.p;::opl:ial:.e h.tr.vinqrequc1 to the matters to be discussed.
4. The other .tatutory aqencie., 1e bousinq, education, social
service., will be represented throuqh the District Councillors
with each aqancy free to sancSalonq to any Forum lIIeetinq an
officer from the relevant service where appropriate.
S. The Forums are intended to provicS. an OPPOrtunity for discu~sinq
matters relatinq directly or indirectlL to the policinq Qf, the
area. Th. ChaLrman may ~ hi. or her agsolu~e discr.tion decline
to accept an item for discus.ion/consideration if it is not
considered relevant or for some other reason it is not appropriate
for it to b. the subject of public cSebate, aq. cases which are
sub-judice, alleqations of crillla aq&inst 1n4ividuals.
6. It is open"to lIIembersof the Forum to contact the Police or the
Clerk at any time to pursue proqress on issue. raised previously
0... to ask for items to he pbc.:l on '!he next a'!enda.
-,..
7. The venue and frequency of lIIeetinqs of each Forum will be for
determination by the Forum but, as a matter of 'ieneral quidance,
they will each probably need to lIIeet betwean three and four times
per year. Th. police Authority will keep the overall format and
lIIembership of Forums under constant review.
8. Cbairmanshit:l 'l'ha chai:cmanship of each ForumwUl be taken
initially by a lIIemberof the PoJ.1ce Authority. It will be
appreciated that in settinq up the.e consultative bodie. the
Merseys.l.de Police ~uthority wants to be informed of the issue.
raised so that it can ke.p abreast of matters of cODllllOnconcern
to the cOllllllunity. It will be for the Chairman to ••• that this
i. carried throuqh.
"9. The proceedinqs ot each Forulll meetinq will !:le recorded !:ly the
Clerk to the Forum., who wil.l. be • memborot the .tatt ot the
Clerk to the Police Authority. Copies ot proceedinq. will also
be available to members ot the Forum, and to any member ot the
public who .ubmit. a request tor a copy, Copie. will also be
mad. available to District CCl\lncUS, Parish Councils and voluntary
orqani.ations, where reque.ted. A.ummary ot the issu •• raised
at each meetinq will !:le submitted to the Police Authority and the
cu..t Con.table.
lO, A notJ.ce ot & Fu.l:Wol_ ..w.r.; ~:!. l:l~ ._t to members ot that
Forum at least •• van day. in advance, toqeth.r with an indication
ot matters which the Clerk to the FOrumha. !:lean .pecitically
asked to plac. on the aqanda, 'l'his will. not, however, preclude
a memberot a FOrum, or a .member ot· the public, from .eakinq to
3:ai•• any 3:elevant maeter not included on the aq.anda.
ll. General
Th. Polic. Autho3:ity (or where app3:0priat. the Chi.f Constable)
shall. be the final arbiter on any circ:um.tance. not provided tor
herein.
The arJ:anqaments for all FOrumwill, of co=se, !:lek.pt under
constant review,
. '
-..
November, 1982
-,
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travesty of the old local watch committees. However
whereas the old watch committees, even following the
Desborough changes, (I05)had some degree of sanction and
authority, the Police Liaison Forums were essentially
toothless and moreover had in practice become largely
composed of members of groups and organisations that could
hardly claim to speak for the vast majority of local
working class residents. The liaison forums were set up
following publication of the recommendations of the Scarman
Report with the aim of establishing 'closer links' between
police and local communities. Commenting on the relatively
small attendance of the forums, Mrs. Simey stated:
"The type of people who attend are those who act
as communicators for the area •••• I don't think
we want too many people."(I06)
The forums were launched following a series of public
meetings around Merseyside. Topics discussed obviously
varied from area to area, but some issued were not up for
discussion. For ~xample at St.Helens, V~s.Simey was asked
why the police committee had not attempted to dismiss the
Chief Constable following his handling of the riots. She
replied that the whole matter was still under investiga-
tion and the facts had still to be established. It then
was pointed out that the facts were already known, i.e.
that a disabled man had been run down and killed by a
police vehicle acting on the Chief Constable's policy of
"positive policing" and lethal types of CS gas cartridges
had been fired directly at people causing serious injury.
She replied that the matter was not to be discussed.
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At another public meeting at Newton-Ie-Willows, a
sub-division of St.Helens, most of the 'community leaders'
expressed some complaint or other about youth. Charles
Oxley of the 'Campaign for Law and Order' and the owner
of a private school in Rainhill and who, we might note in
passing, was not a resident of Newton-Ie-Willows, com-
plained about the lack of police enthusiasm shown in
response to his call making a complaint about a couple of
young boys he'd caught peeing on the wall of his estate.
In a similar vein, a local vicar complained of youth
in his belfry. Apparently scaffolding had been erected
around the belfry for repairs and he had problems with
youth climbing allover it. The good vicar eventually
became so upset at this that he did the christian thing
and threatened the youth~with a bicycle chain. Police
representatives assured the vicar that the matter would
be looked into.
In some respects the initial public meetings called
to launch the eLF's were useful in terms of providing a
platform for members of the public to make criticisms of
policing in their areas. The antagonism to reactive forms
of policing was particularly made clear; however the liaison
forums which were established from these public meetings
would have no influence or sanction on policing policies
such as these, or indeed any policing policy •. As Peter
Wright, Deputy Chief Constable said in supporting the
idea of the forums: "It is not enough to be in·touch-
cond~tions demand that they (the police) must be seen to
be in touCh."(I07)
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Following the riots and the Police Committee's
climb down from a confrontation with the Chief Constable,
the Labour councillors embarked upon a strategy of concil-
iation of which, as we have seen, the liaison forums have
been an important component. No doubt they felt that
such directions would boost their political credibility.
Whether or not the elected members really believed they
had some influence is debatable, but there is no doubt
that they acted as if th~ did. Tony Judge of the 'Police
Journal' must have been feeling in a particularly cynical
mood when he commented:
"••• Margaret Simey is tasting real political power
for the first time in her long career in local
politics."(108)
Nowhere does Mr. Judge tell us what this 'real
political power' consists of.
The emphasis for Simey was no longer the question
of democratic control of policing. The theme became
"partnership" :
"If we cannot have partnership between chief con-
stables and police authorities, we are done for."(I09)
- argued Simey, one year after the riots. Simey and her
party thought that because they had assumed control of
the Police Committee, the reactive policing policies
and the autonomy of the Chief Constables could be curtailed
by appeasement. In attempting to obscure their failure to
achieve this, they Simply swept the issues under the carpet,
and in the process a dangerous vacuum had been widened.
These illusions effectively provided a convenient veneer
for the continuation and further development of reactive'
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policing. Nothing has changed with regard to this
process, and yet tor Mrs. Simey in 1983:
". •• the bond between the Merseyside Chief
Constable and the Committee was now excellent."
(110)
Policing on Merseyside continued to be reactive
and coercive but the elected Labour members of the Police
Committee chose to ignore this. Nationally they commended
this strategy ot 'partnership policing' which was bankrupt
from the start, as working. It was misleading and
dangerous. In commending the establishment of a police
authority to Londoners as the answer to their policing
problems, they ettectively avoided confronting the con-
tinuation ot police abuse, harassment and violence, and
offered a recipe of cynical deception:
"In consequence we have, we like to think, made
considerable progress towards that ideal of
partnership policing which is the essential
basis of any democratic police force. We
commend the lesson of our experience to the
London Met."(lll)
Partners in what?
It is in this notion ot 'partnership policing' that
the appearance ot power-sharing was tostered to obscure
the political powerlessness ot the Police Committee.
In reality this 'considerable progress' which Simey
reterred to was largely a progress in rhetoric, which
collapsed when confronted with the policing ot the miners'
strike of 1984. In return for the police corporate
management's acquiescence with the Police Committee's
'Community Liaison' schemes, the rhetoric ot the Police
Committee shifted between 1981 and 1983 from confrontation
to conciliation:
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"Professional and politician must therefore
for all practical purposes enter into a working
relationship as between partners who are equal
but different."(112)
A partnership, maybe - but not of equals. Such notions
lay at the centre of their idealist conception of policing.
There was either a failure or an unwillingness to confront
the pervasiveness of coercive law enforcement practices
on Nerseyside. Instead, there was perpetuated an uncrit-
ical deference to the notion of the Chief Constable's
'autonomy' and 'responsibility' for 'the impartial enforce-
ment of the law'. (113) With this position, there could
be no recognition of the selective enforcement of laws,
nor a recognition of the political and ideological deter-
minants of law enforcement policy. And therefore there
emerged a subsequent failure to identify the political
and ideological basis of the reactive forms of policing
which emerged during the 1970's and were soon to form
component elements of the later establishment of an
autonomous and nationally controlled para-military police
force in the wake of the 1981 riots and consolidated in
the 1984 miners' strike.
It was during the 1984 miners' strike that the
'partnership policing' rhetoric of the Labour controlled
r Police Committee collapsed in the face of the escalating
costs of policing the dispute. Censure motions were passed
over the Force's £5 million bill for overtime during the
dispute.(ll4) However operational issues concerned with
the policing of the dispute were given little consideration
by the Committee. In the Merseyside Borough of St.Helens,
frequent complaints were made by the local mining
- 262 -
communities about police tactics on picket lines.
Contingents of P.S.U.s from Nerseyside and other forces
were stationed in various localities around St.Helens for
the daily policing of the dispute in the Lancashire coal-
field. The effect of the influx of these mobile contin-
gents on the local town created conditions of saturation
policing similar to that previously exnerienced in the
inner cities. Evidence for this emerged the following
year in the Annual Report of the Chief Constable concerning
a dramatic rise in convictions and cautions for drunkenness
in the town. A report in the local paper failed to iden-
tify the link between the two issues:
"Incidents of drunkenness last year showed a marked
increase in St.Helens as against a dramatic drop
in Knowsley, according to the Chief Constable,
Mr. Kenneth Oxford ••••
•••• The 535 cases of convictions and cautions
for drunkenness in St.Helens in 1983 rose by 23
per cent to 658 in 1984. Knowsley's 1983 figure
of 603 dropped by 30 per cent to 422 last year."(115)
This seemingly inexplicable shift in rates of drunken-
ness for the two neighbouring Boroughs can only be under-
stood with reference to the policing of the miners' strike.
-..
We have already noted in some detail in Part 2, the
law enforcement policies of the Herseyside Force on drinking
and its implementation in the Knows1ey Borough during the
late seventies. As with other areas of Merseyside, reduc-
tions in police cover as caused by the shift of resources
into policing the strike was the likely cause for the
sharp decrease in offences in Knowsley and their subsequent
rise in St.Helens.
Confrontation between the Police Committee and the
Chief Constable once again came to a head in Harch 1985
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when the Chief Constable failed to attend a Police
Committee meeting in which new policing guidelines within
Merseyside County Council's £213 million cash limit were
being debated. (116) The Chief Constable had sent his
apologies and went to attend ,a conference on terrorism
in the U.S.A., which he stated was at the request of the
Government.(ll7) At a special meeting of the Committee on
the 24th March 1985, the Labour Group noted the Chief
Constable's failure to inform the Committee of his intended
absence:
"••• the central degree of confidence and mutual
resnect between the Authority and the Chief Con-
stable appears no longer to exist."(118)
For the Labour Group, the issue was seen as 'the last
straw,(119)in the long series of confrontations between
the Committee and the Chief Constable. At the time of
writing (June 1985) a report is being prepared for the
Horne Secretary detailing the Committee's case and request-
ing Home Office approval to dismiss the Chief Constable.
It is, however, unlikely that this issue will force
the dismissal of the Chief Constable given its nature_
Moreover, with the absence of a popular campaign to
support the demand, as would have been the case had the
demand been made at the height of the 'Oxford Out'
campaign following the riots of 1981, the issue lacks
effective political weight. Indeed it is likely the
issue will still be left unresolved when thed, Police
Committee is abolished along with the County Council in
1986:(120)
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Preventive policing emerged in the course of the
evolution of capitalism in Britain as a general system
of law enforcement and order-maintenance and was estab-
lished as a permanent presence within working class
communities. As preventive policing was expanded in
the provinces during the nineteenth century and consoli-
dated in the first half of the twentieth century its
formal development saw the gradual diminution of its
more overt para-military characteristics and a broadening
and specialisation in methods of information gathering in
crime detection and poIi tical surveillance.' In this
respect, as capitalism progressed in the twentieth century,
creating neW productive forces, an expansion in mass
commodity production and circulation, structural changes
in social relations and, particularly in the post-war
'period, a restructuring of working class communities,
all led to corresponding changes in the traditional
character of preventive policing. By the 1950's the
general form of preventive policing proved increasingly
inadequate in meeting the expanding reproductive needs
of late capitali sm.
vie have already documented the expansion of police
forces over recent years as part of the state's policy
in coercive management of the recession and its social
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consequences. As examined in Parts I and 2, the outcome
of this process has been the development of reactive
forms of policing, shaped by reactionary 'law and order'
ideologies. The new para-militarism,which has character-
ised police strategies in policing political. protest,
industrial disputes and working class estates in recent
years has been developed by police chiefs who have enjoyed
considerable political autonomy in the formulation and
implementation of their law enforcement policies.
These developments have not however gone unchallenged
by the liberal establishment who have witnessed over recent
years the erosion of their ideological hegemony in matters
of state policy. As an alternative to reactive policing
and its overt para-militarism, the liberals (and indeed
some radicals) have advocated 'community policing' schemes
and encouraged their practical development in many forces
around the country.
The counter-position of 'community' policing to the
coercive, heavy-handedness of reactive policing is however
misleading. This problem arises from the basic assumptions
of liberalism about the role of the police in society.
Policing is essentially viewed as a neutral process of law
enforcement in a socf ety where all citizens are equal
before the law. It exists as a service for the prevention
of crime and to uphold the rights and freedoms of the
people, and must operate with the consent and support of
the people. Para-militarism is viewed as a strategy which
undermines this con&ensual relationship and weakens the
function of the police as a community service. 'Communi ty
policing' is prescribed as the necessary remedy for
restoring public confidence and support for the police.
These assumptions fail to recognise the class role
of the police and the historical fact that para-militarism
is endemic to policing under capitalism. This para-
military character may vary in form at different times
and in different places, but it has essentially remained,
either overtly or covertly, within the expanding structure
of the police system. The development of 'community
policing' schemes, and particularly their marketing in
the media and local neighbourhoods, has been used as a
public relations exercise to obscure the continual devel-
opment and consequences of reactive policing. For Brogden,
this public relations character of 'community policing'
has been its key feature, and used by the police for the
'mobilisation of consent'. {12l)
However there is another important aspect to
'community policing' schemes,which Brogden neglects3and
that is their role in pre-emptive policing. This has
been clear since Alderson's early programmes in the Devon
and Cornwall Constabulary. Since the 1970's the ideas
of John Alderson, ex-Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall,
have gained increasing ground in police and political
circles. Alderson's experiments in 'community' (or
'pro-active') policing have steadily gained increasing
sympathy amongst liberals and left-reformists as an
alternative to reactive policing with its emphasis on
para-militarism. Alderson himself writes:
'lISocialpressures tend more and more to seduce
police thinking and ~ublic awareness away from
(preventive policing).'towards a quasi-military
reactive concept."(122)
However, in practice 'community policing' schemes
have come to serve as a supplement to reactive policing
and an extension of pre-emptive policing. Even Alderson's
Devon and Cornwall Constabulary had Police Support Units
trained in crowd control techniques and the use of riot
shields(!_23)during his time as Chief Constable. The
cultivated consensual image of 'community policing' as an
alternative to reactive policing 'is deceptive:
It ••• Community policing merges at the local level
the coercive and consensual functions of govern-
ment, enabling the police to wield a frightening
mixture of repressive powers, on the one hand,
and programmes of social intervention on the
other, as mutually reinforcing tools in their
effort to control and contain the political
struggles of the black and working class commun-
ities." (124)
For Alderson, 'community policing' 'seeks to reinforce
social discipline and mutual trust in communities' and
'envisages a very high degree of coordination and co-
operation with all other agencies of government from the
top administrative level to the bottom working level'. (~?5)
In some respects, 'community policing' may be viewed
, 1 (126)as an 'extension of tradi tiona preventive policing.----
However as a strategy for information gathering conducted
within the context of computerised command and control
systems, 'community policing' with its emphasis on
'penetration' of the community 'in a multitude of ways'
(~2?) is merely pre-emptive policing legitimised by public
relations ruse.
"Since the Scarman enquiry into the riots of 1981,
this Public Relations aspect of 'community policing' has
been expanded, partic't.llU'lywith the creation of polic e-
community liaison schemes, for the two fold purpose of
a) fostering illusions amongst 'community leaders' that
they can influence law enforcement policy in their areas,
and b) to formalise the 'penetration' of committees for
surveillance and information gathering. In this respect
'community policing' as a pre-emptive policing strategy
is in fact complementary to reactive policing, and indeed
counter-insurgency planning:
"Counter-insurgency theory not only stresses the
need to combat domestic subversion, but also the
annexation and synchronisation of social and
welfare state institutions under police control." (1_2§_)
Major David G. Epstein, a U.S. Army counter-insurgency
expert, further emphasises this role of the police in
counter-insurgency strategies:
"The police must expand their public service and
information services with the view of winning
friends and influencing people. If the police
must expand into operational areas not traditionally
looked upon as police concerns such as social relief,
the justification for such a move can easily be found
in the objective sought."(~~9)
The Counter-Insurgency Force
During the first half of the 1980's there were two
major counter-insurgency operations conducted by the police.
One against the inner cities in 1981, the other within the
coalfields in 1984-5. Both these operations revealed the
extent to which para-militarism had come to figure promin-
ently in policing strategies for repressing working class
struggles. This para-militarism has always existed in
varying degrees in British policing; however during the
1970's and 1980's it began to assume a more cohesive form
of organisation through the development of specialist
squads. By 1985 the new para-militarism had been fully
institutionalized as a national Counter-Insurgency Force
under a centralised command and control system operated
by the Association of Chief Police Officers.
The extent of the organisational and operational
development of the Counter-Insurgency Force between 1981
and 1984 can be gauged when comparison is made between
police organisation and strategies in the 1981 riots and
'the 1985 miners' strike.
During the Bristol anti-police riots of 1980', the
police initially used milk crates as makeshift riot
shields during the early stages of the disturbances.
They were taken by surprise by the scale of opposition
and forced to retreat until the arrival of more riot
equipped reinforcements, during which time the insurgents
had control of the streets for three and a half hours. (130)
Following the Bristol riot, moves were under way to
centralise and expand the organisation and structure of
police riot contingents and by the time of the widespread
anti-police riots in the inner cities during the spring
and summer of 1981, the framework of a national riot
force - a third force - had been established. However,
again during the initial stages of the riots in Brixton
(April) police riot contingents withdrew under the weight
of opposition and in Liverpool 8 in June the Chief Con-
stable gave the order 'that tear gas should be used, in
the full knowledge that this breached Home Office guide-
lines. which restricted use of the gas against armed and
beSieged criminals only'.(l~~)
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From these shortcomings in the strength and opera-
tional inefficiences of the national riot force which
arose from the 1981 riots, and the subsequent publication
of the Scarman Report, 'community policing' schemes were
expanded, particularly 'community liaison forums', and
again the operational structures and resources of the
national riot force were also further expanded. As Kettle
and Hodges have noted:
"••• the official response to Bristol had been to
investigate better ways of providing police mutual
aid for crowd control. The immediate response to
Brixton was to order new types of helmets and to
improve protective clothing and shields. And the
official reactions to the July riots, especially
the rhetorical reactions, encouraged the police
to stock up with better riot control hardware
and suggested the reintroduction of the Riot Act."
(132)
By the time of the 1984 miners' strike, the national
riot force had become consolidated as Britain's Counter-
Insurgency Force under the centralised and autonomous
control of A.C.P.O. As Major Epstein recommended back
in the late sixties:
"A centralized planning and command system which
will control the police on a nationwide basis
must be instituted where not already presen.t."(13'3)
Britain now has a third force, and has had one since 1981.
·r For Brogden however, writing in the aftermath of the 1981
riots, the riot contingents do not constitute a third force:
"••• the shambles of the initial police reaction
to the urban riots of 1981 suggests a lack of
both commitment and preparation for that alternative
role. II (:134).
-,
Rather they are:
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"••• more akin to 'crisis-response' units than to the
~oundation of a permanent para-military Third Force."
('135)
'Crisis-response' units they are indeed. All third forces
are. That is what they are there for. They are counter-
insurgency forces, mobile state para-military units
established ~or the repression of internal dissent during
periods of social, political and economic crises. They
exist as a para-military reserve force - whether military
orientated (for example the American National Guard) or
police orientated (French CRS) - standing between the
regular police structure and the Armed Forces. In Britain
the ACPOcontrolled national riot force, with its own
, ,command and control and operational headquarters, is now
Britain's third force.
Circumstances requiring ~ intervention on the
mainland to repress social unrest have been envisaged and
planned for in the higher echelons of the state for some
time. These moves have been monitored with equal foresight
by libertarians and socialists, to expose this 'state
within the state'. One such publication to emerge from
this work, 'The Technology of Political Control' (1977)
by Carol Ackroyd, Jonothan Rosenhead, Karen Margolis and
Tim Shallice,(136)painstakingly pieces together ~rom
various sources the steps taken and to be taken on the
road to what they term the 'Strong State'. (13.1> Nuch of
their information is derived from the army itself in the
form of Major General Sir Frank Kitson's book 'Low IntenSity
Opera tions' (138)and the 'Army Land Operations Nanual'. (l~~)
The role of troops in repreSSing social unrest is quite
clear in these publications; as Kitson has stated:
"If a genuine and serious grievance arose, such
as might result from a significant drop in the
standard of living, all those who now dissipate
their protest over a wide variety of causes
might concentrate their efforts and produce
a situation which was beyond the powers of the
police to handle. Should this happen, the army
would be required to restore the position rapidly.
Fumbling at this junction might have grave conse-
quences, even to the extent of undermining confi-
dence in the whole system of government."(140)
Since the early 1970's, following top level debate
on dealing with internal dissent, strategy shifted towards
emphasis on the police to contain unrest. The original
position, reflecting ALOM was stated in 1971 by the
Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir John Waldron at a
Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) seminar:
"There is nothing I hate to see more than policemen
wearing steel helmets and protective clothing rush-
ing forward with sticks and tear gas ••• if conditions
became so bad that the marchers started to thrO\l1
bombs at us, which is possible, I would have to call
out the military, I would call them out for one ~
purpose only, and that would be to kill."(141)
Contemporary police chiefs have obv~ously thought
otherwise and the reason for this lies in the restruc-
turing of the police and policing strategies. The devel-
opment of S.P.G.s, D.S.U.s and P.S.U.s has created a third
r force in Britain. The lessons of Ulster have undoubtedly
shown to the British State the failure of armed interven-
tion by the military to contain mass dissent.
Prior to the 1984 miners' strike the British police
had ,,20,000riot helmets, 8,000 protective shields, 6,000
flame proof overalls and a fleet of carriers with wire
window grilles, run-flat tyres, and flame-proof engines
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and petrol tanks. They also had 5,000 baton rounds and
1,000 CS gas prOjectiles.(~42) By October 1984 the
mainland forces had a total of 20,000 plastiC bnl.Le'ts , (:143)
The Counter-Insurgency Force is now a permanent agency
\within;the armoury of the capitalist state in mainland Britain.
Conclusion
"All forms of enforcement ultimately depend on
the power of the state. If sheriffs' officers
are prevented by force or threatened violence
from seizing goods or entering upon property
they must call upon the police; if the police
cannot tackle the job the armed forces must
be brought in."(144)
Law enforcement rests not only upon a legal framework
but also expresses political power. In this sense the
enforcement of law expresses relations of power which
carry the political authority of the state. It is the
state which enforces the rule of itself; the 'rule of
law' in this respect is none other than the rule of the
state.
Enforcement of the law by the contemporary bourgeois
state is achieved both through the ideological subordina-
tion of the masses to its hegemony (145) and through the
exercise of coercion. Whichever aspect of these processes
is examined, the consistent, endemic characteristic is the
exercise of class power.
Stripped of their mystical appearance, laws are -
essentially rules, created and enforced through the
machinery of the state. In that they are applied 'en
masse' - i.e. that their 'jurisdiction' embraces mass
society - they express the political control of social
relations. When High Court Judges make rulings, or when
chief constables formulate law enforcement policies, they
do so not on behalf of themselves as individuals, or on
b eha'l.f'of the citizens they preside over, but on behalf
of their social class. For the ruling class, state power
is class power. The law enforcement process is the crucial
mechanism in the state by which the ruling class maintains
and reproduces class domination. The bourgeois ideal
which espouses 'equality before the law' is negated in
the material practice of law enforcement. (146) Whilst
all members of bourgeois society may ideally be subject
to 'the rule of law', not all members make the rules.
This is the prerogative of the ruling class:
"These actual relations are in no way created
by the state power; on the contrary they are
the power creating it. The individuals who
rule in these conditions, besides having to
constitute their power in the form of the
State, have to give their will, which is
determined by these definite conditions,
a universal expression as the will of the
State, as law - an expression whose content
is always determined by the relations of this
class, as the civil and criminal law demon-
strates in the clearest possible way." (14'0
(Marx and Engels, 1845)
In this respect, the 'universal expression' of
bourgeois law, its egalitarian principle, is contradicted
by the inequitable class relations from which its content
is determined, and consequently 'acts as a form of domina-
tion'. This then is effectively the class basis of law
enforcement processes under British capitalism. Consider
the concepts of the Council of the Law Society:
"••• any system of justice must reflect the
ordinary principles of natural justice if it
is to command t he respect of the public. II (148)
Law enforcement processes are.determined not by
metaphysical notions of 'natural justice' or the 'rule of
•law' but by relations of political power embodied within
'\
class society:
"In consciousness - in jurisprudence, politics
etc. - relations become concepts; since they
do not go beyond these relations, the concepts
of the relations also become fixed concepts in
their mind. The judge, for example, applies
the code; he therefore regards' legislation as
the real driving force." ('149)
(Marx and Engels, 1845)
In capitalist society, law enforcement effectively
operates to reproduce the state power of the ruling class.
And as a reproductive force of class relations it is in
turn subjected to the pressure of changes and development
in the relations of production and the productive forces.
We have analysed in some detail the material basis
of developments in law enforcement processes in our study
of policing on Merseyside during recent years, and we
have identified the relationship between centralisation
processes and the development of corporate managerial
police command. The consequences of these processes have
also been assessed in terms of their impact on working
class communities. Law enforcement has been demonstrated
to be not a 'neutral' or 'impartial' process guided by
principles of 'natural justice' and legal equality but a
process determined by policies reflecting the social,
political and economic conditions of class society.
-,.. Under the social conditions of late capitalism in
the 1970's and 1980's, law enforcement policy in mainland
Britain has been increasingly orientated towards new para-
military forms of policing on the one' hand and the develop-
ment of new forms of surveillance on the other. These
movements have formed part of the wider process of re-
structuring of the capitalist state to police late capitalism.
-~-~I'
The onset of recession from the 1970's has precipitated
crisis conditions of capitalist production and reproduc-
tion. With the contraction of domestic production, the
flight of capital abroad(15~}and the rise of mass unem-
ployment, the capitalist state entered the 1980's propelled
by a reactionary Conservative government committed to
monetarist policies designed to restructure conditions
for capital accumulation through the restructuring of the
state and its expenditure programme. Its objective has
been to 'reduce aggregate demand, increase unemployment,
and weaken unions in the monopoly and state sectors,(15~) -
the classic monetarist approach as outlined by the American
marxist economist James O'Connor in his book The Fiscal
Crisis of the State. As O'Connor argues:
"••• the capitalist state must try to fulfil two
basic and often mutually contradictorv functions
- accumulation and legitimisation."(1!?2)
In this respect, the Thatcher Government's monetarist
commitment to restructuring conditions for accumulation
has, through the 1980's, increasingly weakened the legiti-
macy of the state in many working class communities as
policies on privatisation, health service and education
cuts, the running down of the steel and coal industries
and the enforcement of anti-union legislation have taken
their toll. The hegemony of the bourgeois democratic
state has proved difficult to sustain for the Conservative
Government in its attempts to unload the burden of econ-
- ornic crisis onto the backs of the working class, whilst
at the same time trying to convince them that its measures
are medicinal:
"The state must involve itself in the accumulation
process but it must either mystify its policies
by calling them something that they are not, or
it must try to conceal them."(!23)
Such strategies may be observed, for example, in
the Conservative Government's 'law and order' policies.
The increased expenditure on policing and expansion of
para-military forces is justified, echoing the demands
of A.C.P.O. as a necessary measure for the maintenance
of 'law and order'. In this sense, 'law and order' becomes
, ,
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a euphemism for more coercion and increased expenditure on
the technology of repression.
As we move through the 1980's, post-war liberal-state
politics of persuasion by consent have been transformed
into reactionary-state politics of persuasion by force.
The capitalist state, in restructuring conditions for
capital accumulation, has itself been transformed by the
crisis conditions of late capitalism. "The large number
of power centres within the national state, each with a
measure of autonomy •••"(!?1),, ••• are either expanded or
contracted on the basis of their utility in managing the
contradictions of the crisis of late capitalism. For the
late capitalist state " "• •• • • • a class-conscious political
directorate is needed to coordinate the activities of
-r nominally independent government agencies." (!2_5)
This has most clearly been the role of the Thatcher
Government in the early 1980's. In strengthening repress-
ive agencies such as the police to ensure the enforcement
of monetarism, the power base of the police force has also
-,
been strengthened. Unlike the new police of nineteenth
century early capitalism, the corporate police force; of
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late capitalism is no longer a 'tool' of the government
and military, but a force of increasing autonomous polit-
ical power inlits own right within the late capitalist
state. This position has been strengthened considerably
in the 1980's by the Thatcher Government as the price paid
to secure and maintain the political and ideological
~ffini ty (~5 6)of the Association of Chief Police Officers
in order to ensure effective enforcement of monetarism.
Unlike the slump of the late 1920's and early 1930's
the social conditions of recession today are more general-
ised in terms of their impact on the working class. Areas
and towns which escaped the worst excesses of the recession
,during the inter-war period are now experiencing all the
consequences of capitalism in crisis. During the 1960's
the first manifestations of the crisis occurred in inner
city areas such as Liverpool and Belfast and then during
the seventies permeated outwards into the connurbations.
On the crest of this movement has emerged working class
struggle and confrontation with the state; from Belfast
in the late sixties and early seventies where Republican
wor'kers confronted the para-military 'B'ISpecials and
troops, to the inner cities of the mainland in 1981
where black and white unemployed youth confronted para-
military riot police, and out towards the coalfields in
1984 where, similarly, miners struggling for their jobs
and industry have been confronted with police para-
militarism.
As this work has demonstrated, the generative form
of the contemporary national riot force in mainland
- ~ - lcao
Britain has to a substantial degree been evolved from
the early reactive forms of policing introduced into
urban working class communities which were suffering
disproportionately high levels of surplus labour some
years before the emergence of widespread mass unemploy-
mente
The studies on Knowsley have shown how the Kirkby
New Town estates were used as guinea-pigs for testing
and developing mobile reactive policing and demonstrated
the political and ideological foundations to the law
enforcement policies implemented in these p~ocesses.·
As the recession years of the 1970's expanded the surplus
labour population of Knowsley, as with many other working
class communities around the country, reactive policing
became the standardized form of policing in these areas.
The confrontations of 1979 in the Huyton, Kirkby and
Prescot districts of Knowsley Significantly illustrated
the. degree of changes in policing that were taking place
in the Borough. As Scraton (1984) has commented:
"The feeling of rejection and neglect is now deep-
-seated and resented in the Knowsley communities.
It is a resentment compounded by high levels of
unemployment and reflected in the high incidence
of petty crime, gambling, fighting and property
destruction. It is against this background that
a more directly interventionist form of policing
emerged in 1979."(p.13)
The deathnof Jimmy Kelly in police custody at Huyton
Folice Station became the focal point for a wave of protest
and complaints against 'K' Division. In the same year,
the death of Blair Feach in Southall became the focal
point of controversy surrounding the role of the new
- "-"=l94a - ~sI
Special Patrol Groups in policing political demonstra-
tions.
1979 was, in terms of the development of reactive
policing, a watershed in the changing forms of policing
working class communities. This study has attempted to
identify and analyse these new forms and the content of..
these changes as expressed in the politics of law enforce-
ment. It has been shown how reactive policing emerged as
a transformation of preventive policing, and why these
changes have occurred, by examining the content of the
movement, the politics within these developments.
Through the use of case studies, primary and secondary
sources, the analysis identified the historical and
contemporary changes in the structure and composition
of political power within the police in class society
and the political power of the police within class society.
In the space of about twenty years, mobile reactive
policing in mainland Britain has been expanded and
developed from the early 'ad hoc' Unit Beat Policing
experiments in Kirkby during the 1960's, into a national
riot force for the coercive repression of internal dissent
arising from the steady deterioration of the social condi-
tions of late capitalism in the 1980's.
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POLICING THE YOUTH OF KIRKBY
\
Policing the Youth of Kirkby
Over the period December 1981 to January 1982
I conducted a survey of youth opinion on policing
in Kirkby. A questionnaire was administered to 251
stUdents at Kirkby Technical College and encompassed
a broad cross-section of students ranging from YOPS,
apprentices and social care to business stUdies and
full-time academic stUdents. The original target for
the sample was set at 500, to be comprised of 250
stUdents from Kirkby College and 250 from Frescot
College, with the intention of obtaining a range of
opinion for the Knowsley area as a whole. However,
permission tp conduct the survey at Prescot College
was refused. Nevertheless, although the survey was
limited to Kirkby College, the data collected has been
of some use in providing a general indication of the
impact of policing strategies on young people in Kirkby.
Of the total number of respondents to the questionnaire,
133 out of the 251 fell into the 16-19 years old bracket
for Kirkby. Of them: 81 were on YOFS courses, 29 were
apprentices,S social care, 8 business studies and 10
students on full-time academic courses.
Of the total number of respondants (251), 20 (7.9%)
lived outside the Knowsley area and a total of 28 (11.1%)
respondants were aged 20 and over.
In order to provide a relative dimension to the
section 2 responses of Kirkby 16-19 year olds, these
results will be compared to the results of the general
total minus the Kirkby 16-19 years old category.
section 2 of the questionnaire was comprised of 6
fixed-alternative, multiple-choice questions. Respond-
ants were provided with a statement on the policing of
their town and asked to indicate as to whether they
strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree
with it. A fifth category of 'undecided' was also
provided. From the responses a 'shade of opinion' could
be both numerically quantified and graphically illus-
trated. For numerical quantification, the 'strongly
agree' and 'agree' totals were combined, as were the
'strongly disagree' and 'disagree' totals, to provide
general percentages of agree/undecided/disagree. However,
r in order to more accurately convey the shades of opinion
for each statement, pi-charts have been provided to
illustrate the strongly agree/agree/undecided/disagree/
strongly disagree continuum.
··Forthe first statement The oolice in my town
show a friendly attitude to youth the majority of
~,
Kirkby 16-19 year olds generally disagreed by a percen-
tage of 67.6%. When compared to the total minus Kirkby
(16-19) we find the percentage in disagreement drops to
47.4%, making a difference of 20% between the Kirkby
16-19 year olds and the rest of the sample of those
disagreeing with the statement. Of the Kirkby (16-19)
the remainder agreed with the statement by 12% and 20.3%
were undecided. With the total minus Kirkby (16-19),
the remainder agreed by 17.7% and 33.8"10we'reundecided.
When"these figures are compared with the responses
to the third statement of section 2 Youth are a target
for police harassment in my town the percentage of
discontent falls slightly by around 3.5% for Kirkby (16-19)
and 7% with the total minus Kirkby (16-19). Of the Kirkby
16-19 year olds, 63.9% generally agreed with the statement,
19.5% were undecided and 15.7% disagreed. This compares
with 42.3% in agreement, 19.4"10undecided and 36.4% in
disagreement for the total minus Kirkby (16-19). Again
we find a percentage difference of about 2~1o between the
Kirkby 16-19 year olds and the rest of the sample.
With the third statement of section 2 which specifi-
cally refers to youth The police in my town show a
lack of understanding of youth problems we have the
highest percentage figure of discontent compared with,
figures recorded for the other statements in section 2.
with the Kirkby 16-19 year olds, 69.1"10agreed, 18.7%
were 'undecided and l2.~/odisagreed with the statement.
For the total minus Kirkby 16-19 year olds, we find
51.6% in agreement, 28.&/0undecided and 17.7% in dis-
agreement. Again, there is a difference of around 2~/o
between the Kirkby 16-19 year olds and the rest of the
sample.
In the open-ended question of section 6 What
changes (if any) would you like to see made in the police
force there were around 333 separate suggestions
which I attempted to roughly categorise under four general
headings 'Youth'; 'General Public'; 'Black people';
'policy'~" Of the 'Youth' category there were about 54
specific suggestions of which 4 responda~ts suggested., .,. .
that the police could be ,'more friendl¥' to youth', 3
suggested 'more respect to youth' and one a' 'change of
attitude to youth'. Whilst such quantifications are
rather ambiguous given the limitations of content-analysis
for quantitative assessment, these responses, when con-
textualised within general patterns arising from responses
can provide a more q~alitative picture of the thinking of
young people, 'in their own words', as compared to the
restrictions of closed-ende'd questions.. The data given.' ..'
above from section 6 takes on more meaning when it is
-..
viewed in the context of the many other responses, where
a substantial amount of recorded responses (in both
sections 5 and 6) are extremely critical of police
attitudes to youth. In the 'General Public' category,
20 respondants suggested the police be 'more friendly'
and 5 suggested changes of attitude amongst many other
sim~lar types of suggestion.
The marked difference in percentages of those
disagreeing with the first statement (2a) between Kirkby
16-19 year olds and the overall total is a feature which
characterises most of the responses to the questions in
the survey. This is not to suggest that the substantial
amount of youth discontent with policing in Kirkby, or
that discontent is felt by a majority of Kirkby youth,
is a new discovery. These facts are already known and
corneas no surprise to anyone who is familiar with, or
has experienced social conditions in Kirkby. What the
survey attempted to achieve was a rudimentary quantifi-
cation of the degree of discontent with the policing
strategies of Kirkby and Knowsley and the essence of the'
discontent, to assess'the impact of the kind of law,;
enforcement policies directed towards youth, as analysed
in chapter 2 and the other sections of this chapter. ,
In section 5, respondants were asked 'What do you
see as the main task of the police in your town?'. As
with the section 6 open-ended question, answers given
were many and varied although patterns did emerge. Many
responses identified the policing of youth as a specific
task of their local police. Some were of a general
-,..
,
character, such as 'breaking up gangs' (3); 'controlling
the youth'; 'to keep youth under control without too
much harassment'; and 'community policing aimed at youth
with hopefully a better attitude than they now have'.
Others gave replies more in terms of what the task should
be e.g. 'try harder to understand the problems of
youth' and 'try to help youth'. Other more specific
responses included: 'picking on youth' (3); 'keep youth
off the streets' or 'keep us off the streets', 'a youth
oppression group', 'beating up youths' and 'treat us
like school pupils'.
respondants.
'Vandalism' was recorded by 18
Other statements in section 2 dealt with more general
aspects of policing. In response to the statement
There is a need for more police in my town we find
a significant difference between the figures for Kirkby
(16-19) and those of the rest of the sample. With Kirkby
16-19 year olds, 30% agreed, 15.7% were undecided and
53.3% disagreed with the statement. For the rest of the
sample, the weight of opinion shifts; 38.1% agreed, 29.6%
were undecided and 30.5% disagreed. However, even given
the small majority in favour of the statement for the
total minus Kirkby (16-19), few respondants in the overall
total saw this as a major issue. In the section 6 open-
ended question What changes (if any) would you-like
to see made in the police only 3 specifically suggested
more police. However, it must be noted that 47 respondants
specified 'more foot-beat patrols' and 11 specified less
car patrols.
On the question of 'law and order·, respondants were
asked their opinions on the statement The oolice do a
good job in maintaining law and order in my town. This
was the only statement out of the six in section 2 where
a majority of respondants gave a positive response for
the police in both categories. For Kirkby 16-19 year
olds, 37.5% agreed, 28.5% were undecided and 33% disagreed
with the statement. It is interesting to note here
the relatively high proportion of Kirkby 16-19 year
olds (28.5%) who were undecided on this statement as
compared with the other statements of section 2, whereas
with those undecided in the total minus Kirkby (16-19).
the percentage (25.4%) is one of the lowest of section
2 for that category.
'Law and Order' featured as a major ~~ply to the
open-ended question of section·S. 62 respondants gave
'law and order' as the main task of the police, 9 gave
'law', 7 replied 'order' and IS said 'keeping the peace'.
Not all these responses were the same however. For
example, two business studies students wrote: ,"To keep
law and order in the best,and most comfortable way", and:
"To maintain a high standard of law and order as well as
being liked and not despised by sane of the citizens".
Another suggested: .....maintain law and order and to be
a helpful friendly force". One Social care student
suggested: "Keeping the law in order".
Other variations carried more critical riders:
"Keep law and order by legal means but they don't they
use 'illegal' action", as one YOPS student and four
apprentices similarly wrote. Another apprentice saw
the main task of the police as: "To maintain law and
order by legal means or police means when no one in
authority is watching", and another: .....supposed to
keep law and order". Violence was identified by some
as part of the law and order role. One apprentice wrote:
"To keep law and order, but sometimes to incite violence
against youth (who they dislike)" and another
suggested: "To maintain law and order but at the sarne
time without any of the aggravation."
In relation to the question of police accountability.
and control, respondants were asked to consider the
statement The police are becoming a law unto them-
selves in my town. Here again we find a sharp difference
between the response of Kirkby 16-19 year ?lds and the
rest of the sample. For Kirkby (16-19), 57.&/0agreed,
23.3% were undecided and 18.7% disagreed with the state-
ment. With the total minus Kirkby (16-19), 24.5% agreed,.
29.6% were undecided and 44% disagreed with the statement.
As these results indicate, the weight of opinion
amongst Kirkby youth expressed substantial dissatisfaction
with the type of policing they experienced. When compared
with the figures for the total minus the Kirkby 16-19
categoryl we find a significant increase of around 20% of
respondants expressi~g dissatisfaction with the polic~ng
in Kirkby•." This 'hardening,of opinion against the police
in Kirkb~ undoubtedly relates to the development of the
specific repressive policing policies in the 1970's
directed towards the policing of Kirkby youth in the form
I"
of 'anti-vandal patrols', task forces etc. The antagonisms
already existing between police and youth could only be
sharpened. For Chief Superintendent Chapple, on assuming
command of 'K' Division in 1975, law enforcement policy
was developed from assumptions such as:
"Hooliganism is as much a part of the Kirkby
way of life as the vanda'lLsm ;" (p.:tl~)
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SURVEY D ETA I L S
a) The 'police in my town show a friendly attitude
to youth. '
CJStrongly agree
ClAgree
CJUndecided
£:JDisagree .
t:JStrongly disagree
POLICE - COMMUNITYRELATIONS: OPINION RESEARCH.
I) PERSONALDETAILS.
~: .
OCCUPATION: •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
MALE Cl (tick box)
FEMALEC]
TOWN OF RESIDENCE: •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
HOWLONGHAVE YOULIVED IN THIS 'roWN? ••••••••• years.
ESTATE/AREA'OF RESIDENCE: ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
2) :BELOWARE" A NUMBER OF STATEMENTSON THE roLlCE. INDICATE YOUR
OPINION OF EACHSTATEMENTBY TICKING THE APPROPRIATEBOX.
b) The police are becoming a law unto themselves
in my town.
ClStrongly agree
C]Agree
t:J Undecided
t::JDisagree
t:JStrongly disagree
c) Youth are a target for police harassment
in my town.
t:JStrongly agree
t:JAgree
t::1Undecided
t:]Disagree
t:]Strong1y disagree
d) The police do a good job in maintaining
law and order in my town.
DStrongly agree
C1Agreen Undecided
CJDisagree
Cl Strongly disagree
';" e) There is a need for more police in my
town.'
t:lStrongly agree
ClAgree '.
CJ Undecided
ClDisagree
J:::J Strongly disagree
f) The police in my town show a lack of
understanding of youth problems.
J::J Strongly agree
C]Agree
Cl Undecided
~Disagree
t:J Strongly disagree
3) REASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS BY ENTERING
THE APFROXlr1ATE NUMBER IN THE BOX PROVIDED.
a) Rowma.ny times have the police of your town been of
direct help to you over the last three years? o times
b) Howmany times have you been stopped by the
police in your town over the last three years? o times
4) .F.LEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS :BY TICKING
THE APPROPRIATE BOX.
a) Do you feel you could approach a police officer for
advice in your town?
DYes
ONooDon't Rilow
b) Have you ever been assaulted by the police
of your town?
(e.g., pushed, pulled, hit etc •• )
c) Do you think the police are racially prejudiced
against black people?
CYes
ONo
tl Always
Cl Sometimes
.C Rarely
·CNever
C Don't Know
d) Howhave you arrived at your opinions on the police?
(You may tick more than one box)
I:l Personal experience Cl Observation
t:J Newspapers or T.V. [J EXperiences of friends
Cl Parents
\ .tJ Other ways (please specity)
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
5) ~at do you see as the main task of the police in your town?
(Answer in 2!l! sentence only) .
Answer: •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
6) What.changes (if a:rr:r) would you like to see made in the police
.force?
(Answer in one paragraph)
Answer: •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
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(1) Student Nu~ber 001-251
(2)
( 3)
(4) Age 0 = NA
16 = 1
17 = 2
18 = 3
19 = 4
20+ = 5
Sex 0 = NA- 1 Male=
2 = Female
(5)
( 6) Occupation 1 = .YaPS
(7) 2 = APprentice
3 = Social Care
4 = Business Studies
5 = Academic
Course (1) YOPS:
1 = YaPS Day Release
2 = YaPS (asc) (I)
3
. (OSC) (II)= YOPS
4 = TSD (Woodwork)
5 = Office Skills Day Release6 = WIC (YOPS)
7 = Catering (osci
8 = osc Day Release (I)
9 = esc Day Release (II)
(2) APPRENTICE
1 = Carpenters and JOiners (I)2 = carpenters and Joiners (II)
3 = Fitters4 = Craft Engineers Year 3
5 = Craft zngineers Year I6 = Bricklayers
7 = Electricians
8 = Wood Machinists
~.. 9 = Technician Engineers
(3) SOCIAL CARE
1 = NNEB (I)2 = NNEB (II)
3 = NNEB (III)
(4) BUSINESS STUDIES
1 = BEC (NO I)2 = Advanced Secretarial
(5) ACADEMIC
1 = Sociology' A' eI)
2 = Sociology 'A' (II)
( 8) Town of Residence: 10 = HUYTON
(9) 11 = KIRKBY
1 = KNOWSLEY 12. = HALEWOOD13 = PRESCOT14 = KNOWSLEY VILLAGE
20 = ST. HELENS
2 = OUTSIDE 21 = RAINHILLKNOWSLEY 22 = SKELMERS DALE23 = FORMBY
24 = MAGHULL/WEST DERBY/DOVECOTE/FAZAKERLEY
(LIVERPOOL)
25 = ORHSKIRK26 = LYDIATE
(10) EstateLArea: KIRKBY AREA (11)
(11) 01 = Towerhill
02 = Northwood03 = southdene'04 - North Park Estate05 = west Vale
06 = Field Lane
07 = Spinney Woods08 = Old Hall Estate09 = Mill Park
HUYTON AREA (10)
01 = Page MOss02 = Roby03 = Swanside
04 = Longview .05 = Pluckington Farm
06 = Brookhouse Estate
07 = Courthey08 = St. John's Estate
09 = Huyton Quarry
~,.. 10 = Paramount Estate11 = Blue Bell Estate12 = Mosscroft13 = cantril Farm
PRESCOT AREA (13)
01 = Whiston02 = High Hill
03 = The ~'lood-, 04 = Eccleston Park
KNmVSLEY VILLAGE (14)
HALEWOOD (12)
01 = Mackets Lane Estate
LIVERPOOL (24)
01 = Dovecote
02 = Mossley Hill
03 = West Derby
04 = Fazaker1ey
05 = Maghull
OTHERS
00 = Town Area as shown in (8) (9)
(12) Period of Residence in Town:
o = N.A.
1 = 1-5 years
2 = 6-10 years
3 = 11-15 years
4 = 16-20 years
5 = 21-25 years
(13)
(14)
(15) 0 = N.A.(16) 1 = Strongly agree(17) 2 = Agree(18) 3 = Undecided
4 = Disagree
5 = Strongly disagree
(19) How many times have the police of your town
been of direct help to you over the last
three years?
1 = 1 time2 = 2 times~,..
3 3 times=
4 = 4 times5 = 5 times6 = 6 times7 = 7 times8 = 8 times
9 = 9+ times
(20) How many times have you been stopped by the
(21) police in your town over the last three years?
1 99+ times
(22) Do you feel you could approach a police officer
for advice in your town?
o = NA
1 Yes
2 = No
3 = Don't know
(23) Have you ever been assaulted by the policeof your town?
0 = NA
1 = Yes
2 = No
(24) Do you think the police are racially prejudiced
against black people?
0 = NA
1 = Always
2 = Sometimes
3 = Rarely
4 = Never
5 = Don't know
(25)-(30)
How have you arrived at your opinions on the
police?
1 = Tick o = No tick
(25) Personal experience
(26) Newspapers and T.V.
(27) Parents
(28) Observation
(29) Experiences of friends
(30) Other ways
0;"
(1) 01 of Total living in Kirkby:,/0
(154) = 61.3%
(2) % of Total living in HUyton:
(46) - , 18.3%
(3) 01 of Total living in Prescot:,/0
(16) = 5.3%
(4) % of Total living in Halewood: ..'
(9) = 3.5%
(5) % of Total living in Knowsley Village:
(5) = 1.9%
(6) % of Total living in Knows ley Borough:
(230) = 91.6%
(7) % of Total living outside Kno\V'sley:
(20) = 7.9%
TOTALS
2 (a) The police in my town show a friendly
attitude to youth:
Strongly agree : 3 )
34 ) 37 = 14.7"/0AGREEAgree · )
Undecided · 67 = 26.6"/0UNDECIDED•
Disagree · 102 )•
strongly disagree 44 )146 = 58.1"/0DISAGREE· )
N.A. · 1 = 0.3% N.A.•
2 (b) The police are becoming a law unto themselves
in my town:
Strongly agree · 35 ) ·42.2"/0AGREE• 106) =Agree • 71• )
Undecided • 66 = 26.2"/0UNDECIDED•
Disagree : 74 )
strongly ) 77 = 30.6"/0DISAGREEdisagree · 3· )
2 = 0.7"/0N.A.N.A. ••
2 (c) Youth are a target for police harassment
in my toto'm:
Strongly agree : 35 ) 135 53.7"10AGREE) =Agree · 100• )
Undecided · 49 = 19.5% UNDECIDED•
Disagree • 58 )•
Strongly disagree 6 ) 64 = 25.4% DISAGREE· )
N.A. • 3 = 1.1"/0N.A.·
-,.. 2 (d) The police do a good job in maintaining
law and order in my town:
Strongly agree • 8 )• 98) = 39"/0AGREEAgree • 90• )Undecided · 68 = 27"/0UNDECIDED
Disagree · 67 ) 81 32 •2"/0DIS AGREE) =Strongly disagree • 14 )·N.A. · 4 = 1.5"/0N.A.·
~Col
2 (e) There is a need for more police in my town:
Strongly agree · 19 )
66 ) 85 = 33.8% AGREEAgree •• }
Undecided • 56 = 22.3% UNDECIDED•
Disagree • 80 }•
Strongly 27 ) 107 = 42.6% DISAGREEdisagree • )·N.A. · 3 = 1.1% N.A.
2 (f) The police in my town show a lack 'ofunderstanding of youth problems:
Strongly agree • 71 }•
} ,,'• 153 = 60.9% AGREE• 82Agree )
•Undecided • 59 23.5% UNDECIDED=
• }Disagree • 29
Strongly 8 ) 37 = 14.7% DISAGREEdisagree ·• }• = 0.7% N.A.N.A. · 2
3 (a) How many times have the police of your townbeen of direct help to you over the last
three years?
0 = 176 75 = 29.&/0had direct help of25T 'police in last 3 years.
1 = 37
2 = 22
3 = 6 38 = 15.1% more than once in251 last 3 years.
4 = 4
5 = 2
6 = 2 176 = 70.1% no help over lastill 3 years.
7 = 0
~,..
8 = 0
9+ = 2 YOPS 68 = 83.9% no help over81 last 3 years.
13 = 16% had help in last81 3 years.
~,
3 (b) How many times have you been stopped by the
police in your town over the last three years?
Stopped • 135 = 53.7% 00 = 116 = 46.2%•
Not stopped • 116 = 46.2% 01-09 = 100 = 39.8%·
10+ = 35 = 13.9%
4 (a) Do you feel you could approach a police officer
for advice in your town?
N.A. : 1 = 0.3% ~
YES • 121 = 48.2% 16 = 19.7%•
NO • 73 = 29% 37 = 45.6%·
DON'T KNOW • 56 = 22.3% 28 = 34.5%•
4 (b) Have you ever been assaulted by the police
of your town?
N.A. • 1 = 0.3% YOPS· -
YES · 79 = 31.4% YEs: 45 = 55.5%'·
NO • 171 = 68.1% NO • 36 = 44.4%• •
4 (c) Do you think the police are racially prejudiced
against black people?
lJ..,WAYS • 25 = 9.9%•
SOMETIMES • 140 = 55.7%•
RARELY · 28 = 11.1%•
NEVER • 13 = 5.1%•
r f DON'T KNOW • 44 = 17.5%•-,.
N.A. • 1 = 0.3%·
4 (d) How have you arrived at your opinions
on the police?
(i)
Personal experience:
141 = 56.1% (YOPS 47 = 58"10)
(ii)
Those who did not have personal experience:
Newspapers or T.V.: 50 = 45.4%
(i.e. 45.4"10 of those who did not give
personal experience included media as
influence).
(iii)
Those who gave personal experience.and
included media:
31 as "10 of total of those.giving
personal experience: 21.9%
(Iv)
Parental influence as opinions:
Total = 30 = 11.9%
(v)
Observation:
Total = 161 = 64.1%
(vi)
Experiences of friends:
Total = 142 = 56.5%
-,.
5. t'lliatdo you see as the main task of the police
in -your town?
'LAW AND ORDER'
'Law and Order' 62
,La>;\l' 9
'Order' 7
'Keep the Peace' 15
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
"Keep Law and order by legal means but they don't they
use illegal action." (YOPS) (4 app)
"To keep Law and order, but sometimes to incite violence
against youth (who they dislike~" (App)
"Keep law and order by legal means but they don't they
use illegal action" (yap).
"To maintain law and order but at the same time without
any of the aggravation" (App)
"•••• supposed to keep law and order" (App)
liTomaintain law and order by legal means or Police means
when no one in authority is watching." (App)
liTomaintain a high standard of law and order as well as
being liked and not despised by some of the citizens."
(Bus std)
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
"To keep Law and order in the best and most comfrotable
way.1I (Bus st)
"maintain law and order and to be a helpful friendly force."
(Bus std)
"To maintain Law and order and to understand the problems
of the people of Kirkby not condemn them." (Acad.)
"The maintaining of law and order while keeping good
community relations." (Acad.)
"Keeping the law in order." (Soc. care)
YOUTH
"Breaking up gangs" (3)
"Picking on youth" ( 3)
"Keep .youth off the streets" (Acad, )
"Keep us off the streets" (yap)
"A youth oppression group" (YOP
"treat us like school pupils" (YOp)
"beat up youths" (yop)
"controlling the youth" (App)
"try to help youth" (Soc.Care) (2)
"preventing youth crime"
"to keep the youth under control \-d thout too much
harassment" (Bus. std.)
"try harder to understand problems of youth" (Soc.Care)
"Community policing aimed at youth with hopefully a better
attitude than they have now" (Acad.)
CONHUNITY ROLE
"Community leadership"
"To help us (but don't)"
"help people/public" (23)
"protection" (14)
"come out when asked" (2)
(YOP
(5) (YOp)
"show their power over the'public" (App)
"think they own the people" (YOp)
"to be noticed" (YOP)
"boss us around"
"good public relations" (8)
"to be helpful/understanding" (Bus.std)
"community service" (5)
"respect people's problems"
CRIME PREVENTION
"stop crime" 17
~,.. Car robbers 5
Burglary 8
Vandalism 18
'Robbers' 9
Fighting/Violence 14
"Stop crime (but don't)" - 4
Theft 4
Pub fi'ghts 2
Attacks on old people - 2
Crime prevention
l'vIuggers
'Stop and search'
Stop law breaking
"prevent crime lawfully"
Protect property
POLICE METHOIl3
2
1
4
"looking for trouble"
"pull you up"
"trouble makers"
"beat everyone up"
"to cause as much trouble as they can"
"Riding around in cars" (Social care)
"Patrolling streets"
"Motorists"
"~'lalkingthe streets and not riding around in a car or van"
(Social care)
6. What changes (if any) would you like to see
made in the Dolice force?
YOUTH
More friendly to youth (4)
Stop harassment of youth (14)
Understand youth more (23)
Keep youth off streets (1)
Hore respect for youth (3)
Equal/adults/explanations (2)
Bikers (2)
Vandalism (4)
Change attitude-youth (1)
GENERAL PUBLIC
More fair (2)
.More polite (3)
More helpful (9)
Cooperation (8)·
More consideration (1)
Respect (2)
Stop thinking they own
the people (2)
More understanding (8)
of area (2)
More friendly (20)
Treat us like humans (2)
Treat us properly not like
dirt/dogs (2j
Treat people better (3)
MOre community involvement (17)
Change attitude (5)
Better public relations (1)
Better/more communication (5)
Greater community relations (1)
More open exhibitions (1)
BLACK PEOPLE
Stop harassing (3)
More black pes (10)
Less prejudice (8)
POLICY
More police living in area/local (3)
More foot patrols (47)
Do away with SUS/S&S (8)
Do away with/less cars (11)
Less police violence/force (11)
Older PCs (4)
Indep. Invest. Complaints (3)
Greater control of police (2)
Keep order (1)
Less power/authority (2)
Better discipline Cl)
Abolish uniforms (4)
Change uniform (2)
More organized (1)
Hore 'community policing' (4)
Less time in custody (6 hrs)
Layoff motorists (8)
More serious crime (8)
Abolish SPG (1)
Stop corruption (1)
Deeper investigation - police brutality (1)
Better training (riots) (l}
Less riot gear (1)
More riot gear Cl)
Hore pub checks (1)
More pay - male PCs (1)
Abolish ~V.P.C.s (1)
Better supervision by senior officers
Get rid of aggressive (2)/arrogant (1)
policing
Vandalism (4)
More police (3)
Better equipment (1)
Hore pay (1)
Hore police with dogs (1)
More on night patrol (3)
More strict method with crime (2)
Governing body to police the police
Hore sympathy towards victims
r More drivers
More on patrol
Better complaints system
Longer training period
Training in social problems
More emp.- crime prevention not convictions
Better training (2)
Not carry weapons
Smaller police stations
'Kt DIVISION
Disband (1) Investigation Cl) oxford sack (1)
A P PEN D I x (11)
C 0 RR ESP 0 N DEN C E
j l
27th Januar,y, I984Mr. C.X.Wilson,
County SOlicitor and Secretar,y,
PO110x95.
Metropolitan House,
Old Hall street,
Liverpool. Your ref. C3/45/cJtJ
Dear Mr. Wilson,
Thank: you very' much tor your letter (2,rd Ja.nu.a.r.r, I984) .~ the Police
Authority Report on the Merseyside Disturbances which I had requested
tor rrr:I llOstgrad:uate research ompolice authorities.
WhenI telephoned to make the request I also asked tor a copy ot tha·
report prepared tor the Police Olmm1ttee by P,A, ManagementConsulb..nts Ltd.
The Intorim Report ot the Consultants was approved by the Police Co1lllllittee
on the 25th April I978 (ref': POL/53/78), and the final ond completed
neports wera accept ed by the Olmm1ttee in August 1978. Your assistant
informed me that these Reports were quite lengthy and I can appreciate
that duplication o! all the matarial may prove tim~coneuming and expensive.
However, it this is the case, it would be of much assistance to rrr:r work
it perhaps you could provide mewith just the 8um~ and conclusions of
the Reports conce:med.
Finally, may I take this opportunity to express my tha.."lks to you and your
star! tor the kindness and assistance I have been given in meeting ~
requests tor Police Oo~nittee reports.
Yours sincel:ely.
Mark Urbanowicz
(post~~uate student,
'r Warwick U1iversi ty. )
Merseyside
County Council
County Solicitor and
Secretary's Department
C K Wilson LLB(Hons)
County Solicitor and Secretary
Mr. M. Urbanowicz,
5 Monmouth Grove,
Parr,
ST. HELENS,
Merseyside.
PO Box 95
Metropolitan House
Old Hall Street
liverpool
L693EL
Telephone 051·2275234 .
Extn. 2456
Telex 629018 MERCTY G
Your ref. Our ref. C/CJC Date 2nd February, 1984
Dear Mr. Urbanowicz,
Thank you for your letter of 27th January, 1984.
I have written to the Chief Constable requesting him to supply you
with a copy of the report or, if this is not possible, a copy of the
report which summarises the recommendations of the Consultants survey.
I anticipate that you will be hearing from the Chief Constable in the
near future.
Yours sincerely,
County Solicitor and Secretary ._
BMc
CIO
Principal F Rex Carr BA (Hon.) Dip Ed fsrM filM FRGS
Preseot College of Further Education
WarringtonRoad Prescot MtI.eyaide Tel.phon. 051""26 41 01/94B2
GHH.EAW
15 February 1982
Mr M Urbanowicz
5 Monmouth Grove
Parr
St Helens
Merseyside
Dear Mr Urbanowicz
Thank you for your letter of 3 February 1982 and please acce~t my
apologies on account of your previous inconvenience.
Unfortunately after having the necessary consultation with the College
authorities regarding your visit, I have to report that such research
as you suggest is unacceptable on educational grounds.
Although a Head of Department, I'm sure you'll understand that it is
not my prerogative to authorise such visits.
Yours sincerely
G H Hambleton
Head of Community & Social Studies Dept
~'I
}tr. C. H. Hambleton,
Head of Community & Social Studies Dept.,
Prescot College of Further Education,
Warrington Road,
Prescot,
Merseyside.
I7 February, 1982.
Dear Mr. Hambleton,
Thank you for your letter of the 15th. of Februar,r, 1982 informing me
of the College authorities decision with regard to my research project.
Having determined that my research is unacceptable on educational grounds
I feel that I must approach the persons of the College authorities who
made this decision in order to make clear the objectives of ~ research and
to discern the specific objections laid against the project.
I fully appreciate that it was not your prerogative to authorise this
research and I understand that 1 must pursue the matter with higher
author! ty. Accordingly I would be very grateful if'you could infom me
as to how to obtain the names and addresses of'the persons on the College
authorities who made the decision regarding my research project DO that
I may contact them personally.
Yours sincerely,
A P PEN D I x (iii)
ELEf.1ENTS OF A THEORY OF REPRODUCTIVE CAPITAL
I. PRODUCTIVE CAPITAL
As a working definition, Capital may be generally
described as 'exchange-value which seeks a further
accretion of value' (Mandel, 1978, p.592). Exchange
value is essentially the content of the circulation
process:
"The commodity owner is able to retain his
commodities in the form of exchange-value,
or to retain the exchange-value as commo-
dities, makes the exchange' of commodities,
in or~er to recover them transformed into
gold, the specific motive of circulatio~."
(Harx, 1977, p.127)
However, the fetishistic character of commodities
in circulation creates the illusion that monev makes.
commodities commensurable (Marx, 1977, p.68) whereas
in reality, commodities become commensurable as exchange-
values exchange-value as the product of 'abstract
general labour' (power) (Marx, 1977, p.29) or 'mater-
ialised labour-time I (l1arx,1977, p.68).
Commodities express exchange-values and use-values
in circulation, which, under conditions of extended
reproduction (Marx, C.~ITAL VOL.I. p.549) facilitates
capital accumulation the accretion of value **
(Mandel, 1978, p.597).
As part of the process of extended reproduction,
capital accumulation therefore constitutes the conditions
of production, as the conditions of production are like-
wise those. of reproduction. (Marx, C.~ITAL VOL.I. p.531).
As capitalist production has historically developed,
the accumulation of capital by the state has incorporated
the state as an integral part of extended reproduction,
i.e. the reproduction of the conditions of production.
Exchange-value as the social machinery of capital-
facilitates the accumulation of capital, as an extended
reproductive process through circulation, i.e. the circuit
of productive capital. Social production is simultaneously
social reproduction:
"Whatever the form of the process of production
in a society, it must be a continuous process,
must continue to go periodically through the
same phases. A society can no more cease to
produce than it can cease to consume. When
viewed, therefore, as a connected whole, and
as flowing on with incessant renewal, every
social process of production is, at the same
time, a process of reproduction."
(Harx, CAPITAL VOL.I. p.531)
Reproduction is not therefore' attached to the end
of production, but is an ongoing process simultaneous
with production, i.e. continual reproduction of the process
of production.
Likewise, the circulation process is an integral part
of the production process:
r "Capital's movements in circuits is therefore the
unity of circulation and production; it includes
both. II
(r1arx,CAPITAL VOL.2. p.60).
And similarly the production process is part of circula-
tion: -,
liThecapital-relation during the process of
production arises only because it is inherent
in the act of circulation, in the different
fundamental economic conditions in which
buyer and seller confront each other, in
their class relation."
(Marx, CAPITAL VOL.2. p.32)
,
So when we consider Productive capital - its circuit,
i.e. its dynamic:
liThecircuit of productive capital has the general
formula P •••• C MC •••• P;'.It signifies
the periodical renewal of the functioning of produc-
tive capital, hence its reproduction, or its process
of production as a process of reproduction aiming at
the self-expansion of value."
2 • EXTENDED REPRODUCTION .~D THE
CAPITALIST STATE
The process of extended repro~uction of capitalist
production forms a reciprocal relation,to the maintenance
of its essential conditions. It is part of the wider
social development of class society - a similar social
process of extension to that described by Marx in the
separation of labour from the means of production:
"•••• in its further development capitalist
production, once it is established, not only
reproduces this separation but extends its
scope further and further until it becomes
the prevailing social condition."
(Marx, CAPITAL VOL. 2.,p.33)
As an increasingly significant component of extended
reproduction under late capitalism, the state has emerged\
as an extensive political extension of the reoroductive
forces of capitalist production. Moreover, this
extension can only be on the basis of reproduction,as
the state's accumulation of capital is not determined
by the immediate dynamics of capitalist market forces
(i.e. rates of revenue, taxation, etc. are relatively
constant) in the circuit of productive capital. capital
accumulated by the state can therefore only be reproduc-
tive.
If we pursue this point further, in terms of commodity
consumption we find that with the circuit of productive
capital such commodity consumption takes the form of
productive consumption:
II •••• a definite portion of each year's product
belongs to the domain of production. Destined
for productive consumption from the very first,
this portion exists, for the most part, in the
shape of articles totally unfitted for individual
consumption. II
(Marx, C.~ITAL VOL. I. p.53l)
In relation to the circuit of reproductive capital
this aspect of commodity consumption therefore takes the
form of reoroductive consumotion. The reproductive
consumption of commodities by the state is primarily
determined not by considerations of profit, market forces
etc. (i.e. by participation in a market economy where
market considerations are paramount) but by political
considerations (state policy etc.) where the maintenance
and reproduction of specific forms of bourgeois political
power ?re paramount considerations.
This does not imply that the requirements of the
~'b
market economy are not a primary political consideration,
but that the relation to the market economy - the circuit
of productive capital - assumes a reproductive rather than
productive character - it is an aspect of extended repro-
duction. Within the sphere of the state, reproductive
capital reproduces the political conditions essential to
the continuity of the capital accumulation process.
3. PRODUCTIVE AND REPRODUCTIVE CAPITAL
Under conditions of modern capitalism extended repro-
duction is increasingly characterised by the extended
reproductive capital of the state and under late capital-
ism these processes are significantly influenced by
centralisation.
The dynamic of centralisation under modern capitalism
is the stage of development of the material productive
forces. Centralisation expresses both the accumulation
of capital and an extension of political power. It is
effectively the outcome of a qualitative shift in the
relations of production brought about by rapid movements
in the development of the productive forces. 'Centralisa-
tion completes the work of accumulation' by extending
'the scale of operations'. (Marx, CAPITAL VOL.I. p.588).
This process lies at the centre of the development
of the corporate management of capitalist production and
in the growth of corporate management of the reproductive
forces of the capitalist state. As previously analysed,
· .
capitalist production is simultaneously capitalist
reproduction. The accumulation of capital by the state,
whilst drawing (extending) from the immediate processes
of capitalist production - a political extension of the
reproductive processes of capitalist production - maintains
and extends the capitalist state's reproductive forces,
reproducing its form, and in the process reproducing the
conditions for capital accumulation. The dialectic bet~V'een
the productive forces of capitalist production and the
reproductive forces of the capitalist state ios therefore
recinrocal.
With the centralisation and expansion of the police
force, for example, that which is defined as the means of
production and reproduction in the sphere of capitalist
production (productive forces) becomes in the employ of
the state, the means of reproduction of the conditions of
capitalist production and reproduction (reproductive forces).
For example, the use-value and exchange-value of
commodities such as computers, vehicles, communication
systems etc. express productive, unproductive and repro-
ductive consumption, depending on the relative positions
of buyers and sellers. Therefore the productive consu~p-
• tion of these commodities expresses both productive and
reproductive forces in capitalist production and in state'
operations assumes the form of reproductive forces.
Capital, as defined by Marx, is a social relation. In
the sphere of commodity production it is a relation of
production and reproduction; in the sphere of the state
productive consumption within the circuit of productive
capital~becomes a political extension of the reproductive
processes and assumes the form of state reproductive forces.
It is clear then, that state investment in and
,accumulation of capital for its operations are not
'unproductive' but reproductive.
Given the dialectical reciprocity between the produc-
tive forces of capitalism and the reproductive forces of
the capitalist state, the relationship of the capitalist
corporate management to the productive forces is politically
reciprocated in the relationship of, for example, the police
corporate management to the reproductive forces it controls.
Whilst then, capitalist production is both a productive
and a reproductive process, the capitalist stat~ has taken
the form of a political extension of the reproductive·
process. The political economy of the state under late
capitalism does not produce surplus-value, but merely
reproduces the conditions necessary for the production
of surplus value.
For example, the production of computers, vehicles,
communication systems etc. becomes productive capital when
consumed by the capitalist class and employed for the
creation and extraction of surplus value within production
processes, and when consumed by, for exa~ple, the police
force, these commodities become transformed through
exchange into reproductive capital employed to reproduce
conditions for the productive capital relation and hence
conditions for production and extraction of surplus value.
If we consider the general formula for the circuit
of productive capital as:
P ••• C' M' C ...- L ••• P (p')
'r.n?
(Harx, CAPITAL
VOL.2 p.65 and
p.88)
P : Production (pI : extended reproduction of circuit of
productive capital) ***
M : Money-Capital (M' increased by surpIus value)
C : Commodities (C' - increased by surplus value)
L : Labour power
MP : Means of production
then the general circuit of productive and reproductive
capital, including the extended reproductive capital of
the state would appear thus:
Circuit of Productive and Reproductive Capital
r- - - ~R--- - - - - - - - - - --,
I I
I, H' C...-L 'IV,
P ,.. • • • C -""'_'r1P • • ••• P
I ~L-~T__ .J
T : state Revenue
state Reproductive Capital
reciprocal relation of state expenditure on commodities
to circulation whereby state productive cons~~ption of
commodities transforms them into reproductive capital
and thereby employed for the reproduction of the
R :
r-I'-..•
conditions of production, i.e. the state component
of extended reproduction.
4. STATE REPRODUCTIVE C.~ITAL
The essential purpose of state capital is reproduc-
"'CC~tive; even though, for example, the government~employ
producti ve wage-labour in its mines (~1arx,CAPITAL VOL.2
p.lOO), the state does not become a capitalist, even if
..-the state industry achieves a surplus. This is because
there is no direct relation of surplus-value . appropriation1,
i.,
Its role is reproduc-
tive. Forms of capitalist state and its reproductive
capital are determined by the movements and character of
the extended processes of reproduction; the demands of the
system of private capital accumulation. In this respect
the constant and variable reproductive capital of the
state upholds, and is determined by, the movement of
relations of production and the productive forces; they
are interlinked and mutually dependent.
However, consider for a moment a basic tenet of
current monetarist dogma, as often parrotted by Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher: We are often told, 'the private
sector creates wealth, the public sector consumes it' as
a justification for privatisation and massive cutbacks in
expenditure on health, educational and social services.
They are asserted to be a drain on private capital requiring
extensive curtailment. The nationalised industries are
being\pruned into forms where their surplus product would
produce surplus value if entered into circulation as
exchange-value in the hands of private capital.
Whilst the real purpose of these moves is to finance
the coercive reproductive forces of the state to support
the restructuring of private capital accumulation, contain
grm"ing permanent surplus population but justified on the
grounds that the public sector consumes wealth, the
monetarists fail or are umdlling to recognise these
services and industries as essential reproductive forces.
Their policy is the continued extension of 'the coercive
reproductive forces at the expense of the socially useful
reproductive forces - a process, incidentally,. initiated
by the Labour Government of the mid-l970s. Expenditure
on military hardware alone is more irrunediatelyfinancially
beneficial to private capital than kidney machines and
school milk.
However, late capitalism faces an unsolvable paradox.
Whichever aspects of its reproductive forces the state
expands or contracts - and increasingly one or other
aspect must be expanded - the contradictory tendency of
reproductive capital is to ultimately accelerate the
decline of productive capital and germinate the seeds of
its potential transformation into socialist forms of
production with the abolition of anarchic and archaic
market forces and the repressive states upon which they
grow increasingly dependent.
Footnotes
H
..
i.e. a universal equivalent (Marx, 1977.
p.46-47)
We might also note at this pOint that
it is the state which produces money
as the universal equivalent. The police
and the judiciary act as the guarantors
of the universal equivalent-and its
inequitable system of distribution.
As opposed to ~imple.reproduction which
results in the consumption of surplus
value. (Handel, 1978. p.597)
See Marx, CAPITAL VOL.2 pp. 81-82 •
A P PEN D I X IV
METHODOLOGY
APPENDIX IV METHODOLOGY
Research for this thesis began in the Winter of 1978.
Prior to the early eighties and the inner city riots there
ot'll'!i Go.
wereAfew publications dealing with the politics of policing.
Of particular importance were The Technology of Political
Control (1977) by Ackroyd et.al., Bowden's Beyond the
Limits of The Law (1978) and Bunyan's The History and
Practice of the Political Police in Britain (1977).
These works proved vital in identifying the key
changes in policing strategy and law enforcement policy
which were taking place in the 1970's. In a similar vein,
the State Research Bulletin provided a detailed chronology
of these changes in the late seventies and early eighties,
many of which effectively by-passed the parliamentary
system.
Since the early eighties there has been a rapid
expansion in publications dealins with issues generated
by recent changes in law and policing. Taken together
these works have formed a grim catalogue of case-studies
on state violence and the abuse of human rights, and have
engendered wider debates on police powers, accountability
and the 'rule of law'.
There are now also a number of published studies
concerned with policing on 1-1erseyside. McLure's Spike
Island (1980) provides a descriptive, almost anecdotal
account of policing in inner-city Liverpool, whilst
Brogden's The Police: Autonomy and Consent (1982) provides
a detailed study of the historical development of the
Liverpool police and its political autono~ from the
local state. Brogden attempts to situate the development
of the Liverpool police within class relations and identify
the processes by which the police express class interests.
Apart from Rohner's New Statesman articles on the
'K' Division incidents, there is also Scraton's articles
in Causes for Concern (Scraton and Gordon 1984), which
examine these incidents within the context of the existing
framework of police accountability, and in particular that
of chief constables. There is also a detailed study and
informed discussion of the Jimmy Kelly inquest, which
highlights the inadeqUacy of the Coroner's Court as a means
of testing complaints against the police and investigation
of deaths in custody.
Scraton also draws on the recent history of policing
on 11erseyside in his latest publication, The state Of The
Police (1985). This work also embraces the Toxteth riots
and the policing of the miners' strike and provides a useful
overview of the emergence of a 'politically autonomous'
and 'centralised form of policing' in the 1979-85 period.
1984-5 also saw the appearance of two studies on policing
on f.1erseysideby Richard Kinsey and Barry Loveday, funded
by Merseyside County Council. Kinsey's Merseyside Crime
Study (1984-5) took the form of a series of surveys on
police and public attitudes about crime and 'law and order'.
Conducted in terms of consumer demand and presented almost
as a piece of market research, the findings show some
interesting results on the perception of crime, but reveal
practically nothing about the nature and role of policing
in the working class communities of inner Liverpool,
Kirkby and st. Helens.
Loveday's report (The Role and Effectiveness of The
Merseyside Folice Committee, 1985) provides some useful
material on policing on Merseyside. The direct recruit-
ment of Army personnel based in West Germany in the 1970's
to alleviate manpower deficiencies in divisions such as
Knowsley (p.10) is of particulgr interest. Also of interest
are the extracts from Loveday's interview with Assistant
Chief Constable David Gerty (the external investigator of
the complaints against the police in 'K' Division in 1979).
This thesis, whilst based upon much of the recent
history of policing on r'1erseyside,as covered in the above
publications, attempts to provide'more of an in-depth
political analysis of the changing forms of policing in
Britain during the recent period and their specific develop-
ment in working class communi ties on r,lerseyside. It has
not been the intention to provide a definitive political
economy of policing under late capitalism, but rather to
make a contribution in this direction. Despite the now
considerable number of radical publications concerned with
contemporary policing, very few have attempted to system-
atically develop a political economy of policing under
modern capitalism.
The central elements of this study have been concerned
with theoretical analysis of the changing forms of policing
in Britain, and research into the content of these changes
in terms of both their internal dynamics and their relation
to wider social, economic and political processes.
The material used in this study has been drawn from
a number of primary and secondary sources. In Part I,
the research of police historians and contemporary journal-
ism were used to analyse and illustrate changing forms of
policing in Britain. These sources. provided the basis
for examining the development of law enforcement policies
in the policing of working class communities. Part I also
draws upon existing research and theoretical works on
issues concerned with the state, policing and law enforce-
ment. The material on the policing of public order situa-
tions is drawn from newspaper reports, books and journals.
A detailed case-study based on observation of the policing
of an anti-fascist demonstration is also provided, along
with photographs from numerous public order situations
observed during the early 1980's.
These themes are further developed and analysed in
Part 2. This section provides a detailed analysis of the
recent history and politics of policing in the Merseyside
area, with a particular focus upon the Knowsley district.
The 'material for this section was drawn from journals,
newspapers and published police documents and reports of
Lancashire Constabulary and Merseyside Folice. These
included the Annual and Occasional Reports of Chief
Constables along with Council and Folice Committee minutes,
reports and Working Group papers. The Chapple Report on
the policing of Kirkby was examined in detail and used to
illustrate, the relation between ideology and law enforce-
ment policy, and the process by which policing in the
borough area was transformed. This is followed by case-
studies on reactive policing in the Knowsley area.
Material on the 'K' Division incidents was drawn from
newspapers and from Rob Rohrer's New Statesman article.
Two later cases are based on court proceedings.
Part 3 begins with a detailed case-study on the death
in police custody of Jimmy Kelly. This work included
attending the inquest proceedings and examining the
transcript of the sixteen-day inquiry. Other sources of
material for this section were drawn from Police Committee
reports, law reports, statutory legislation, the files of
the Jimmy Kelly Action Committee and relevant existing
literature on the police. The Police Committee study is
also supplemented with notes from an interview with Police
Commi ttee Chairperson r.1argaretSimey in 1981.
As an appendix to the study is a survey of youth
opinion on policing in Kirkby, conducted in the winter
of 1981-2. The questionnaire, administered to 251 students
at Kirkby Technical College, was comprised of both fixed-
alternative and open-ended questions. The sample of
students who completed the qUestionnaire included students
on YOPS, apprenticeship, social care, business and
academic courses. The survey provided a general indica-
(tion of the impact of reactive policing strategies on Kirkby
youth.
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